Unity and complexity in Plato's conception of the soul by Bourlogianni, Xanthippi
Durham E-Theses
Unity and complexity in Plato’s conception of the
soul
Bourlogianni, Xanthippi
How to cite:
Bourlogianni, Xanthippi (2008) Unity and complexity in Plato’s conception of the soul, Durham theses,
Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/2407/
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or
charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details.
Academic Support Office, Durham University, University Office, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP
e-mail: e-theses.admin@dur.ac.uk Tel: +44 0191 334 6107
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk
Unity and Complexity in Pnato's Conception of the Soul 
Xanthippi Bourlogianni 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the 
author or the university to which it was 
submitted. No quotation from it, or 
information derived from it may be 
published without the prior written 
consent of the author or university, and 
any information derived from it should be 
acknowledged. 
A thesis submitted to the 
Department of Classics and Ancient History 
Durham University 
In accordance with the requirements for the 
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
2008 
1 8 DEC 2008 
Declaration 
I confirm that no part of the material offered has previously been submitted by me for 
a degree in this or any other University. 
This thesis is exclusively based on my own research. 
Material from the work of others has been acknowledged and quotations and 
paraphrases suitably indicated. 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be 
published without her prior consent and information taken from it should be 
acknowledged. 
Abstract 
In this thesis I examine Plato's conception of the soul in the Republic. I attempt to 
show that Plato in the Republic regards the human soul as something unitary and that 
the unity the human soul possesses is compatible with the complexity and plurality 
that the soul displays. I wish to argue that the nature and the unity of the soul, which 
is expressed by the fact that the soul desires the good as the whole, is not adequately 
revealed in the arguments of the division of the soul in Book 4 of the Republic. In 
Book 4 the reader is presented with a divided soul that is characterized by internal 
conflict. I suggest that one would achieve better understanding of the unity of the soul 
and its rational nature if one followed the 'longer road' that Socrates recommends in 
Republic Book 6. The 'longer road', which involves a better methodology, would 
also provide one with more adequate understanding of the relation between the parts 
of the soul and the relationship between the parts and the whole. I suggest that a 
proper understanding of the nature of the soul as a unity and a whole involves the 
assumption that one part is not in essential opposition to the other parts and the whole, 
as it appeared to be the case in Book 4. Consequently radically separate parts do not 
need to be accepted in the soul. 
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Introduction 
In this thesis I examine Plato's conception of the soul in the Republic. I attempt to 
show that Plato in the Republic regards the human soul as something unitary and that 
the unity the human soul possesses is compatible with the complexity and plurality 
that the soul displays. I wish to argue that the unity of the soul, which is expressed by 
the fact that the soul as a whole desires the good, is not adequately revealed in the 
arguments of the division of the soul in Book 4 of the Republic. In Book 4 the reader 
is presented with a divided soul, which is characterized by internal conflict. A 
different approach is needed so that one may grasp adequately the nature of the soul 
and its unity. I wish to suggest that one would reach better understanding of the 
nature of the soul and its unity if one followed the 'longer way' that Socrates 
recommends in Republic Book 6. The understanding of the nature of the soul and its 
unity would not exclude the presence of complexity in the soul. This would also 
provide one with adequate understanding of the relation between the parts of the soul 
and the relationship between the parts and the whole. A proper understanding of the 
nature of the soul as a whole would involve the assumption that one part is not in 
essential opposition to the other parts and the whole, as appeared to be the case in 
Book4. 
In attempting to show that Plato takes the human soul to be unitary, I also wish to 
indicate that there is continuity in Plato's conception of the soul throughout the 
dialogues or at least greater continuity than it is often recognized. I am not going to 
discuss general issues pertaining to the continuity and consistency in Plato's thought. 
Furthermore, I am not going to undertake an extensive comparison of the Republic 
with other dialogues. However, in attempting to trace Plato's conception of the parts 
of the soul in the Republic and how he understands the relation between the parts to 
each other and the relation between the whole and the parts, I shall attempt to provide 
an interpretation of the Republic which will allow the views expressed in this dialogue 
to appear continuous with views expressed in dialogues which are normally 
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understood to be either earlier, such as the Gorgias, or later, such as the Theaetetus, 
the Sophist, the Phaedrus, and the Timaeus. 
There are many questions that arise regarding the treatment of the soul in the 
Republic and the relation of such treatment with both earlier and later dialogues. One 
question is whether and how far Plato in the Republic rejects so-called Socratic 
intellectualism. The argument for the division of the soul in the Republic is often 
interpreted as signalling Plato's distancing himself from the psychology of the so-
called earlier dialogues. On the other hand, there are issues of consistency and 
continuity that concern the relation between the Republic and later dialogues. For 
instance, while in dialogues such as the Timaeus and the Phaedrus Plato appears to be 
still committed to the tripartition of the soul, in the Philebus the theory of tripartition 
seems to be absent, while in the Laws a bipartite scheme seems to be in use. 
Moreover, there is apparent divergence in the later dialogues concerning the nature of 
the disembodied soul. Therefore, in the Phaedrus the disembodied soul is apparently 
tripartite while in the Timaeus it seems to be the case that only one part is considered 
to be immortal. 
It seems to me that a fundamental question one has to deal with is whether Plato 
takes the soul to be a complex or a simple entity whether embodied or disembodied. 
Furthermore, one may ask whether Plato in the Republic and in the later dialogues 
conceives the soul to be something complex and whether he conceives such 
complexity to undermine the soul's unity; if not, how the parts are precisely related to 
each other so that the soul can appear to be something rational and unitary. 
I am going to suggest that Plato in the Republic remains committed to the so-
called basic Socratic tenets, such as the thesis that the soul desires the good, the 
corresponding involuntariness of wrongdoing and the thesis that wrongdoing is or 
involves ignorance. These 'paradoxes' are in my opinion related to Plato's conception 
of the soul as an entity that is unitary and essentially rational. Therefore, I attempt to 
provide an account of the parts of the soul in the Republic that will not undermine the 
soul's unity. I believe that such account can be also applied to later dialogues such as 
the Phaedrus and the Timaeus in relation to which I shall suggest that the soul, both 
embodied and disembodied, is considered to be complex. 
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Issues of consistency and interpretation emerge not only concerning the relation 
of the Republic to other dialogues but also inside the Republic itself. The main focus 
of my thesis will be on questions of interpretation that concern the Republic. The 
argument for the division of the soul in Book 4 is commonly interpreted as indicating 
the acceptance of good-independent desires in the soul, and more generally as 
signifying the rejection of the intellectualist position of the earlier dialogues. 
However, in Book 6 Socrates asserts that the good is the aim of human action and 
attributes human failure to ignorance of the good (505e). Furthermore, in asserting 
that all souls desire the good, Socrates appears to indicate the unity of the soul. Thus 
one may ask whether Socrates 'claims in Book 6 can be reconciled with the division 
of the soul in Book 4. 
Furthermore, in the course of his discussion of the immortality of the soul in Book 
10 (6lla-612a) Socrates indicates that the nature of the soul has not been adequately 
revealed in his discussion of the soul in the earlier Books of the Republic. Socrates' 
claims in Book 1 0 can be associated with the warning he has addressed against his 
approach to the soul in Book 4 ( 435c-d) and that he has been repeated in Book 6 
(504b). The question arises whether Socrates' account of the soul in the earlier Books 
is inadequate or fails, and if it is inadequate, where precisely this inadequacy lies. 
Furthermore, if the arguments for the division of the soul are taken to be inadequate 
one may ask why Socrates has introduced these arguments in the first place. 
In my thesis I suggest that the inadequacy of Socrates' arguments lies in the fact 
that Socrates has not tried to provide an account of the nature or essence of the soul. 
Furthermore, I assume that to accept that the soul has a nature is also to accept that the 
soul is something unitary. The argument for the division of the soul did not provide an 
account of the nature of the soul, but rather it attempted to provide an account of the 
nature of the parts of the soul. Furthermore, it did not indicate that the soul has unity. 
More specifically, the argument in Book 4 rested on the assumption that there can be 
straightforward opposition in the soul, and in order to accommodate such opposition 
Socrates separated the opposing factors. In separating the elements of the soul, 
Socrates indicated that the soul is not something self-contradictory. However, I 
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believe that the account of the soul as something unitary is a stronger assumption than 
the assumption that it is not self-contradictory. 
I shall attempt to show that the acceptance of the soul's unity, which is indicated 
in Books 6-7 and also in Book 1 0, is not compatible with the radical separation of the 
parts that has been established in Book 4. It is not compatible with the conception of 
the parts as opposites, and also with the presence of direct and straightforward 
opposition in the soul. Reciprocal separation of parts has been introduced as a 
consequence of the presence of opposition in the soul. I think that the unity of the 
soul entails both that the elements themselves are not in essential opposition to each 
other and also particular instances of conflict or opposition tend to be resolved. I shall 
suggest that to accept that the soul has a unity and a whole is to accept that the parts 
depend on the whole and are also interrelated and interconnected. 
Nevertheless, separation of parts can b.e seen as a first step towards achieving 
and establishing the unity of the soul. I am going to suggest that in separating the 
parts of the soul Plato's primary aim is to establish the potential for reason's 
autonomy in the soul. Furthemiore, I believe that reason's separation from the lower 
parts is necessary for the unity of the soul. The unity of the soul is due to the presence 
of reason in it. Reason can integrate the different elements in the soul by imposing 
order and harmony to them. More precisely, I believe that the unity of the soul 
presupposes that the lower parts of the soul are dependent on reason and not separate 
or independent from reason. Therefore, I believe that there are no desires in the soul 
independent from reason. The lower elements' sharing in reason is not uniform in the 
human soul and thus there is room for irrationality or conflict. But ultimately, there is 
no 'part' of the soul which is completely outside reason's sphere of influence. Finally, 
the assumption that the lower parts of the soul are not separate from reason, while 
reason can be separate from them, indicates, on the one hand, the possibility of the 
autonomy of human soul while embodied and, at the same time, the possibility of 
harmony in the soul's relationship with the body and the sensible world. 
In the first part of the thesis I discuss the argument for the division of the soul and 
the account of the virtues in Book 4 of the Republic. I examine the relationship 
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between the parts of the soul and the relationship between the parts and the whole that 
the argument for the division of the soul seeks to establish. Then, I discuss the 
account of the virtues of justice and sophrosune in Book 4 in order to trace the 
relation between the parts of the soul that these virtues involve. I associate justice 
with separation and sophrosune with unity. I eventually suggest that both justice as 
separation of elements and also sophrosune as unity of elements depend on reason's 
activity. 
In the second part of the thesis I discuss Socrates' warning that a longer road is 
needed in order to acquire better understanding of the soul. I attempt to speculate on 
what a longer way would involve and to trace the inadequacy of the arguments for the 
division of the soul. Furthermore, I attempt to provide an account of the relationship 
between the parts of the soul and the soul as a whole. Then, I discuss the account of 
the soul that Plato provides in Book 10 in the context of the discussion of the soul's 
immortality. I suggest that Plato conceives the nature of the soul as something unitary 
which desires the good as a whole and as something simultaneously complex. Finally 
I attempt to discuss the question of how justice would be conceived in relation to a 
soul that is not characterized by conflict. 
In the third part of the thesis I discuss more extensively the conflict between 
reason and appetite that Socrates discovers in the soul in Book 4. I attempt to indicate 
that Plato in the context of the argument in Book 4 is not aiming at rejecting the 
position that the soul essentially desires the good. Then I discuss Socrates' assertion 
in Book 6 that the good is the aim of human action. I attempt to provide an account of 
human desire and action that does justice to this assertion. Finally, I conclude my 
thesis with a discussion of the arguments concerning the nature of pleasure in Book 9. 
I suggest that Plato's account of the nature of pleasure indicates the unity of the soul 
as a unity between reason and desire. 
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Part I 
Parts of the Soul and tb.e Virtues in Book 4 of t.he Republic 
Chapter 1 
The principle of opposites and the division of the soul 
Some preliminary questions 
The argument for the division of the soul is introduced in order to settle a 
question that Socrates carefully formulates at 436a8-b4. Socrates has already 
distinguished between three kinds or characters (eide te kai ethe, 435el) and has 
attributed these characters to the soul. His grounds have been that these kinds or 
forms of behaviour characterize cities or nations and their origin cannot be something 
other than the individual (435d9-436a6). The difficult question is whether we do each 
ofthese three things1 with the soul as a whole, or with different elements in the soul: 
TobE b£ fJbll xaAEnov, Ei -rc;J ainc;J -rou-rc,u £Kaa-ra 7LQlh-ro~J.EV fJ 'rQLai.v 
oumv MAo MAc,u· ~J.av8avo!J.EV !J.EV hf.Qc,u, 8U!J.OU!J.E8a b£ aN\c,u -rwv f.v 
1 Socrates at 435el mentions kinds and characters (ELbTJ TE Kai. f)8f]). At 436a9-bl, he seems to refer 
to mental activities or functions such as desiring, learning, being angry, which are treated as forms of 
action (nQanowv 436a8-9, b2-3). There is implicit association between character (e.g. the 
c:ptAof.!a8ec;, 8Uf.!OELbec; c:ptAoxQ~f.laTov 435e-436a) and mental activities such as desiring or 
learning. The association also indicates a connection between internal activity and external behaviour. 
The parts of the soul are (fJ8TJ) are associated with characters also in Book 10, (604e2, 605a5). Parts of 
the soul are most commonly called dbfJ, but also yivTJ (e.g. 44lc6). The term f.!EQOc; occurs at 
442bl0, c4, 444b3, and 58la6. 
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fJf.iiv, bn8u~oU~EV b' av 'tQL'tYJ 'tLVL 'tWV 71EQL rolV 'tQOcpijv 'tE Kal y£vv11aLV 
i]bovwv Kat oaa 'tm:nwv abEAcpa, Tl oAt;~ 't1j t~Jux1J Ka8' eKaa'tOV aV'tWV 
71QlX't'tO~EV, O'taV OQ~i]aw~EV. TaV't1 Ea'taL 'tCt XME71Ct bLOQLaa8aL al;,(w<; 
A6you. 
'But the matter begins to be difficult when you ask whether we do all these 
things with the same thing or whether there are three things and we do one thing with 
one and one with another-learn with one part of ourselves, feel anger with another, 
and with yet a third desire the pleasures of nutrition and generation and their kind, or 
whether it is with the entire soul that we function in each case when we once begin. 
That is what is really hard to determine properly .... Let us then attempt to define the 
boundary and decide whether they are identical to with one another in this way' 
(trans. by Shorey). 
On the basis of the argument for the division of the soul Socrates is going to 
suggest that we do not do each of these things with the soul as a whole, but rather 
with different elements in us ( 439d4-8, 441 c4-6). Many commentators have observed 
that since Socrates has already distinguished different kinds of behaviour or mental 
activity the parts of the soul must be something more than these different functions or 
forms of mental activity. 2 The question that arises is what these parts are precisely and 
how Socrates conceives their relationship with the soul. 
There are a variety of opinions concerning the character of the parts of the soul 
and the question of whether the parts of the soul should be considered to be different 
subjects. Woods (1987) argues that we need something more than three types of 
mental function, and that the division of the soul does not consist in a three-fold 
classification of mental phenomena (pp. 24-5, p. 47).3 Woods understands the 
argument for the division of the soul as establishing different sources of psychic 
activity or action (p. 25). However, he argues that the parts are not subjects and 
maintains that the soul as a whole constitutes the subject of desires (pp. 34-5). 
2 See Crombie (1962), p. 345, Woods (1987) p. 30 ff., Irwin (1995) p. 203, Bobonich (2002) pp. 224-
5. 
3 Woods more specifically objects to Cooper's interpretation (Cooper (1984) pp. 3-21). 
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Crombie (1962) much earlier than Woods has argued that the argument for the 
division of the soul is aiming at establishing different sources or origins for psychic 
activity: 'We conclude that when Plato talks about parts of the soul he is talking about 
acts which we perform, desires that we have, things in which we take delight. These 
are divided into three kinds because we acquire the propensity to perform these acts 
and the susceptibility to these feelings from three different sources' (p. 355). 
However, Crombie seems to understand the principle of opposites as establishing 
different subjects in the soul (p. 345), even though he believes that such a conception 
of the parts of the soul is absurd.4 Price (1995) also declines to call the parts of the 
soul subjects or agents even though he recognizes that Plato may talk about them as if 
they are subjects (p. 54). He suggests that 'a subject of an activity cannot also be the 
aspect of another subject in respect of which this subject performs it' (p. 54). Price 
argues that the parts 'should rather be conceived on the analogy of physical spaces or 
fields that contain things' (p. 54). He defines a psychic part as a 'home of a family of 
desires and beliefs that that have a tendency to stand in relations both of strong 
contrariety and confrontation with members of any other family but not of their own' 
(p. 53). 
Bobonich (2002) p. 217 characterizes the parts of the soul as subjects: 'the 
person is a compound of distinct agent-like parts that are themselves the proper or 
ultimate subjects of beliefs, desires and other psychological states and activities.' He 
views the parts of the soul as having characteristics of a person (p. 219 and p. 220) 
and he believes that each part can move the agent to act without the cooperation of 
other parts (p. 220). Unlike Woods and Price, Bobonich does not recognize the soul as 
a whole as the subject of mental activities (p. 219). Finally Lorenz (2006), who adopts 
an interpretation of the overall strategy of the argument quite similar to the 
4 Crombie (1962) p. 354 maintains that while the argument in Book 4, as well as what Plato says later 
in Book 9 (580-1) give the impression that Plato conceives the three parts are distinct subjects or souls, 
'this impression must be misleading' since 'a conception of a committee of three souls animating a 
body, and struggling for the control of its members is intrinsically absurd'. Nevertheless Crombie 
believes that Book 4 suggests distinct subjects (see p. 354 and pp. 365-68) and he eventually argues 
that the principle of opposites and the argument in Book 4 should not be taken seriously (p. 354-355). 
According to Crombie, different origins of action could be established by a weaker principle (p. 354-
355). 
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interpretation propounded by Bobonich, views the parts of the soul as responsible for 
motivating conditions (pp. 19-20) He also characterizes the parts as subjects of 
motivating conditions (p. 20). However, he argues that it does not follow that a 
particular desire cannot be attributed to the soul (as a whole) at all (p. 21). He clarifies 
that 'we and our souls are (derivative) subjects or bearers of such motivating 
conditions in virtue of the fact that parts of our soul are the (proper) subjects of such 
conditions' (p. 28). 
Now I wish first to argue that city-soul analogy 
indeed suggests that Socrates seeks to establish something like different subjects or 
agents in the soul. Socrates needs to establish that the definition of justice, which has 
already been reached in the case of the city, can apply to the soul. The verb 7IQcX'r'rHV 
(436a8-b3) that Socrates uses to refer to different forms of psychic activity, alludes to 
the definition of justice in the city as 'ra au'tou 7IQ£Xrr'rHV (Kai. 1-n1 
rroi\urrQ£XYf-!OVE'iv) for each part or class of the city (433a8-9).5 For the definition of 
justice to apply to the soul we need to view the soul as analogous to the city that has 
been constructed by Socrates. It may be argued that three functions or forms of 
behaviour and activity are present in any city, as Socrates suggested that they are 
present in every soul. What is characteristic of Kallipolis, is that different activities or 
roles have been separated from each other by being assigned to different groups of 
people. While, for example, in democratic Athens all citizens are involved in ruling 
and deliberation concerning the common interest, in Kallipolis, as a result of 'justice', 
this role is assigned to a particular group of people. In the case of the soul we need to 
see whether something analogous is or can be the case, in other words whether 
different functions or activities can be separated and be assigned to different 'parts' of 
5 I wish to clarify that the activity in question is mental activity and not external action. While 'doing 
one's own' applies to agents in the city in terms of external action, in the case of the soul it applies to 
mental activity. Internal action is clearly distinguished from external action at 443c9-d2. Psychic 
activity is modelled on external action but the two kinds of action are not confused and certainly 
internal action is not reduced to external behaviour. Justice in the soul is primarily a form of internal 
action and only secondarily external action (443c9 ff.). One should not assume that if the inferior parts 
of the soul are considered as explanations of certain forms of internal activity, they are also considered 
to be sufficient explanations of external action or behaviour. I am going later to suggest that they are 
not sufficient explanations of any kind of action, whether internal or external. 
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the soul. Thus it appears that for the definition of justice to hold in the case of the 
soul, Socrates has to establish not merely different functions or activities, rather 
different subjects or parts to which these activities can be attributed. 
However, in order to draw more specific conclusions I firstly wish to discuss 
the argument for the division of the soul in detail. I am going to follow the main lines 
of Woods' interpretation of the argument and argue against the interpretation of the 
argument in Book 4 that has been propounded by Bobonich because such an 
interpretation does not allow the soul to appear as something unitary, and the subject 
of motivation in any way. I am going to argue that the soul is presented as the 
qualified subject of certain activities. The parts themselves are these activities or 
functions, and what Socrates primarily establishes is that these activities are actually 
or potentially independent from each other. As I understand the argument, it does not 
exactly establish different parts as subjects or loci or sources of such activities. Rather 
it shows that these activities may constitute separate 'parts' in the soul. This 
separation, whilst it can be expressed in spatial terms, ultimately indicates the 
potential at least independence of certain activities from each other. Such 
independence perhaps may lead one to assume that they do have different sources. 6 
Eventually in a different section I will return to the argument for the division 
of the soul and argue that more generally Plato does not believe that the parts of the 
soul are autonomous from each other in the way at least that the argument for the 
division of the soul seeks to present them. Furthermore, if one understands Plato as 
trying to establish different sources of motivations, what the argument at best 
achieves is to indicate that there are partially different sources of motivation. 
6 Eventually Socrates seems to imply that there are different sources or origins of the opposite attitudes 
at 439c10-d2. 
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The principle of opposites and its application 
The principle of opposites, which when applied to the soul yields different 'parts', 
is introduced at 436b9-c27: ~fiAov on -rcn'.rrov -ravaV'tla nou::'iv fl mxaxnv Ka'ta 
-rau-r6v Y£ Kai. 71QO~ -rau-rov OUK £8£AT]an CXfla, WU't£ av 710U El1QlaKWfl£V f.v 
au-ro'i~ -rav-ra yLyvOf1£Va, da6f1£8a on ou -rau-rov fjv aAAa nA£[w. 
'It is obvious that the same thing will never do or suffer8 opposites in the same 
respect in relation to the same thing and at the same time. So if ever we find these 
contradictions in the functions of the mind we shall know that it was not the same 
thing functioning but a plurality' (trans. by Shorey). 
According to R. Stailey and C. Bobonich, the statement of the principle opens 
two possibilities for a solution in the case of the soul. 9 One possibility that the 
principle seems to allow is that the soul is not one thing, rather it is or it comprises a 
plurality of entities or parts, as long as the opposition is in the same respect in relation 
to the same thing and at the same time. The other possibility is not to deny that we 
7 I call the principle that is introduced here 'principle of opposites' following Robinson (1971 a) p. 380, 
Irwin (1977a) p. 327 Woods (1987) p. 3. Robinson (1971a), p. 39 distinguishes the principle from the 
law of contradiction. Woods (1987) p. 33 disagrees with Robinson (197la) and denies that the 
principle is a formal one rather he argues that it is a 'substantial one'. I am more inclined to see the 
principle of opposites in a way similar to Robinson (197la) p. 48. In anachronistic terms perhaps it can 
be characterized as an a priori principle, since I think that it is not taken by Plato to be derived from or 
confirmed on the basis of observation. Woods (1987) p. 32 argues that if the principle is a purely 
formal principle there will be no question of disputing its validity; the question will simply be whether 
it is correctly applied in this case to yield the conclusion that Plato wants to establish. Since the 
principle is accepted as a hypothesis (437a5-6), it is possible to dispute its validity, but I think not on 
grounds (or at least merely on the grounds) of observation. The validity of the principle should be 
ultimately defended or rejected by dialectic and by reference to other hypotheses. 
8 In a later formulation of the principle 'do or suffer opposites' is supplemented with 'be opposites' 
(437a1). 
9 See Stailey (1975) p. 115-8 and Bobonich (2002) p. 223. According to Stailey (1975) p. 115, 'Plato 
wishes to draw a distinction between saying that something is not affected with regard to the same and 
saying that two or more different entities are involved in it'. 
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have one thing, rather to qualify the opposition by showing that it is not Ka'!a 
'!athov (in the same part or respect). Stalley and Bobonich have objected to the 
more 'traditional,to interpretation, according to which it is shown that the opposition 
is not Ka'!a '!IXU'!OV in respect of the same thing (or part). They maintain that 
Socrates shows that the soul is divided into different subjects or entities, or into 
different parts. 11 In my discussion of the argument I shall follow the more 
'traditional' path, and recognize no real distinction between respects and parts and 
thus that the soul does not suffer opposites Ka'!a '!IXU'!OV. Thus, in my opinion, the 
soul as a whole remains the qualified subject of the opposition. 
Disagreement to a great extent has ansen because of the two apparent 
counterexamples of co-presence of opposites that Socrates is immediately going to 
discuss in order to defend and clarify his principle. Socrates applies the principle of 
opposites- to a man who stands still and moves his hands and his head (436c9-d2), and 
also to a spinning top which can be said to revolve while staying on the same spot 
( 436d4-e5). It has been maintained that the two examples receive different treatment. 
According to Stailey (1975) and Bobonich (2002), in the case of the man the 
application of the principle yields different parts or subjects, whereas in the case of 
the spinning top it yields different respects. On the basis of these examples they argue 
that the principle of opposites is applied to the soul in a way analogous to the way that 
it is applied to the man and not to the spinning top. 
10 This interpretation seems to be adopted by Robinson (197la), and is also propounded by Woods 
(1987) in particular pp. 33-5, Price (1995) p.40-l, Irwin (1977a) p. 191 and pp. 326-8 and Irwin (1995) 
p. 204. 
11 Stailey (197 5) p. 113 argues that the expression kata tauton should not be translated as 'in the same 
part' (or in respect of the same part), rather should be translated 'in the same respect'. Thus he 
distinguishes between parts and respects and argues that the soul is divided in different parts and not in 
different respects. There is a difference between the interpretation of the principle propounded by 
Bobonich on the one hand and Lorenz (2006) on the other hand, even though Lorenz follows Stailey 
and Bobonich. Lorenz also draws a distinction between 'parts' and 'respects'. According to Lorenz the 
soul somehow remains one thing even though it has different parts and not respects, while Bobonich 
assumes that the soul does not remain one thing, rather we have separate subjects. Thus Lorenz seems 
to believe that the 'ontology' that the argument yields involves three different kinds of entities: A 
simple entity, an entity which is complex but has different respects, like the spinning top (p. 24, n. 14) 
and an entity that is complex in that it has 'parts'. 
13 
Two main arguments can be adduced in support of their interpretation. First of 
all the redescription of the two examples is different. In the first example different 
parts feature as grammatical subjects of the verbs denoting motion and stability 
( 436d 1-2), while in the case of the spinning top the object as a whole remains the 
subject and it is qualified by showing that the opposition is not KaTa TaUTOV (436el-
2). The second argument concerns the thesis that the spinning top is divided into parts. 
Both commentators argue that motion and rest in the case of the spinning top cannot 
be associated with different parts. It is the whole circle, which moves and stays still. 
We cannot in other words attribute motion to one part of the spinning top and rest to 
another12. On these grounds and on the basis of the fact that later Socrates treats the 
parts of the soul as grammatical subject it has been argued that the soul, unlike the 
spinning top is not divided into different respects, rather into distinct 'parts' or 
'entities' which are also the subjects of different forms of psychic activity. 
I wish now to deal with the first argument. The spinning top does have 'parts' 
and the circumference and the straight line/axis are indeed presented as parts of it. 
Stailey and Bobonich are right in arguing that there is no part of the spinning top that 
is at rest or in motion, provided that we understand 'part' in one sense of the term. I 
think that the importance of the second example lies in the fact that Plato wants to 
convey a more abstract notion of 'parts' and a corresponding notion of complexity, a 
notion that in my opinion is more applicable to the soul. The circumference and the 
straight line of the spinning-top are geometrical parts that cannot be reached by some 
short of physical division. 13 Physical division could proceed ad infinitum and would 
12 More precisely Bobonich (2002) p. 230 argues that it is not the case that only the circumference is 
standing still and he maintains that the whole top stands still since the whole top continues to occupy 
the same space. Bobonich, like Stalley ((1975) p.112) maintains that the problem is resolved by 
recognizing different kinds of motion (p. 231). Stalley (1975) p. 112 also argues that the spinning top 
moves while staying in one spot: 'Any part of it, however small its extension, must therefore be 
moving'. See also Cross and Woozley ( 1964) p. 116, who have made a similar point. 
13 Shields (2001) resting on this passage argues that we have 'conceptual parts' which he also suggests 
the soul involves. Shields distinguishes between 'conceptual', 'aggregative' and 'organic' parts (146-
7). He believes that the soul according to Plato is essentially simple and he argues that the parts that the 
argument in Book 4 establishes are compatible with simplicity, because they are solely conceptual parts 
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not yield a part that stands still. Thus, I think that separate parts in this case are 
reached by reason through some process of abstraction, which aims at making 
opposition specific. Furthermore, it seems to me that the fact that we have different 
kinds of parts in the case of the human body and in the case of the spinning top does 
not undermine Plato's principle or his argument since this principle involves no 
restriction on what counts as part and what not. Any given entity, or anything that we 
independently accept to be one entity, in which opposition is present in relation to the 
same thing and at the same time has to be considered to be complex and to have parts 
of a certain kind. Opposition may not constitute the sole criterion of complexity, but 
this is the criterion that Socrates provides in this context. 
Perhaps at this stage I should also discuss the question of whether spatial 
language needs to be applied in the case of the parts of the soul. In the case of the 
spinning top the 'parts' or 'respects' are not specified as rest and motion themselves, 
rather as the circumference and the axis. These seem to be treated as spatial parts, 
which the opposites, which in this case are rest and motion, can be associated with. In 
the case of the soul however, in the course of the argument it will tum out that the 
parts are the psychic activities themselves. 14 If the parts of the soul are considered to 
be kinds of motion, or if they are considered to be analogous to physical motion, 15 
then it seems to be the case that the parts are not something which contain the 
opposites, or something other than the opposites in which the opposites can be 
and conceptual parts in his opinion are compatible with simplicity. I am not sure that the argument in 
Book 4 really establishes one conception of the parts at the expense of the other. The parts of the soul 
certainly appear to be 'organic', since according to Shields' definition organic parts are 'functionally 
defmed entities' (p.l46) and the parts of the soul are certainly functionally defmed. Furthermore, as I 
am going to suggest later, it may also look as though we have 'aggregative parts' since no principle of 
unity is established which would show how functions are unified. But more generally, as I am going to 
suggest in the following chapters Shields is right in maintaining (p. 149) that the argument for the 
division of the soul, since it rests on experience, cannot establish anything essential about the soul at all 
and thus also whether it is essentially simple or complex and precisely in what way it is complex. 
14 This becomes clear at 439a9 where thirst is specified as one of the two respects to which the soul is 
divided. I should note here that both Bobonich (2002) p. 233 and Stailey (1975) p. 116 are in my 
opinion mistaken in assuming that there is no mention of different respects after some point in the 
argument. 
15 See 437bl-5. 
15 
located, or by reference to which they can be distinguished like the 'circumference' 
and the 'axis'. The text indicates that the parts are the opposite movements 
themselves. Socrates does not mention something further in the soul which contains 
the opposites and which is a part of the soul. If there is something that is presented as 
having or containing the opposites this is the soul, in which the opposites are said to 
be (439c6-7). Now as I am going to argue more extensively, Plato's primary aim is to 
encourage us to consider these mental activities as separate. Spatial language is 
certainly helpful because it is easier to think of them as separate if we allocate them to 
different spatial 'parts' of the soul or if we imagine them as occupying different 
places in a container, which is the soul. 16 Nevertheless, in my opinion, what is the 
primary aim is this form of separation or distinction of activities in the mind, and 
possibly spatial language of this kind may be considered to be dispensable in the 
end. 17 
Now I would like to discuss more extensively the two apparent 
counterexamples. The two apparent counterexamples are treated in the same way and 
the application of the principle yields descriptions that are logically equivalent. In 
both cases Socrates objects to a mistaken description of the case and he supplies an 
alternative formulation that protects the speaker from contradiction. While the two 
16 This opens the more general question whether the soul is to be considered as a spatial entity. The 
later dialogues in presenting the soul as self -motion point to this direction. I think that again the parts 
of the soul would not be somehow places in the soul rather they would be different kinds of 
0 
movements. 
17 For this reason I am not sure whether Price's (1995) characterization of the parts of the soul as 
homes of different affections (pp. 53-55) is correct. Now it is true encouraged to see the parts as 
somehow containing many desires and they can be seen as 'homes' of a number of desires. However 
what the argument strictly speaking establishes is that thirst constitutes one part of the soul. One 
question is whether the desires for example that are attributed to the appetitive part have something that 
unifies them, apart from the fact that they are all irrational or potentially in opposition with reason. 
Can we indeed say that such desires all have a common origin or source? The argument in Book 4 does 
not really establish such a common origin, and at best it could be said that their common origin is the 
body and certain bodily affections. More generally I think that Plato is not assuming that the appetitive 
part has any kind of internal unity. To present it as a kind of subject of a number of desires or a 
homunculus is to attribute to it a unity that it does not have. I am going to argue later that if there is 
something that can unify different desires this is reason and their common relationship to reason. But 
such relationship is not revealed in the context of the argument for the division of the soul. 
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alternative formulations differ in grammatical terms, I believe that they are logically 
equivalent and interchangeable. 18 
In the case of the first counterexample, namely the man who stands still and 
moves his hands and his head (436c10-d2), Socrates indicates that the principle of 
opposites forbids (OUK av, OLf-laL, cX~LOlf-lEV oihw Atynv bc'lv) saying that the 
same man is in motion and at rest simultaneously (on 6 au-roc; EUUlKE 't:E Kat 
KLVEL't:aL cXf-la). Rather, what we have to say is that one part of him (-ro f-lEV n 
au-rou) stands, another (-ro bf:) stays still. Here the parts of the man feature as the 
grammatical subjects of the two opposites. Nevertheless reference to the man, .to 
whom these parts belong, is not omitted. I think that reference to the man by using 
partitive genitive (-ro f-lEV n au-rou) is necessary to indicate that the man can be seen 
as the qualified subject of (or to) the two opposites, rest and stability, and as the whole 
of which the parts are parts. 
The second counterexample ( 436d4-e5) IS more 
sophisticated (xaQLEv-r((oL-ro 6 -rau-ra Atywv ... KOf.HpEUOf-lEVoc;). The objector 
claims that spinning tops move and stay still as wholes (oi: yc a-rQ6~LAOL oAm 
£a-raa( 't:E cXf.la Kat KLVouv-raL). Socrates objects to this way of putting the case 
and does not recognize the spinning top as a counterexample of the principle. 19 What 
the objector here has failed to predict is that the spinning top can be considered as a 
complex entity. A spinning top constitutes a more sophisticated example because 
18 See also Price (1995) pp. 40-41. 
19 Bobonich (2002) seems to assume that we can say in the case of the spinning top that it moves and 
stays still as a whole and that Socrates agrees with the objector: 'The qualification at Rep 436d5 that it 
is as a whole that a rotating top fixed on a point both moves and is as rest is significant' (p. 229). See 
also Lorenz (2006) p. 24, n. 14 for a similar point. Nevertheless, Socrates clearly rejects the imaginary 
objector's description of the case. The fact that later Socrates uses the spinning top as the grammatical 
subject of motion does not mean that he accepts that one can say that 'the spinning top moves and stays 
still' simpliciter or as a whole. The latter formulation indicates unqualified ascription of opposites to 
the same subject. Socrates rejects unqualified ascription of opposites to the same thing because it 
generates contradiction. Rather we have to delete the initial expression 'as a whole' by providing 
different parts or respects which qualify the opposition. See also Woods (1987) p. 35, n. 30. 
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parts in the spinning top are not easily detectable. Socrates maintains that there are 
indeed parts in the spinning top, the circumference and the straight line or axis 
(cpai~eV av EXHV avrra t:u8u '[f Kai. 71:e(HcpeQE<; f.v aurroi<;20). The spinning top 
stays still in respect of the straight line and moves in respect of the circumference 
(Karra ~t:v rro t:u8u £arravaL..Karra bt: rro TieQLcpeQE<; KuKAcf> KLvt:ia8aL). The 
grammatical subject in this case remains the spinning top, but a qualification is 
provided so that it becomes clear that the spinning top is not in motion and at rest 
simpliciter. Socrates could have said that the circumference of the top revolves while 
the axis is immobile. 
A new formulation of the principle of opposites and a final example are 
provided at the end of the argument for the separation of thirst from reason (437bl-
439b6). Socrates first argues that the soul of the thirsty man in so far as it thirsts 
(Ka8' OUOV bLtPij) desires nothing else but to drink (439a9-bl). The phrase 'Ka8' 
OUOV bLtPij' corresponds to the expression Ka't:ll rraU't:OV in the initial formulation of 
the principle of opposites (436b9-10). H specifies the part or respect, which is thirst 
itself, and which constitutes one of the opposites. More specifically, the phrase 
indicates a respect by reference to which the soul is examined in abstraction from 
whatever other characteristics the soul has or may have.Z1 Socrates says that it 
20 The expression EXELV atha eueu 't:E KaL 7lEQlcpEQE~ f.v lXU't:Ol~ is I think equivalent to the 
expression n) flEV n auwu (436dl). Later in the case of the soul, the soul will be presented as what 
contains the parts (E't:EQOV av n f.v auTf.i ELT] (439b4), f.vEi:vat flEV f.v Tf.i tjlvxfj au-rwv n) 
KEAEUOV, EVELV£Xl bi: 't:O KWAuov nLELV, at\Ao ov) (439c6-8). 
21 The expression thirst in so far as it is thirst is introduced first at 437d7 Ka8' oaov bttjla EU't:l and 
corresponds to the expression thirst itself (au-ra 1:0 btl.Jnlv) where Socrates indicates that he is looking 
at the definition of thirst. This language is introduced by Thrasymachus in Book I, 340d3 ff. Actual 
rulers in so far as they are rulers do not err (34lal). Actual rulers may not be perfect rulers and thus 
actual rulers do err, but they do not err in so far as they are rulers or in so far as they deserve being 
called rulers. By introducing this language Socrates is able to talk about rulers qua rulers, to abstract 
from actual rulers any features which may interfere with the ruling art and thus also to talk about how a 
ruler should be. In a similar fashion thirst in the soul as something that solely desires to drink is or can 
be reached by some sort of abstraction. The problem with such a language is that it encourages the 
assumption that there is somehow a little perfect thirst in the soul as if there is a little perfect ruler 
somehow in actual rulers. 
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follows that if something is holding the soul back while it is thirsty it is something 
other (OUKOUV ... E'rEQOV av n EV avtij ELT]) than the factor or the element that 
desires to drink (-rou bnjJwv-roc;), i.e. thirst as such, (au-ro -ro bnjJe'iv 437e4, 439a4-
5). In other words he indicates that the respect in which something is thirsty is 
different from the respect in which it does not want to drink (since, as it has been 
demonstrated thirst as such aims solely at drinking)_22 Socrates goes on to reformulate 
the principle of opposites: ou yaQ bi), cpa~ev, -r6 ye av-ro -r4J au-r4J eau-rou 7tEQi.. 
'tO au-ro apa -ravaV'rla 7tQcX'r'rOL (439b5-6). In this new formulation the dative 
together with the (partitive) genitive (-r4J au-r4J E:au-rou) corresponds to the 
expression Katit -rau-rov of the earlier formulation23. The genitive indicates the 
relation of the part with the subject that is divided, which is also the whole that 
comprises or contains the parts, viz. thirst as such and the aversion to drinking. The 
dative ( 439b5) here perhaps corresponds also to datives in the initial question whether 
the soul should be divided or not ( 436a9-b 1 ). The parts of the soul, what is thirsty 
(439b2: -rou bnjJwv-roc;, 439c7: -ro KeAeuov) and what objects to drinking (439c7: 
-ro KwAuov), can take the place of the dative. I previously suggested that the part 
which desires solely to drink is thirst as such?4 So as the following example also 
makes clear, opposition in the soul is not Kata -rau-rov .25 
22 I am going to discuss in greater detail how he shows that thirst is distinct from what forbids drinking. 
This distinction depends on the clarification of the object of thirst. If thirst were not simply for drink, 
but for something else as well (e.g. for the good), perhaps it could be argued that thirst were somehow 
responsible for our not drinking, and thus what would forbid us from drinking as well. 
23 See also Woods (1987) p. 40 n. 7. 
24 This also becomes clear at 439bl0-d2, where Socrates says that what inhibits arises from reasoning 
while what drags and draws from affections and diseases. The 'subject' of dragging is the desire. 
25 Bobonich (2002) p. 530 n. 22 argues as follows: 'The position of "fE in 439b5 stresses n) at.n:o and 
emphasizes that Plato's conclusion is that the same thing is not acting. ft:: rarely intrudes in unified 
phrases such as TO mho and its position here makes it clear that the important words are TO atho 
and not Tc;J auTc;J. In my opinion Bobonich is not right in arguing that the subject is being divided. The 
emphatic use of "(E perhaps underlines the fact that the subject should not be divided. The crucial world 
thus is Tc;J auTc;J. That the soul is TO auTo (the same thing) is not denied. 
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Socrates proceeds to offer a final example (439b8-cl), an archer whose hands 
simultaneously push the bow away and draw it towards him. This example is more 
relevant to the case of conflict of desires than the previous ones, since previously we 
had cases of compresence of motion and rest, whereas now there are simultaneous 
opposite movements. Also it has to be noted that here opposite movements are related 
to an external object, namely the bow. The bow corresponds to the 'drink', which 
constitutes an external object and in relation to which opposition in the soul becomes 
manifest. There is a further difference as well in the treatment of this example. What 
Socrates objects to in the case of the archer is not saying that the one and the same 
archer does two opposite things. Rather what he objects to is speaking as if the same 
part of the archer (viz. his hands) moves in opposite directions (439b8-9:ouK Kai\w~ 
exn i\.eynv on au'rou &f.!a ai XELQE~ ... ). In other words he objects to a way of 
speaking that suggests that opposition is 'located' in one part of the agent. Socrates 
makes this clarification because he wants to object to somebody who would maintain 
that someone both desires to drink and not to drink in respect of his desire. He has 
already argued that thirst as such is solely for drink and nothing else and thus thirst .as 
such is not capable of stopping us from drinking. 
In relation to the previous formulation of the principle, we can see here that 
the hands of the archer correspond to the dative together with possessive/partitive 
genitive: aU'rOU ai XELQE~ ='(4> aun}J eaU'rOU). Reference to the archer as in the 
previous cases is not eliminated and in my opinion it cannot be omitted. We do not 
have free-floating parts. The parts are always parts of something. 
The way is open for Socrates to recommend how one can speak correctly 
about the soul. As indeed we can see that it happens in many cases (439c5), we can 
say that some people are thirsty but they are not willing to drink (ITO'rEQOV bl) 
cpWf.!EV nva~ eanv Q'[[ bujJwv'ra~ OUK tEUi\.nv 7ILEiv;) (439c3-4). The more 
accurate way of putting the case (T( ouv, £cp11v tyw, cpa(ll n~ av 'rmhwv rrEQL) 
would be to say that there is in their soul (contained in the soul as part of it) what 
commands drinking and what forbids drinking which is something distinct (tvEivaL 
f.!EV tv -rD lfJUX"Ij aU'rWV 'rO KEi\.EVOV, EVELVal bf: '(0 Kwi\.uov 7ILELV, ai\.i\.o OV Kai. 
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KQa'tovv 'tOU K£A£uov'toc;) (439c6-8). Whereas Socrates does not directly object to 
saying that the same person is thirsty and unwilling26 to drink, by providing the 
further specification that the elements are distinct, it becomes clear that the person as 
a whole does not have a pro-attitude and an anti-attitude towards the same thing, and 
also that the parts which are responsible for the two attitudes are distinct. 
I shall discuss in detail the division of the soul into thirst and reason at a later 
stage. Suffice it to say that three conditions need to be met so that Socrates can divide 
in the soul into distinct parts and in order to show that the opposition is not in respect 
of the same. First of all we have to show that the soul undergoes or has opposites, 
second that the opposites are in relation to the same external thing (nQoc;/n£Qi. 
'taU'tov), and third that the opposition is simultaneous. The argument from 437bl 
and on aims at meeting these conditions. Thus first of all Socrates argues desire and 
aversion towards something can be classified as opposites (437bl-c9). Then he 
develops an argument in which he specifies the object of thirst in order to show that 
opposites can occur in relation to the same thing (437dl-439bl). As to the final 
condition, namely the simultaneous presence of opposites, it seems to be satisfied at 
439c2-5, where Glaucon agrees that in many cases many people are thirsty and are 
unwilling to drink. There is no point in the whole argument where Socrates tries to 
argue that opposition is in respect to the same thing, as he would need to do if he 
wanted to show that we have many souls and not one. Thus to conclude, the soul is 
divided into different parts or respects, which are the opposite attitudes themselves. 
26 There is also something else that one can notice in this formulation. Socrates here in the first 
formulation attributes unwillingness (auK £8tAnv) to the subject as a whole in relation to one of the 
two opposites while not in relation to the other. It seems to me that unwillingness here is related to the 
fact that eventually reason prevails (KQamuv -rou K£An)ov-roc;). Thus it seems that willingness here, 
as attributed to the subject as a whole indicates what course of action one will follow in the end. Thus 
also for example in the Protagoras the Many who try to describe a case of weakness argue that they 
know the best but they are not willing to do it (Protagoras 353d: OUK £8tAnv 71QlXTT£LV). 
Nevertheless it seems to be the case that Socrates wants to avoid this language in this context, which 
suggest a unified agent and to substitute it with language that indicates one part prevailing over 
another. 
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Conclusions concerning the parts of the soul in Book 4 
Having discussed the argument I wish to draw certain conclusions concerning 
the relationship that the parts have with the whole to which they belong and also the 
relationship between the parts themselves. 
Throughout the argument for the division of the soul Socrates lays emphasis 
on describing correctly things that possess opposites. His emphasis on correct 
description or use of language can be taken as indicating that Socrates is objecting to 
a certain 'Heracleitean' use of language and the paradoxes and contradictions that 
such way of speaking generates. More specifically unqualified ascription of two 
opposites to something may suggest the unity of opposites and also more generally 
that unity can lie in opposition. Socrates proposes a use of language that indicates the 
disunity of opposites. We are invited to separate the opposites by plac!ng them in 
different regions in a thing, or by considering as constituting different respects of 
something. Thus the argument may be taken as discouraging us from unifying the 
opposites and in so far as the parts of the soul are behaving as opposites, there is a 
sense that we are discouraged from unifying them or considering them as forming a 
unity. 27 
Furthermore the argument forbids assigning or predicating (unqualifiedly) · 
opposites to a thing as a whole. In the case of the spinning top for example, we cannot 
say simply that it moves and stays still without providing any further specification. It 
seems that by disallowing the reader to assign opposites to something without any 
qualification, Socrates also separates or distinguishes the thing that possesses the 
opposites from the opposites. The opposites do not belong essentially or intrinsically 
27 In Book 7 separation of opposites seems to be considered as the first step in the development of 
intelligence (noesis) and thought (dianoia) (524dl-4). Noesis investigates whether the opposites which 
appear thus fused by the senses are really two or one (524b3-5) and manages to think of them as 
separate (KEXWQLUf.tEVa voi)an: 524c 1) by thinking of them as (solely) two together and not as one, 
and each one as one (524b10-cl). 
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to the thing in question.28 Furthermore, since the opposites are considered as separate 
in this way it becomes I think clear the unity and identity of the thing under question, 
if one assumes that the thing has unity and identity in its own right, is not due to the 
opposites and to opposition. In fact it could be argued that the argument by 
distinguishing the thing from the opposites safeguards the possibility of the unity of 
the thing, since if the opposites would be attributed to it in an unqualified way it 
would be something self-contradictory. However, I have argued that the separation of 
the opposites from the thing that can be characterized by opposites is not complete, 
since the opposites are still presented as belonging to the same thing or being in the 
same thing, as different respects or parts of the thing under question. So whereas the 
thing that possesses the opposites can be said to be to some extent independent from 
the opposites in the sense that its essential identity is not defined, but it is not said to 
consist in the opposites either, the opposites, even though they are presented as 
separate from each other, in so far as they are conceived as parts of certain things are 
not independent or separate from the particular things to which they belong. I will 
discuss the question of the unity of the soul in a different section and argue that the 
soul has unity. Here I wish to note that Socrates neither asserts nor denies that the soul 
has unity and that we are justified in saying that the soul is one or the same thing?9 
2828 One may compare with what is said concerning the opposites in the Phaedo. In the Phaedo 
Socrates distinguishes between 'essential' and 'accidental' predication. See 0' Brien (1967) pp. 199-
200, Gallop (1975) p. 192, Rowe (1993) p. 250 (note to 102c1-4). Socrates suggests first that it is 
wrong or misleading to say that Simrnias is larger than Socrates and smaller than Phaedo (102b3-cl). 
See also Gallop's comments (Gallop (1975) pp. 192-3). This kind of talk, which involves unqualified 
predication of an opposite to a subject, would suggest that Simrnias is larger or smaller in virtue of his 
nature, or of being Simrnias, which is wrong: au yc.XQ nov m:¢uKEVaL LLf.lf.lLav U7IEQEXELV 'IOtl'rYJ, 
1:4J LLf.lf.lLaV ELVaL, c.XMa 'I£ij f.lEYE8EL 0 'IUYXcXVEL exwv· ovb' au LWKQcX'IOV<; U7IEQEXELV on 
LWKQcX'IT]<; 6 LWKQcX'IT]<; EU'ILV, c.XM' on Uf.lLKQO'IT]'tC.X EXEL 6 LWKQcX'IT]<; 7IQO<; 1:0 EKELVOU 
f.lEYE8oc;; (Phaedo 102cl-5}. Apart from things such as 'Simrnias' which can have both opposites 
there are things which despite not being identical to the opposites themselves (103d2-3}, are always 
one of the opposites and can never have the other and deserve the name of the opposites (1 03 e2-3) as 
long as they exist. It is clarified for example that fire is always hot and when cold comes fire retreats or 
perishes (103e2 -104c3). It seems thus that fire is essentially or intrinsically hot (104a2-3) and also it 
seems to be implied that saying that fire is hot is not problematic (104b2). 
29 If one follows Bobonich's interpretation it would rather appear that Socrates fmnly would exclude 
that the soul is one thing. The argument here indeed undermines the unity of the soul in the sense that 
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What he shows is that certainly the opposites do not constitute a unity. Thus if the 
soul possesses unity this unity does not consist in opposition or in the opposites 
themselves. 
I wish also to note that what is said in Book 4 is not inconsistent with what 
Socrates says in Book 5.30 There it is implied that sensible things suffer from 
compresence of opposites (479b8-9). Socrates refutes the claim that certain things are 
beautiful on the grounds that they appear to be ugly (478e7-479b6). If 'appears' to be 
ugly entails that something is also ugly, it could be said that one and the same thing is 
both ugly and beautiful. However, Socrates does not say there that since things are 
beautiful and ugly there is no problem in calling these things with either or both 
opposites. He does not say that sensible things are beautiful and ugly. What he wants 
to show is exactly that since sensible things appear to be ugly they cannot be said to 
be beautiful, and more generally, that attribution of 'being' to these things is 
problematic. Appearing to be ugly is taken to imply 'not being beautiful'. Socrates 
aims at refuting the claim that these sensible things are beautiful on the grounds that 
they also appear to be ugly, and he wants to present sensible things as problematic in 
general. Thus things appear to be somehow simultaneously beautiful and not 
beautiful, they look self contradictory and incoherent, and lack proper unity. It is not 
proper to say that they are beautiful but it is not fully correct to say that they are not 
beautiful either. Furthermore, saying that they are and are not beautiful is also 
problematic as well as saying that they are neither beautiful nor non beautiful (479c3-
5). Th~y 'waver between being and non-being' (479d2-4). Predication of beauty to 
these sensible things turns out to be impossible and we are at a loss as to how to 
describe or to think about these things, which look like riddles ( 4 79c 1-3 ). In Book 4 
the argument disallows (unqualified) predication of an opposite to something that 
involves the other opposite, hence it is consistent with what Plato says in Book 5. In 
we see that opposition is possible in the soul, but Plato's purpose is not to exclude the possibility for 
such unity. 
30 See Robinson (l97la) p. 39. Robinson argues that 'the addition of being opposites .... Introduces an 
apparent contradiction with another part of the Republic' referring to 479b9, "each of the many", 
whatever they are has the remarkable characteristic that "it no more is than isn't what anyone says it 
is". That is probably consistent with the Principle that nothing will do or suffer opposites; but it seems 
inconsistent with the Principle that nothing will be opposites'. 
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Book 5 he indicates that (unqualified) predication of beauty to something that also 
involves ugliness is problematic and leads to contradiction. 
However, there is a difference between the two arguments. Whereas the 
argument in Book 5 does not provide us with a solution as to how we can talk about 
the many 'sensible' things without contradiction, and seems to be intended to leave 
the sight lovers at loss, Book 4 provides some kind of solution, which rests on the 
separation of opposites. Even though we are not allowed to say that something which 
also involves or may involve the opposite 'ugliness' is beautiful simpliciter, we can 
say that something is beautiful in a certain respect of it, or at a given time or in 
relation to something else. In other words predication of one opposite to a thing is 
unproblematic if we provide some qualification that indicates that something is not 
inherently or unqualifiedly or always beautiful/just/good and which at the same time 
indicates that this thing is not confused with (the form of) beauty/justice/goodness. 
More generally it seems that the argument in Book 4 helps both to maintain the 
coherence of our language concerning the sensible world and also the coherence of 
particular things (sensible, or non sensible like the soul) which we talk about, since it 
shows that they are not self contradictory. 31 
Furthermore, the argument in Book 4 allows making true statements 
concerning particular things, while in Book 4 it looks as though nothing we can say 
about something is true, even though it is not quite false either. It seems to me that the 
principle in Book 4 establishes both the possibility of truth and also as a consequence 
the possibility of falsehood in relation to particular objects or actions, which can 
feature as a subjects of predicative judgements and which are liable to change or may 
involve the opposite of the characteristic we want to predicate to the thing. The 
statement that Aspasia is beautiful is not true and correct according to Plato, as both 
the argument in Book 4 and the one in Book 5 indicate, even though it is not 
completely false either, since Aspasia indeed participates in beauty. In an analogous 
· way it is not true to say simply that the soul is thirsty when there are factors in the 
31 For the thesis that the sensible world is not self-contradictory see also Vlastos (1973) pp. 58-75 and 
also Nehamas (1975) pp. 105-17. As I previously argued, the argument in Book 4 does not provide us 
with grounds on which unity of sensible things can rest or how it can be achieved, but it allows us to 
develop such grounds. 
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soul that stand in a relation of opposition to thirst. If somehow we were solely able to 
say or to believe that Aspasia is beautiful or Aspasia is ugly, strictly speaking we 
would not be able to say or think something true about Aspasia. However, it seems to 
me that Plato would allow that we truly say (if we have access to an adequate, reliable 
non sensible measure or standard of beauty) that Aspasia is beautiful now, in this 
respect, or in relation to another woman's ugliness.32 
As Woods and Irwin have observed, what is said concerning the parts of the 
soul also concerns causation or explanation. 33 In so far as the parts are regarded as 
opposites, then one has to observe the requirement introduced in the Phaedo that one 
and the same thing cannot be the cause of two opposites and also one opposite cannot 
be the cause of the other (Phaedo 96e-97b, lOla-c). Thus it turns out that there are 
distinct causal factors in the soul, the two opposites are not caused by each other and 
also the soul as a whole is not strictly speaking the cause of the two opposites. 
I wish to deal with the question of the attribution of the opposites as subjects. 
I agree with Lorenz (2006, p. 28) in so far as he argues that the soul as a whole can be 
said to be a qualified subject of the opposites. However, I am not so sure whether the 
parts of the soul themselves should be considered to be the proper or non-derivative or 
unqualified subjects of the opposites. One reason I think this might not be correct is 
because it would commit Plato to self-predication, and I am not sure whether this is 
necessary. I previously argued that the parts of the soul in the context of the argument 
are nothing more than the opposite activities themselves. Thus if something is the 
proper subject of thirst as a desire, something in other words to which a desire for 
drink could be attributed in an unqualified or non derivative way, this would be thirst 
as such. However, even though Socrates does treat thirst as the immediate subject of 
desire, and calls it what desires in us, perhaps such language should not be taken 
32 I think that ultimately true statements concerning sensible things are possible, if sensible objects are 
ftrst of all not confused with the forms, and second if one is able to consider them in their relationship 
with forms. While sensible things 'are' not beautiful as such, they 'become' beautiful due to their 
participation to forms, and insofar as they participate to forms. Because of this participation they also 
acquire a share in being and truth. 
33 See Woods (1987) p. 40, and Irwin (1995) p. 204. 
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literally.34 35 But even if we can see the parts as subjects of a certain kind, since they 
also constitute agencies or causes, I think the argument for the division of the soul 
seems to suggest that one cannot avoid reference to the person or to the soul as a 
whole. Socrates in other words does not allow one to simply say that thirst desires 
drink, rather one has to say that someone's desire desires drink. The fact that 
reference to the whole cannot be eliminated suggests that the parts of the soul cannot 
be properly seen or fully considered as subjects in the sense self-subsistent entities, 
existing in their own right, even though the soul as a whole again is not presented as a 
proper subject or agent or cause either. 
I suggested previously that Socrates wants to establish something more than 
different activities or functions of the soul and if the parts of the soul may appear to 
be the psychic activities themselves and not something for example which is a subject 
of this activities or a container which these activities are to be attributed, it may 
appear that the argument does not eventually establish something more than different 
activities in the soul. What Socrates I think is trying to establish is not exactly 
34 Gallop {1975) p. 194 and Rowe {1993) pp. 250-2 note that in Phaedo 102cll-d2 we may have a case 
of self-predication. In this case for example largeness in Simmias is larger than smallness in Socrates. 
Commentators though seem to be reluctant to commit Plato to such a thesis. It seems to me that what 
basically Plato tries to express is that Socrates can be said to be comparatively small in relation not 
exactly to Simmias himself (as if Simmias himself somehow were the standard of comparison and 
largeness) rather in relation to the comparative largeness in Simmias. 
35 One question that I have not discussed is whether certain predicates or characters which belong to a 
part of an entity can also characterize the whole entity in an unqualified way. For example in the case 
of Kallipolis, justice, which is not a property of parts, rather it belongs to the whole, can be seen as a 
condition which allows the virtues of the parts to characterize the city as a whole. Thus the city is said 
to be wise as a whole in virtue of a small part that rules (428e7-9). It seems that the wisdom of the part 
and the relation of this part to the others allow wisdom to be predicated to the city as a whole without 
any qualification. Other cities, which are not established according to justice, would not be wise as 
wholes rather only partly. This is because justice establishes a certain relationship between the parts so 
that one does not undermine the activity of the other, and it allows more generally such an activity to 
characterize the whole. Thus in a similar way, in a just soul, we will be able to say that a soul is wise as 
a whole, or in an unqualified way, in virtue of the fact that there is justice in it and the wise part rules. 
As I am going to argue later justice does not fully exclude the presence of opposition in the soul. 
However, somehow it makes such opposition ineffective so that the nature of one opposite is allowed 
to determine the nature of the whole. 
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different activities, rather some short of stronger notion of difference or distinctness. 
We have activities that stand in relation of opposition to each other, and the argument 
encourages us to see the parts or elements in the soul as opposites. This indicates that 
they can be seen as two separate things, which are independent from each other. In 
other words the argument purports to establish the autonomy or the potential 
autonomy of certain psychic activities from each other. 36 One may accept that 
reasoning and desiring are in some sense two activities but one may not treat them as 
two completely separate things. One may regard the one as dependent on the other or 
both of them as interdependent and thus as forming a certain sort of unity. For 
example, even though one might accept that reasoning and being hungry are not 
exactly one and the same activity and thus in some sense they are two, one might 
argue that reasoning depends on the desire, on the grounds that we always calculate in 
order to satisfy particular desires. Alternatively or simultaneously, one may argue that 
desire depends on reasoning since for example reason is needed to specify the object 
of desire and to guide desire towards particular objects. By presenting the activities as 
opposites and by advocating the separation of opposites, Socrates invites us to 
consider the two activities as solely two things, independent from each other, and as I 
previously said not as forming a unity. At least in so far as the activities are working 
as opposites we are discouraged from considering them as related or associated and as 
interdependent or one as depending on the other. Thus what the argument achieves is 
not merely a list of mental activities or motives, which can be established 
independently on the basis of observation, but rather a fact concerning how these 
activities can be related, in other words as opposites and thus as separate things. But 
36 In a similar way in the Phaedo Socrates tries to refute the thesis that the soul is a harmony of the 
elements of the body by maintaining that the soul opposes the body (94b4-95a2). I think that Simmias 
who suggests that the soul is a harmony of the body does not initially at least appear to be saying that 
the soul is somehow identical to the body or its elements (9lc9-d2), rather that the soul depends on the 
body or its elements and it is not something separable from it. For a discussion of the thesis that the 
soul is a harmony in the Phaedo see Taylor (1983) pp. 217-31 and Gottschalk (1971) pp. 179-98. The 
problem with both the argument for the separation of the soul from the body in the Phaedo and the 
division of the soul in Republic Book 4 is that they appear to establish reciprocal independence, which 
as I am going to suggest is not the case. Furthermore, both proofs really do not establish or fully 
establish the separateness of the opposing factors. The soul does not appear to be something completely 
separate from the body if basically it spends its time opposing bodily desires. Rather somehow it 
becomes separate only when it deals with the forms. 
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as I suggested earlier, these activities are not completely separated from the soul or 
the whole of which they are parts. This is important, because later in Book 4 Socrates 
is going to suggest that the activities can indeed at least in principle be unified 
through harmony (443el-2). If he had presented such activities as not somehow 
belonging to the same thing, this unification would appear to be impossible. What we 
learn here is that they cannot be unified in virtue of themselves, or in virtue of their 
opposition. 
Furthermore, it seems to me that Plato does not believe that things which 
behave as opposites cannot be unified. We can have combinations of opposites in 
which the opposites are somehow functioning as a unity and they do not behave as 
opposites. What unifies them, however, is not their very nature in so far as they are 
opposites, or their opposition. Rather, some 'third' thing, which, I think, is reason and 
art, needs to impose order, proportion and harmony upon them and make a proper 
blend out of them. More generally, not any random combination or mixture of 
'opposites' can produce real unity.37 In so far as sensible things have unity, they do 
not have unity in virtue of themselves, or in virtue of the opposites that are present in 
them, rather it is in virtue of reason, which makes them unitary by structuring them 
and imposing order upon the opposites, or whatever elements things happen to have, 
and generating internal agreement and harmony.38 The unity that things that are 
37 For instance, in Eryximachus' speech in the Symposium (185e6-188e4) one can find an attack on the 
Heracleitean thesis that unity involves opposition and that harmony is due to or coexists with conflict 
(187a3-b7). Eryximachus argues that opposites are at war 'before' their harmonization and not 
simultaneously with their harmonization (187a8-b4). In so far as the opposites are connected in the 
proper way, they are no longer in opposition, since harmony, lying in agreement, is not compatible 
with conflict. Eryximachus makes it clear that unity of opposites is due to harmony and art (musical art 
or medicine: e.g. 187b2, 187c3), which generate 'love' between the opposites. The opposites do not 
love each other in themselves (186d6-7). Rather the right love is the product of music (187c4-5) and art 
in general. (There is also 'bad' love, which does not cease conflict, when art is not involved or not 
applied in the proper way, since art is needed at many levels (187c7-d4).) A successful unification of 
opposites in the Republic is the harmonization of the spirit and the philosophic element, which are 
introduced as opposites. Their harmonization is due to 'art', music and gymnastics (44le7-8). I will 
discuss their association more extensively in the following section. 
38 For the artful creation of a unitary thing that constitutes a whole in virtue of the order imposed to its 
elements compare also Gorgias 503d6-504a5. 
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products of art and reason possess, which can also be apprehended by reason, should 
be distinguished from the mock unity that opposites display by being fused together in 
the senses. 39 
One question that one has to deal with if one has to maintain that Plato 
believes that there are separate parts in the soul is the question whether the parts in the 
soul have to be understood necessarily as opposites. Radical, reciprocal separation of 
the parts is something that follows from accepting opposition. If the parts more 
generally are not taken to be in essential opposition to each other and if opposition in 
the soul in reality is not direct or straightforward, as it appears to be presented in 
Book 4, one does not need to accept radically separate elements in the soul. I will 
argue more extensively in the following chapters that the different elements in the 
soul are not in essential opposition to each other, and thus the lower parts can 
associate with and participate in reason. Such participation or sharing in reason 
involves the generation of mixtures or combinations of the elements.40 However, in so 
far as reason does not 'rule' in the soul, such mixtures or combinations are 
problematic and incoherent. Real unity presupposes the reason's autonomy, which is 
necessary for reason to impose order and harmony in the soul. 
39 For the 'fusion' of oppsosites in the senses see again Republic Book 7 (523al 0 ff): Miya f.!TJV Kai. 
o¢u:; Kai. Uf.UKQOV EWQa, <J>af.!EV, aM' ou KEXWQLUf.!EVOV aMa UUYKEXUf.!EVOV n (524c3-4). It 
seems to me that the passage suggests that the opposites in the senses look both two and at the same 
time one. They form a problematic and incoherent unity. Separation of opposites seems to be 
considered as the ftrst step in the development of intelligence (noesis) and (abstract) thought (dianoia) 
(524dl-4). Noesis investigates whether the opposites which appear thus fused by the senses are really 
two or one (524b3-5) and manages to think of them as separate (KEXWQLUf.!EVa vof)an: 524cl) by 
thinking of them as (solely) two together and not as one, and each one as one (524bl0-c1). 
40 That there are mixtures of psychic elements has been maintained by Santas (200 1) pp. 124-31. 
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Chapter 2 
The notion of justice and sophrosune and reason's role in the soul in 
Book4 
Justice and the division of the soul 
Now I wish to discuss the notion of justice in the soul in relation to the 
separation of the parts. Justice as it is presented in Book 4, whether in the case of the 
city or in the case of the soul, involves separation of certain functions. In the case of 
the city, Socrates separates different functions or tasks by assigning them to different 
groups of people. As a result of justice what is generated is a city that has separate 
'parts' or classes, clearly demarcated functional entities. I suggest that, in a similar 
manner, justice in the soul involves separation of functions, which by consequence 
become separate parts in the soul. Justice as separation can be expressed by the 
requirement that the lower parts of the soul do not interfere with the activity of reason 
and ruling (433a8-9, 443d2, 444bl-3). Reason functions in other words independently 
from the other parts, without the lowest appetitive part in particular being involved in 
its activity. 
Regarded as the condition for 'justice', separation turns out to be a positive 
notion. As I argued previously, separation of the elements becomes logically 
necessary from the moment the activities are conceived as opposites. Such separation 
can also be considered as desirable and good since opposites are conceived as fighting 
with and destroying each other. Imagine for instance two people who fight with each 
other; by 'separating' them we no longer allow them to harm each other and to 
commit offence. In different terms separation of functions, in such a way that they 
come to constitute clearly demarcated 'parts', can be said to allow autonomous and 
0 
unimpeded performance of these functions. If separation of activities can be 
considered as something different from the proper performance of these activities, 
separation can be seen as at least necessary for their good operation as long as one 
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activity can be taken to undermine or impede another activity, if the two activities are 
performed together. Moreover, if what is responsible for a function not being 
performed well is its being undermined or impeded from outside, then it may look as 
though justice is sufficient for the good performance of mental activities or functions. 
More generally it looks as though autonomous separate operation is, or leads to, good 
functioning. Hence, it may be provisionally said that justice as separation of functions 
allows the good performance of different functions in the soul and the development of 
virtue in general. As I am going to argue more extensively, what is primarily needed 
is the good performance of reason's function and in particular what is presented as 
undermining reason's function, but also the function of spirit, is the appetitive part of 
the soul. By being separated from appetite both spirit and reason are no longer 
infected or contaminated by certain desires; thus separation from the lower parts, or 
not being interfered in its activity by the lower parts is conducive to reason's 
performing its function well.41 On the other hand, the lowest part's separation from 
reason does not appear to improve its own operation. 
One may object that justice in the soul does not involve separation of 
functions, since it might be argued that the argument for the division of the soul 
establishes separate parts in the soul or separate sources of motivation. Thus the parts 
operate separately anyway. This would mean that each part does its own work in any 
case. I think that the argument for the division of the soul can be seen as establishing 
the need and also simultaneously the potential for the separation of activities, in 
particular reason's separation from desire. In other words, the fact that we see reason 
fighting with appetite, and thus behaving as if it is autonomous from it does not mean 
that it functions always, or in most cases, or in a sufficient degree independently from 
appetitive and other desires. For instance, in the case of the three lower deviant 
characters in Book 8, reason functions primarily as the slave of desire. In that case it 
does not work independently from desire. Its concerns are dictated by the desires of 
the lowest parts (553dl-7). There is still a relative autonomy of reason in that it may 
41 Thus it may be argued that justice as separation is a condition for the good functioning of the reason, 
as Socrates has already suggested in Book I (353e4-5), where the function of the soul has been defined 
as management, rule, and deliberation (353d5). The virtuous, just soul performs its function well 
(353e4-ll ). Justice, as separation of elements, and as self-control, allows and involves 'good' 
deliberation or ruling on reason's part. 
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oppose particular desires (554bll-d3), but overall it cannot be said that it functions 
autonomously enough.42 Autonomous operation for reason presupposes that reason 
looks at the interest of the whole soul and not solely at the interest of a part. 
Furthermore, even though the argument for the division of the soul presents the parts 
operating in an autonomous way, the reader might not know that he has in his soul 
two parts, or that reason can really operate autonomously in relation to desire. The 
argument helps the reader conceive reason as something that can oppose appetite, and 
as at least potentially autonomous from desire, and thus also encourages him to try to 
establish justice and reason's autonomy; to try, in other words, to reason in separation 
from appetite, and more generally, to oppose appetite as much as possible. In fact 
justice as the rule of reason turns out in Book 4 to be more or less equivalent to 
holding bodily desires in check, and it looks as though the purpose of the whole is 
exactly this restraint of appetite ( 442a4-b3). 
The notion of justice is more complicated because it involves reason's ruling. 
One may ask what precisely 'ruling' lies in, and whether it should be seen as an 
activity or function other than the three functions that have already been distinguished 
in the soul, namely learning or deliberating, being angry, and desiring certain things 
or pleasures. I attempted in the previous chapter to provide an account of the parts of 
the soul, according to which they constitute different psychic activities and not really 
subjects of activities. Thus, unlike the 'parts' of the city, it is not the case that the 
parts of the soul can somehow swap functions or activities, or have more than one 
function or activity.43 Basically the parts of the soul are certain activities or functions, 
and if they are to be seen as subjects, or causes they are first and foremost subjects 
and causes of their own activities. Rather, the point of partition is that certain 
activities can be conceived as separate and also in principle performed in separation 
from each other. Therefore, it is not the case that appetite somehow can think or 
42 The three inferior types of deviant characters in Books 8-9 reflect a gradual diminishing of reason's 
involvement in the soul. In the oligarchic character, one desire, the desire for money has been given 
priority over the others, and the nature of such desire allows reason to function to some extent as an 
organizer in the soul, and establish priorities. On the other hand the democratic character establishes no 
priorities and treats all desires as equal. There is no proper order in the soul even though there is some 
sort of balance. Finally in the case of the tyrannical personality, there is no balance and order at all. 
43 See Santas (2001) p. 123. 
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deliberate, and adopt reason's function; reasoning and desiring are two activities that 
can be performed together or separately. When reason becomes so much entangled 
with appetite that it does not really retain any independence, it looks as though 
appetite does the thinking for us. One can still ask whether ruling is somehow an extra 
function that the parts can exchange. I think that 'ruling' can be seen as a more or less 
identical to the function of reason, and in the context of Book 4 corresponds to the 
good performance of such function. For example, reason rules in that it deliberates 
for the good of the soul as a whole, and basically it rules when it deliberates well, 
even though in some sense reason always 'rules', if ruling basically signifies 
deliberation for what is good for the person. Alternatively, justice as the rule of reason 
can be seen as involving a relation of hierarchical ordering of certain functions. Thus, 
in this second sense, a given part rules when the activity of this part acquires priority 
or preponderance in relation to the activities of the other parts. Justice as reason's 
'rule' signifies a hierarchical ordering, and the prominence of a certain function in the 
soul, in such a way that this function comes to determine the character of the whole. 
More generally, the character of the 'ruling' element, in both a city and in a soul 
allows the city or the soul as a whole to be attributed this character.44 
It might be argued that separation and prioritisation are different things, on the 
grounds that three things can be separated but this does not entail that they are 
classified according to a certain hierarchical order or an order of domination. 
Therefore, if I am right that justice involves separation of activities, justice may 
appear to involve two things, both separation of reason at least from other functions 
and also hierarchical ordering and reason'spredominance. Now I think separation of 
activities in justice is somehow simultaneously a kind of hierarchical ordering in the 
sense that the elements are somehow 'located' not only in different places but also 
simultaneously in superior and inferior positions. If, however, separation of reason's 
activity from the others, or the other activities being separated from reason is 
sufficient for it to rule and to predominate, then perhaps there is direct continuity 
between the two notions. If separation entails or guarantees reason's autonomous 
44 See for instance Book 9 where it is said that there are three kinds of the soul and analogously three 
kinds of rule (580d2-d7) and also that depending on which part rules we have three basic kinds of 
people (581 c 1-5). Thus it appears that the ruling character determines what kind of person one is, in 
other words the character of the person as a whole. 
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unimpeded functioning and if this functioning is good functioning, separation is 
somehow the same thing as the rule of reason or it is sufficient for reason to rule. 
One may object that autonomous functioning on reason's part and thus reason's 
separation is not sufficient to rule because in cases of weakness reason does operate 
autonomously and yet it fails to prevail against appetite. Thus also ruling for reason 
means two things, one is looking to the interest of the whole, and the other is basically 
managing to impose its dictates on the other parts and the soul as a whole. One might 
argue that ruling may appear to be a further requirement of justice apart from 
separation. I believe that basically when reason operates autonomously it also rules, 
and in cases of weakness we do not have autonomous unimpeded activity on reason's 
part. Either prior to action reason has not been separated in a proper way or at the 
moment of action its activity is impeded. More generally the separation of appetite 
from reason is basically the same thing as self control or suppression of appetite and 
such separation indeed implies that reason is in control. In general it looks in Book 4 
that reason basically works well and separately when together with spirit it opposes 
and suppresses appetite.45 
A further condition for reason to rule is that spirit also works well. In other 
words spirit good operation is presented as somehow necessary for reason to rule in 
the soul and also to control appetite. But it is not exactly the case that spirit's and 
reason's separation from appetite are two things. Rather it looks as if spirit helps 
reason somehow also remain separate or autonomous from appetite. Spirit, more 
specifically, helps maintaining certain beliefs (429b8-dl, 442b10-cl), in particular at 
the moment of action, when opposite impulses may arise that may undermine the 
person's and thus also helps maintain reason's commitment to these beliefs (412e4-
413c4, 430a5-b5). Spirit makes these beliefs effective for action since it provides 
adequate emotional and motivational backing to these beliefs. 
45 I should also note that reason's separation in Book 4 is not complete and more generally the notion 
of separation that we get in Book 4 is restricted. Ultimately separation is complete with reason's the 
achievement of knowledge of the form of the good. In the Phaedo chorismos is the same as philosophy 
and the soul's purification from the body (67c5-dl0). In the argument for the division of the soul, and 
also more generally in Book 4, we see only a kind of partial separation of reason from the lower parts. 
35 
The argument for the division of the soul seems to establish reciprocal 
separation of the two parts, reason and appetite. Thus we do not have only separation 
of reason from desire but also separation of the lowest part from reason. One question 
that arises is whether we should see separation as being necessarily reciprocal, and 
thus that reason's separation from appetite also entails appetite's separation from 
reason. Furthermore, another related question is whether one should regard justice as 
involving mutual separation not only of reason from appetite, but also somehow 
appetite's separation from reason. One may argue that if separation of reason from 
the lowest part is something positive the opposite is not a positive notion. The 
appetite's separation from reason indicates its autonomy from reason, and its 
irrationality, and perhaps its potential to undermine reason. However, a positive 
notion can still be found it seems to me that as in the case of the city and in the case of 
the soul, separation of appetite from reason can be seen as a form of restriction or 
suppression of appetite. Justice as it is presented in Book 4 is closely connected with 
self-control, as long as one is self-controlled one can be said to keep somehow one's 
desire down, far away from reason. Thus, separation of appetite from reason can be 
seen as a restriction of appetite in its proper position or 'place' in the soul. It may be 
argued that the appetite still works autonomously from reason when it is restricted. 
More generally it may look as though, unlike reason, appetite always operates 
autonomously. But still there is a sense that to 'separate' appetite from reason is to 
deprive it of all elements of reasoning, whether we see this as always being case or 
something one does. However, it no longer disturbs reason, which by consequence 
can rule in the soul. I should also note that as far as the suppression or control of 
appetite is concerned, this is presented as happening due to the joint activity of reason 
and spirit since appetite does not appear to want to stay in its place, rather as naturally 
tending to interfere (442a4-b3). 
The significance and purpose of the separation of the parts/mental activities, 
becomes clearer in the Timaeus. In the Timaeus the separation of the lowest part of 
the soul from reason is presented as the work of the inferior gods, and thus can be 
seen as an expression of divine providence and done for the good. The purpose of 
such separation is clearly and emphatically stated. Gods on purpose place the lower 
'parts' in different places so that they are separate from reason (XWQi.c;: 69d7, 69e3) to 
36 
prevent, as far as it is possible and desirable, the contamination of the supenor 
immortal element, from the lowest elements (Timaeus 69d6-e3). Suffice it to say here 
that 'parts' in the soul are generated by the separation of the affections that are 
provided to the gods by Necessity (69c8, 69d5). Thus 'parts' in the soul are 'created' 
by the lowest gods in the sense that these 'necessary and violent' affections (69c8-dl) 
are 'separated' by being placed in different 'locations' in the body. It is not exactly 
the case that gods 'make' these affections (rra8fJJ.laTa). Rather they compose or 
combine them in a certain way (69d5-6: 
.. . avayKa(wc;; .... auv£8Eaav) following the dictates of necessity and they 'locate' 
them in different places in the body. 
Separation again, as in the Republic, is made both logically necessary and also 
desirable due to conflict and opposition and aims at diminishing such opposition and 
conflict. The conflict is basically one between 'reason' and 'necessity', or between the 
circular motions of reason and the vertical motions of necessity. We saw the conflict 
between reason and the affections or necessity in cognitive terms, at an early passage, 
where the motions associated with necessity were presented as directly affecting and 
disturbing reason's motions and functioning ( 43b5-44b 1 ), making it form false 
beliefs.46 It is precisely this disturbance and conflict that the lower gods aim at 
diminishing. The appetitive element is located as 'far away', in other words as 
separately, from reason as possible so that it does not disturb reason with its noise, 
allowing our best element to deliberate about the collective and individual interest of 
the parts undisturbed (70d7e-71a3).47 Timaeus emphasizes that this is the reason why 
they gave this lower part this position or rank (taxis) (71a3). Such allocation of 
positions can be seen as an expression of divine 'justice' and at the same time 
'legitimises' the order of parts that Socrates has already defended in the Republic. 
Spatial language does not need to be taken literally as also in the case of the Republic. 
46 More specifically the motions associated with Necessity are presented as deflecting the motions of 
the circles of the different whereas they completely impede the functioning of the circle of the same 
(Tim. 43d). 
47 Johansen (2004) p. 146 maintains that the affections that cause the circles of the different to undergo 
irrational motions form the basis for the tripartition of the soul. 
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It indicates as in the Republic the actual or potential independence of certain mental 
functions and more generally the need to do certain things 'separately'. 
The lowest element's distance from reason also indicates its irrationality. 
Unlike thumos that is placed in proximity to reason and is able to listen to reason 
(70a2-7), and thus is not completely separate from it the lowest part is not initially in 
any contact with reason whatever. After the creation of the liver contact and 
interaction will be established, but I am not discussing the liver's role for the moment 
since I am focusing on the notion of separation.48 Separation of the lowest element 
from reason does not solely indicate its irrationality; it also or simultaneously 
indicates the half conscious or unconscious status of its operations. As I am going to 
48 It seems to me that teleology at this stage does not lie in the 'creation' of the 'necessary' affections-
which in any case are not in any literal way created by the gods. Rather 'granted' that we have such 
affections (or that it is necessary for us to have such affections for survival) the gods looks at the end, 
which is human reason's good functioning, and make sure that reason can achieve this end by 
'separating' such affections from reason. Such affections do not positively contribute to reason's good 
functioning. Rather their separation from reason contributes to this good functioning, which is the end, 
and they are not presented as responsible for this separation. The lowest part of the soul and necessity 
in general can be said to aim at the good if they are considered as operating in conjunction with, and 
not in separation from reason. The 'lower parts' in so far as they are conceived as being separate from 
reason, they cannot be said to aim at the good positively (only negatively in that reason is protected). 
Direction of the irrational towards the good is in my opinion is achieved through the creation of the 
liver and with imagination which allows interaction and 'communication' between reason and the 
irrational and 'persuasion' of the irrational by reason. This persuasion corresponds to the persuasion of 
necessity by reason in the cosmos. Otherwise, on their own more generally, or rather if the lower parts 
functioned in isolation from reason, the outcome they would produce would be completely disorderly. 
Compare with: Tim. 46e5: oam f.lOVW8Eiam <j:>QOVTJUEW<; '[0 wxov lXTaKTOV EKUUTOTE 
E~EQya{.:ovTm. (The term f.lOVW8Eiam does not signify that material causes are separate from 
reason: rather if they are separated from reason or in so far as they behave separately from reason they 
produce disorder and random results. When or 'in so far as' they are 'persuaded' by reason and 
function as auxiliary causes, they do not produce disorder and they are governed by purpose.) In the 
end, one may ask precisely what the separation of the irrational affections from reason represents. It 
represents I think reason's potential for autonomy. Such autonomy and 'separation' from necessity is 
ultimately for us to achieve and is not given to us by the gods. But the gods make sure that the human 
soul has such a potential despite the fact that it is embodied and hence amenable to external influences. 
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argue more extensively, reason is conceived as the centre of consciousness, and thus 
by being 'far away' from reason the functioning of the lowest part can remain 
unconscious or half conscious. Reason is not disturbed and can reflect exactly because 
it does not 'listen' to them. In other words, for most of the time we are not aware or 
not fully aware of certain activities or motions, which waver between the mental and 
the bodily. Presumably, if such affections and desires become intense and come to 
occupy a prominent place in consciousness, reason will no longer be able to operate 
undisturbed and autonomously. Instead of reflecting on the good of the person as a 
whole, or about the motions of the planets, it will focus on what to cook for dinner. 
Apart from this, if we think of the lowest element as representing not just basic and 
necessary biological functions or urges but also as somehow involving the 
unnecessary 'criminal' desires of the Republic, the distance from reason indicates the 
restriction of such desires to a half conscious level. In the Republic Socrates seems to 
suggest that for most of us such desires arise only in dreams (Republic 571b2-d5), 
presumably because of continuous suppression. The connection of the lowest part 
with dreams is discussed immediately afterwards in the Timaeus (71a ff.) 
Sophrosune and harmony 
Now having dealt with justice I wish to discuss the notion of sophrosune.49 
Sophrosune is defined as 6~6vma and av~cj:>wvl.a (oneness of mind, 
agreement/concord) in the case of the city (432a7-8), and friendship and concord or 
agreement in the case of the soul ( 442c9-d 1: I:wcj:>Qova ou tij cj:>LJ\(q Kai. 
av~<j:>wv(q Tij au-rwv -rotnwv). Sophrosune basically lies in harmony in the soul.50 
49 The translation of the term sophrosune is particularly difficult. A term that more fully captures the 
meaning of sophrosune is sound- mindedness. 
5° For Plato's conception of sophrosune in the Republic and the connection between sophrosune and 
harmony see also North (1966) pp. 169-176. North argues as follows: 'As the omission of every other 
element in the final definition show, Plato regards concord or harmony as the essential sophrosyne-for 
the purposes of the Republic' (p. 173). 
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There is a passage, however, in which justice itself appears to be defined as harmony, 
and thus it may look as though the two virtues merge into one: 51 
... Mll eaaav'ta 'tlXMO'tQLlX 71:QlX't'tHV EKlXU'tOV EV ain<f> ~-tllb£ 
TioAuTIQay~-tovEiv TIQoc; iiM11Aa 1:a tv uj lJYux~J y£v11, aMa 'tcfJ 6vn 1:a olKEia 
£li 8£~-tEVOV Kai.. tXQ~lXV'tlX ainov ainov Kai.. KOa~-tiJaav'ta Kal q>LAov 
YEVO~-tEvov £au1:4J Kai.. auvaQ~-t6aav'ta 'tQLa 6v1:a, waTIEQ OQouc; 'tQEic; 
lXQ!-lOVLac; auxvwc;, VEa'tllc; 'tE KlXL {ma'tllc; KlXL 1-!EUllc;, Kai.. Ei aAAa lX't'tlX 
!-!E'ta~u 1:uyxavn 6v1:a, mxv1:a 'tav'ta auvbi]aav1:a Kai.. TilXV'taTiaaLv i:va 
YEVO!-!EVOV EK TIOMwv, awq>QOVlX Kai.. ~QI-!00!-!EVOV (443d2-e2) ... 
'A man must not suffer the principles in his soul to do each the work of some 
other and interfere and meddle with one another, but he should dispose well of what 
in the true sense of the word is properly his own, and having first attained to self-
mastery and beautiful order within himself, and having harmonized these three 
principles, the notes or intervals of three terms quite literally the lowest, the highest, 
and the mean, and all others there may be between them, and having linked and 
bound all three together and made of himself a unit, one man instead of many, self-
controlled and in unison ... ' (trans. by Shorey) 
I shall discuss this passage more extensively in a while. I wish to note here 
that until 'iiQ~lXV'ta lXV'tOV a{nov' we have reference to justice, where from 
'Koa~-tiJaav'ta' including this term Socrates starts talking about sophrosune. 52 Both 
justice and sophrosune are forms of ordering or arrangement in the soul. Unlike 
justice that consists in separation and ranking of elements, sophrosune involves 
binding and unison (auvaQ~-t6aav'ta, auvbi]aav'ta). Accordingly one becomes one 
out of many (i:va YEVO~-tEVOV eK TioMwv). In sophrosune the different elements 
51 I am not in full agreement with Irwin's understanding of the relation between justice and sophrosune. 
Irwin (1995) pp. 228-9 tends to see sophrosune as continence and justice as harmony, where the 
elements are in agreement. It seems to me that the notion of self-control corresponds to justice, whereas 
strictly speaking harmony corresponds to sophrosune. 
52 Sophrosune is associated with KOGf.lOI;; at 430e4. 
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are no longer treated as separate, rather they can be considered as forming a unity and 
a whole. In musical harmony, to which the state of the soul is compared, we have 
different sounds or voices that are blended according to certain rules to produce one 
sound. In a similar way the many 'voices' or activities in the soul acquire such a kind 
of uniformity or agreement that they cannot be distinguished from each other. Thus it 
seems to me that that in harmony communion of elements and in such communion we 
have a combination or mixture of elements (krasis), 53 while justice involved or 
presupposed separation. 
Sophrosune involves friendship of the elements and friendship can be 
associated with communion (Kmvwvl£x).54 The elements work together for a common 
53 Harmony is associated with KQiiau:; of opposites in Eryximachus' speech in the Symposium (188a4). 
Bumyeat (2000) p. 47 cites a passage from the Euclidean Sectio Canonis (149.17-24 Jan), where the 
relationship between harmony/concordance and blend or mixture (krasis) is clear. As Bumyeat 
explains (p. 48), in this passage the concordant sounds are given a single name: 'Euclid's idea, then is 
that Greek gives apt recognition to the unity of sound in a concord by assigning a single expression to 
the corresponding mathematical ratio'. Krasis is also associated with harmony in the Phaedo (86b8-c3, 
86d2). Simmias' suggestion is that the soul is a harmony and proper krasis of the physical opposites. It 
seems to me that this position makes the soul dependent on the body and its elements. I think that in the 
Laws one can find the reversal of this position. It is the soul, which accounts for the combination of the 
physical opposites (Laws 896e-897b). More generally, I think that Plato would not accept that proper 
combinations of the elements are somehow due to the elements themselves. Rather harmony is 
something that is imposed on the elements, in so far as they are conceived as opposites, from 'outside'. 
In a similar fashion, the parts of the soul are not exactly responsible for their proper combination or 
harmony and sophrosune. It is either education or reason, as something above the elements or as 
separate from the elements, which imposes order and harmony relying on its own principles and 
generating proper mixtures, which involve itself as a component. 
54 In the Gorgias justice seems to be primarily associated with -ra~Lc;, and, VOf . .HI-!OV while sophrosune 
with K6a~-toc; and KOG!-!LOV (504d1-3). See Dodd's (1959) comments ad loc. pp. 329-30. Kmvwvl.a 
(communion, community or sense of community) seems later to be associated with both, even though I 
think that it is closer to sophrosune: '<j>aai. b' oi. ao<j>o(, w KaMbv\nc;, Kai. OUQavov Kai. yfjv Kai. 
8eouc; KIXL tXV8Q<:~J7WUc; TIJV KOLVWVLaV UUVEXELV KIXL <j>v\LaV KIXL KOG!-!LOTT]TIX KIXL 
aw<j>QOaUVTJV Kai. bLKaLOTTJTIX, KIXL TO oAov -roiho bLa -rafna KOG!-!OV KMOUULV, w haiQE, 
OUK tXKOGI-!LIXV ouN: aKoAaaLav' (507e-d). Restraint of desire is presented as necessary for 
KOLvwvl.a and KOLvwv(a is presented as necessary for friendship (507e). KmvwvliX is associated with 
unity in the Republic at 462b4-6 in the case of the city and at 462c9-d5 in the case of the soul, a 
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purpose, 55 and such working together presupposes interaction between the activities. 
Having discussed the internal action, which can more strictly be identified with virtue, 
Socrates goes on to talk about external action and show how external action can be 
associated with virtue as well ( 443e2-444a2). It becomes clear thus that the virtuous 
person acts as one. I wish to note here that in proper virtuous action the different 
kinds of agency that have been distinguished operate in common for a common end, 
so that the soul does not consist in separate agencies, rather it becomes one agency. 
Furthermore while justice itself as separation or self-control does not imply that 
enmity has ceased, only that offences are not committed among the opposite parties, 
sophrosune implies that the opposite parties are no longer in opposition, or that the 
parts no longer constitute opposites rather they are in a relationship of agreement and 
mutual friendship, which, I think, presuppose affinity with each other. 56 
passage that I am going to discuss more extensively. Also it is associated with affmity at 531 c l O-d2: 
Kai. TJ 'WlJTWV 7HXV'rWV WV bu::ATJAu8af.lEV f.lE8oboc;, f.av f.lEV btl. n)v tiMt'JAwv KOtVWVLaV 
a<j:>LKTJ'ral Kai. auyyivEtav, Kai. auAAoyta81J -raiha 1J f.anv aMi)Amc; OLKELa, <j:>EQELV n 
au-rwv de; & !3ouA6f.lE8a 'rTJV 7tQaYf.la1:ELav Kai. OUK aVOVTJ'ra 7tOVELa8at, db[ 1-lTJ· CtVOVT)'ra 
(53lc9-d3, see also 537cl-3). 
55 Annas (1981) p. 119 understands justice as I incline to view sophrosune. She argues that 'justice is a 
virtue of the city as a 'unity', for it requires of each citizen a recognition of his own role as contributing 
in some characteristic way to the common good'. She accepts that such recognition is also implicit in 
sophrosune but she argues that 'that was a recognition only of superiority and inferiority and 
superiority, not of the full scope of one's position in a particular class in a state which requires 
cooperation from all classes.' As far as what is said in Book 4 is concerned, I am inclined to attribute to 
sophrosune the characteristics that Annas attributes to justice. Nevertheless I will later argue that 
justice also should involve recognition of a common good. However, in Book 4 justice in the city may 
involve recognition of one's particular function and also one's particular position, but this is just 
recognition of a position of inferiority or superiority in relation to the other elements, while it is 
sophrosune which, involving the notion of friendship, suggests recognition of a common good and the 
fact that the good of the city and the other classes also corresponds to the good of the individual in the 
city. Sophrosune, in other words, suggests active endorsement of the common life on the part of the 
lower classes as best for them, while justice does not imply such endorsement. As unity, sophrosune, I 
am going to argue, neither in the city nor in the soul is presented as something that has been achieved. 
In the case of the city, unity, friendship and sophrosune is established only in the context of the two 
superior classes and this happens in Book 5. 
56 A passage which deserves citation is one from the Sophist where Socrates defines stasis and nosos 
as a form of badness in the soul. In the Sophist Socrates does not start from a conception of elements as 
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Comford {1912) pp. 248-9 has provided an account of the nature of the virtues 
and the relation between justice and sophrosune to which I am greatly indebted: 
'Considered as virtues of a whole consisting of distinct parts, Justice and 
Sophrosyne are complementary. Justice is a principle of differentiation and 
specialization of the parts: Sophrosyne is a principle of agreement, harmony and 
unity. A state with three classes, which had only Justice, would not be united: it would 
be a mere aggregate of three separate classes, each doing its own work and not 
interfering with the rest. Justice thus keeps the parts distinct. Sophrosyne is needed 
also to hold them together. It is, or involves, the sense of solidarity which links the 
three parts to one another and makes them form one whole. The two principles are 
analogous to the Neikos and Pfzilia (Harmonia) of Empedocles. Justice is like Neikos, 
which draws like to like and divides the elements into distinct, internally 
homogeneous groups. Sophrosyne is like Philia, which is an attraction between 
unlikes, tending to fuse them all in the unity of the 'sphere'. As Heracleitus says, 
'Combinations are wholes and not wholes; drawn together and drawn asunder'. 
Plato's state is a 'combination': it is a whole drawn asunder into parts by Justice, 
which maintains the differentiation of specialized, departmental activities; it is not a 
'whole' in so far as it consists of these distinct parts, and would fall asunder if it were 
not 'drawn together' by Sophrosyne.' 
There are a few further remarks I would like to make concerning the relation 
between the two virtues. Justice is taken to help maintain and support the other 
virtues. It is 'a quality which made it possible for them all to grow up in the body 
opposites. Rather opposition is dissolution of natural affinity: TI6T£QOV MAo n aTamv ijym'>wvoc; 
t1 1:T)v TaD cpvan avyycvovc; EK nvoc; bu:x<j>8oQac; bu:x<j>oQav ; (228a7-8). TL bf.; f:v \jJuxt;') M~a:c; 
f:m8Ujltct.Lc; Kctl 8UjlCN ijbovcti:c; Kctl A6yov Alm:ctLc; KctL71tXVTct aMt']Aatc; TctUTct TWV <j>ActVQWc; 
f:xovTwv auK ~a8ijjl£8ct bu:x<j>eQOjlEVct; .. . L.vyycv~ ye !lllV f_~ aVtXYJ<T)c; aUjl71ctVm yf.yovev. 
(228b2-6) It makes a difference if the elements are conceived as having affinity. If they have affinity 
I 
and in so far as they have affinity they do not need to be conceived as radically separate and also 
sophrosune and harmony, which suggest affinity can develop. In Republic Book 4 we start from the 
conception of elements as opposites and thus it is not clear how they have affinity with each other and 
also how unity can develop. 
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politic and which when they have sprung up preserves them as long as it is present' 
(433b7-10, trans. by Shorey). I think it is clear in the case of courage and wisdom that 
justice can help their development if justice supports the development of different 
activities or functions without interference from the lower parts. 
It is not clear to me whether we should consider justice to be sufficient for 
sophrosune. Yet, I believe, justice can be seen as conducive to sophrosune and at least 
necessary for it to develop. Metaphorically speaking, it may be said that by separating 
the opposing parties and not allow them to harm each other we leave room for 
friendship and a sense of community to develop. Such a sense of community and 
friendship presupposes justice in the sense that justice makes sure that there is no 
encroachment and offence. But it could be argued also that the reverse is the case; if 
in other words there is friendship there is no offence in any case. Thus while it seems 
that sophrosune as friendship entails justice in so far at least as it signifies absence of 
offence, justice does not entail friendship. In Book 4 in general Plato tends to 
emphasize the priority of justice, and such priority is also presented as a temporal one. 
Thus, for example, when Socrates presents justice as the proper internal activity of the 
soul, justice as establishing the rule of reason comes first and unity afterwards 
( 443d2-e2). Perhaps if justice is to be associated with separation and sophrosune with 
unison they can be seen as two complementary and perhaps successive stages in 
development of virtue where justice is to be performed first and unity can be 
established after the performance of justice. However, at least as far as action is 
concerned, sophrosune and unity seems to be the desirable outcome since it implies a 
unified agency without any internal disagreement or conflict, and in which elements 
in some sense, do not do just their 'own' rather contribute to a common purpose. 
It seems to me that Plato's emphasis on justice and separation can be 
explained in a number of related ways. First of all, as I shall suggest later, all human 
souls possess unity, and more generally the elements do not work separately. 
Furthermore, I am going to suggest that the lower elements should not work 
separately. Nevertheless, the unity that ordinary souls display is problematic, 
incoherent and self-contradictory, whether one experiences conflict or not, even 
though Plato presents all the deviant characters as experiencing conflict. For instance, 
one can assume that the fact that the oligarchic character's soul is wholly directed to 
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the pursuit of money, his soul possesses sophrosune and unity. Such a soul would not 
constitute a unity even if he did not have to suppress certain desires. Justice somehow 
establishes the proper conditions for a real unity, and the precise hierarchical order 
between the elements which unity needs to involve. More generally the 
preponderance of justice, as reason's rule, indicates that unity does not lie in 
unanimous pursuit of any ends, rather in the ordered pursuit of right ends, which are 
dictated by reason. The other related reason why justice comes first is that as I am 
going to argue, what can properly unify the soul is reason. Reason though needs to be 
'separated' first, and operate autonomously in order to unify the soul. Ideally the unity 
of the soul can be achieved by reason, when it comes to grasp the principle or 
principles on which such unity is grounded, and this means that it has to obtain 
knowledge of the good. In order to produce a unity and proper combination between 
the elements, reason somehow needs to see the elements first as separate, including 
itself, examine their individual natures in distinction from its other, and also reach a 
conception of the principles which allow them to combine and associate in a proper 
way without producing contradictions or conflict. 57 
Now in the context of the Book 4 the emphasis is on justice and self-control 
and we are encouraged to consider the elements more as separate rather than as 
forming a unity both in the city and in the soul, in particular the lowest element from 
reason. In fact the lowest element has been so radically separated from reason both in 
the city and in the soul that its integration does not appear to be feasible. More 
generally sophrosune and harmony, as agreement and integration of the elements both 
in the case of the city and also in the case of the soul and also as suggesting some 
degree of rationality and consent on the part of the lowest elements, and thus their 
own positive share in virtue, does not appear to be obtainable. 58 Furthermore, if 
sophrosune turns out to be problematic, then also perhaps justice as conducive to 
57 In some sense we could said that we have also two complementary logical processes, analysis and 
synthesis, and analysis may be said perhaps to come first. 
58 See also Gill (1985) p. 15 who argues that the epithumetikon has not been presented as educable, and 
that 'Plato's claim to have produced tripartite agreement in the psuche (442c-d) or complete harmony 
and unity in the psuche (443d-e) exceeds what we have so far been shown in the educational 
programme' (p. 15). 
45 
sophrosune 1s problematic or defective and perfect virtue does not appear to be 
obtainable. 
Plato nevertheless did not find problematic the unification of the two superior 
elements, despite the fact that they were initially introduced as opposites (375c6-8, 
375d7-8) Later, Socrates is going to characterize spirit as reason's natural ally (441a2-
3) suggesting their connection or affinity, even though the two elements can be in 
conflict ( 441 b3-c2). The education that has been developed in Books 2-3 aimed at the 
harmonization of spirit and reason (410d6-4llal, 441e7-442a2). In so far as spirit is 
harmonized with reason it is, I think, 'blended' with reason and does not behave as if 
it is separate from reason. The joint function that reason and spirit perform, in so far 
as they are thus blended, is appetite's control (442a4-b3). When they suppress 
appetite the two elements operate together, one supporting the activity of the other. 
Such co-operation of the two elements is expressed in the definition of courage as 
preservation of the lawful beliefs one has through one's education, or more generally 
of reason's commands concerning what is to be 'feared' and what not (429b8-dl and 
442b10-cl). 
The city-soul analogy may appear to suggest that spirit has beliefs of its own, 
which it preserves in right action, and more generally that such preservation is a 
necessary and sufficient condition for right action. Strictly speaking spirit does not 
have beliefs of its own. In other words, separating spirit from reason and considering 
it in itself as constituting a separate part in the soul of its own is the same thing as 
'abstracting reason from it' and saying that it has no element of reason. Rather I 
believe that spirit can be assigned beliefs exactly because it is not as a matter of fact 
independent from and separable from reason and belief. 59 At worst it maintains a 
59 It may be objected that spirit is indeed separable from belief because according to Glaucon one can 
find spirit in children or in animals while one cannot fmd logismos in children. He goes on to say with 
a dose of irony that some people may never acquire logismos (441a7-bl) and Socrates adds that spirit 
can be found in animals. I wish to note that logismos is not the same thing as belief and thus the fact 
that we can find spirit without reasoning does not mean that it can exist without belief. Furthermore, I 
believe that reason is not exhausted by logismos, which represents its higher functioning but also 
involves belief. According to Plato a great number of people are irrational and unreflective, but this 
does not mean that they do not have beliefs. Finally in the Timaeus it is suggested that children do form 
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partial independence at best it becomes completely uniform with reason. Such 
independence can be expressed either by the fact that it may not sufficiently respond 
to certain beliefs or alternatively overreact. At the same time, the 'beliefs' that are 
associated with spirit, and whose preservation spirit supports, are not themselves 
separable from spirit, at least in so far as spirit contributes to the preservation of such 
beliefs. Perhaps it can be said that reason can form certain beliefs or give certain 
commands first, in which the spirit responds and thus these beliefs 'later' come to be 
'part' of spirit, in other words are mixed or combined with an affective element. But 
simultaneously such an affective component supports or preserves such beliefs, both 
at the moment of action and also in the long term. 
The harmony between reason and spirit that the program of education in music 
and gymnastics aimed at involved exactly such blending ofbeliefs concerning what is 
good, bad, just or unjust, shameful or fine with an affective or emotional element, 
which supports them and allows them to remain stable and firm in the soul, as an 
indelible paint (429e7-430b5), since the ruling classes have not been provided yet 
with much rational grounds or arguments that these beliefs are true. Rather to a great 
extent one comes to endorse the truth of such beliefs through 'acquaintance' or 
familiarization with them, and also with the association of certain beliefs and values 
with feelings of shame, or pride or anger. In some sense it can be said more that 
education's overall purpose was the training of emotion, if emotion is not considered 
to be something irrational and more generally as a kind of combination of reason with 
an affective element. 60 In other words, education did not treat reason as something 
separate or completely separate from emotion. It was treated as something combined 
with emotion, and more generally as something rather passive, and aimed at making 
such combination as good and stable as possible. 
beliefs even though they are not attributed logismos (43a6-44b) and it is also implied that animals 
possess beliefs as well (77b-c ). 
60 Gill (1985) pp. 15-6 is in my opinion right in suggesting that the education in Books 2-4 treats the 
soul as passive and does not aim at developing one's critical capacities. However, I do not fully agree 
with his suggestion that the education is addressed to spirit. In my opinion, the education addresses 
reason together with spirit and treats reason as something passive, (reason has defined initially by 
reference to dogs), and aims primary at creating a uniformity or agreement between reason and emotive 
elements. 
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Reason and the person 
Socrates at 443c9-d 1 says that justice does not have to do with external action, 
but rather with internal action, which concerns oneself and what is really one's own, 
in other words the parts of the soul: 'TO bf: yc ai\r]8Ec;, 'TOLOlJ'rOV ~EV n Tjv, we; 
emKt:v, i] bLKaLoauvll, aM' ou n rrt:Qi. U]v lt;w rrQat;Lv 'Twv atnou, aMa rrt:Qi. 
-nlv EV'TOc;, we; M118wc; 7r£Ql ECXU'TOV Kal 'Ta ECXU'TOU, ~~ i:aaaV'TCX 'TlXMO'TQLCX 
TrQlX'T'TELV fKCXa'TOV i:v mh<f>. In this passage the internal action, which justice 
consists in, and can be said thus to be genuinely 'doing one's own', since one is 
concerned with one's soul and the parts of oneself, is attributed to the person. 
Furthermore, such activity or action is not presented as exactly the same thing as the 
parts doing their own, as justice was previously defined (443bl-2). Previously justice 
consisted in a proper relation between separate agencies in the soul. Thus here justice 
in the soul does not consist solely in a certain state of order of the soul but also in an 
activity, which produces such order. Furthermore, justice in the second sense and 
sophrosune do indeed overlap. In other words, 'doing one's own' consists in an 
activity or action on the part of the person which produces both justice and 
sophrosune, and thus if justice is 'doing one's own' so is sophrosune.61 Justice 
encompasses sophrosune, and also sophrosune is the final outcome of justice ( 443e2). 
The two virtues become one activity or internal action, or two aspects perhaps of one 
activity, which eventually aims at unifying the soul. 
The question that anses is whether we should take such language, which 
attributes internal action to the person as a whole, as literal. Furthermore one may ask 
whether the person is to be identified with one of the parts of the soul, all the parts, or 
whether it constitutes something over and above the parts. 62 I believe that the person 
61 Cf. Timaeus 72a4-6. 
62 Bobonich (2002) admits that Plato often uses language that indicates that the person is something 
over and above the parts, but he argues that we can explain the claims Plato makes without invoking 
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in this passage corresponds to reason63 and the activity which constitutes doing' one's 
own corresponds to reason's activity, in so far as it cares for the soul and produces 
virtue as a state of the soul. However, in so far as reason plays such an ordering and 
unifying role it does not function as one part among the others, rather it functions as 
something over and above the other parts, being what causes and constitutes the 
whole. Furthermore, I think that 'doing one's own' as an activity of reason, that 
should be performed prior to 'external' action and is necessary for virtuous external 
action ( 4443e2), lies in reflection concerning oneself and self-knowledge, as an 
examination of one's desires and beliefs, and at the same time as a shaping of desires 
and beliefs in accordance with a conception of how one should be. It becomes clear 
that virtue does not solely lie in a proper state of the soul. Rather it also involves one's 
activity of reflection, and more generally in one's active engagement with one's soul 
that produces and supports such a state. 
This passage ( 443c9-444a2) may appear to undermine the conclusions of the 
argument for the division of the soul in two respects. First of all we have here a form 
of action or activity that is attributed to the whole or to the person in an unqualified 
way. Justice and sophrosune have already been presented as characterizing the whole 
and not the parts of the soul or the city. At the end of Book 4 they are also presented 
as forms of action that can be attributed to the whole or to the person. By implication 
also reason, when it operates well can be associated with and be attributed to the 
them (n. 27, p. 531). Indeed on Bobonich's interpretation of the argument for the division of the soul, 
there is no room for the soul as a whole to be something in its own right. On my interpretation of the 
argument for the division of the soul, the whole indeed is not ascribed an agency of its own right, but 
the argument leaves room for such an agency since it does not specify the nature of the whole. Kahn 
(1987) p. 82 n. 8 has also suggested that there is no room for a person as something over and above the 
parts on the level of the explanans. Irwin (1995) discusses Book 8 where the person is presented as 
handling over control to the lower parts of the soul (e.g. 553b-d, 561a-c). Irwin suggests that Plato's 
reference to the person is to be taken seriously (p. 285), and he seems to think that such cases of 
handling over control involve reason (p. 286). Thus he seems to associate the person with reason, even 
though he does not make such association explicit. Irwin rightly notes that 'Plato seems to intend' the 
person to remain the permanent source of authority; every change of domination in the soul is accepted 
by the soul itself (p. 287). 
63 Lovibond (1991) p. 50 has also suggested that Plato has a notion of central agency which 'is 
representative of the self as a whole' and should be in control. 
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whole. 64 Furthermore, if both separation and unification of the elements in the soul 
can be attributed to reason's activity, the conception of the lower parts of the soul as 
autonomous agencies that the argument for the division of the soul suggested is 
undermined. Rather, if my interpretation is correct, we see here that since virtue as the 
proper order or relation of the parts of the soul depends on reason, the agencies or 
activities that the lower parts constitute are also dependent on reason and thus they 
cannot be characterized as (sufficient) causes of action whether internal or extemal.65 
Both their separation from reason, and also their unification with reason is ultimately 
due to reason that can be characterized as the cause of justice and sophrosune as states 
of the person. In my next chapter I will argue more extensively in support of the thesis 
that the lower parts cannot be conceived as separate from reason. 
The relationship between these virtues and reason has been to some extent 
reversed. It is not exactly justice, as involving the proper state of the parts, in 
particular the lower parts which allows the good functioning of reason and its rule, 
rather somehow justice is due to reason, and self-knowledge. Reason appears to be 
responsible for its own autonomy or separation from the other parts. Furthermore, it 
can be said that the lower parts can have a share in virtue if their functions develop in 
a proper relationship with reason. In so far as the lowest part of the soul does not 
appear to have a share in reason, and it remains in opposition to reason, it cannot have 
a positive share in virtue. Thus more generally, I think that what we need is not a 
reciprocal separation between the elements of the soul. Reason indeed needs to 
function independently from the lower parts but the lower parts sho,uld not operate 
independently from reason. However to accept the possibility of such dependence is 
also to accept that the lower parts are not in essential opposition to reason. 
64 Cross and Woozley (1964) p. 129 have asked 'if a man's soul or self is composed of (these) three 
elements, how can he be anything over and above them? And if he is not, how can he be held 
responsible, let alone morally responsible, for his actions?' I think that the notion of justice as a 
structure of the soul which is not externally produced rather lies in one's own activity conveys such a 
notion of responsibility, even though I am not sure whether one can speak of moral responsibility. 
65 It ~eems to me that the lower parts can be characterized using the terminology that Plato adopts in the 
Timaeus (46c7-d4) as sunaitia (auxiliary causes). To characterize them in this way implies that they 
function as causes of action together with reason and not in separation from reason and the desire for 
the good, and also that they ultimately aim at the good. I will develop this suggestion more extensively 
in the next chapter. 
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I should also note that Socrates in this context emphasizes the importance of 
'external' action and thus also I think the importance of habituation for virtue (443-
e2-444a2). However, he indicates that 'external' action has to be undertaken only if 
prior to action one has established harmony in one's soul (443e2-3). Reflection thus 
has to precede action. External action itself, which involves pursuit of different ends 
both counts as virtuous and can be called just ( 443e5) and also contributes to and 
maintains this state of the soul (443e6-7), under the condition that it is done in the 
right frame of mind. Such a frame of mind lies in one aiming at maintaining the 
proper disposition in one's soul and it is this state of mind that makes particular 
actions virtuous (443e4-6). This is a reflective state of mind, and thus habituation is 
not a passive process. It is, I believe, in this sense that one acts as one and not as 
many. Whatever one's particular motives for action are, which may involve for 
example money making, caring for the body (443e3-4), 66 they need to be informed by 
and subordinated to the primary aim of reason which is justice and virtue in the soul 
and done in some sense for the sake of this aim. 67 In this way perhaps the lower parts 
also contribute to virtue in the sense that they provide areas of action or motivations 
in relation to which virtue can be exercised. Thus one does not merely happen to act 
correctly, and for example pursue money in the right way rather one consciously tries 
to establish the proper state in one's soul, and this is the only way that one can pursue 
money in the right way. 
It may be argued that the argument in the Book 4 is not conclusive in that the 
ends of action and more generally the overall aims of the person and reason are not 
specified. In the passage that I discussed extensively the overall aim of action, 
whether external or internal and also reason's aim is virtue and justice, as the proper 
condition in one's soul. Socrates also argues that the knowledge which governs just 
action, namely the action which both conduces to the virtuous condition and also is 
done so that the virtuous condition is preserved, is the only kind of knowledge which 
deserves to be named wisdom (443e7-444al). One may ask what this knowledge 
66 Among the particular aims listed here ( e2-4) the only one that is going to be forbidden later is 
politics (592a5-8). 
67 Compare with 591cl-592a6 on how the virtuous person should act. 
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precisely involves. I suggest that at this stage at least of the Republic, this knowledge, 
which governs right action, involves the assumption that justice and virtue as the 
proper condition of the soul, involving the proper order and arrangement of the parts 
of the soul, is good as such and should be given priority over all other aims. Also 
more generally it lies in the knowledge of how to pursue particular things so that 
either they contribute to or more generally they are in conformity with virtue.68 
Furthermore, if this knowledge has to be made more specific it may be said to 
involve a reflective endorsement of the lawful beliefs that one has acquired through 
one's education in the city one lives in and ideally in Socrates' city.69 These are 
beliefs that people who have been brought up in a civilized state already have to a 
great or lesser extent and that well-educated people, such as Glaucon and Adeimantus, 
are committed to. Self-knowledge and the rule of reason lies in the 'person' coming 
to accept the value of such beliefs reflectively by endorsing the conclusions of an 
argument concerning the nature of the soul and its parts. I believe that what people 
like Glaucon and Adeimantus lack is self-knowledge, knowledge of the nature and 
character of their souls. It is this knowledge more specifically that the argument in 
Books 2-4 aims at providing to some extent, which can simultaneously be seen as 
providing them with grounds which may reinforce their commitment to the value of 
justice and law. 70 
However, in my opinion, the self-knowledge that the argument in Book 4 
provides is deficient. Reason, the best part in us, throughout Books 2-4 has not been 
presented as something more than the passive recipient of such beliefs or as being 
capable of further training that the one that has been sketched in books 2-3 (441e7-
442a5). In being invited to identify with reason one is also invited to identify with 
these beliefs, which most people possess to some extent. 71 The nature more generally 
68 Compare again with 591c-592a and 618b7-619bl. 
69 Compare with 589c8: Ta KaAa Kai aiaxQa VOflLfltX. These very nomima are put under attack in 
Book 5 479d2-4. But later Socrates warns against a premature effort to undermine them (538c-539d). 
70 Right belief is not sufficient for virtuous action in two respects. On the one hand right belief may fail 
to govern action. On the other hand, self-knowledge and understanding of one's soul is also necessary 
for right action and perhaps also sufficient for right action. 
71 See for example 538c6-8, 574d5-6. 
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of reason, as the part with which we learn, has been revealed only in so far as it has 
been said to be an element which is loving what it becomes familiar with. 72 But the 
nature and object of this love is not adequately revealed. Furthermore it is presented 
as an element in the soul both distinct from and in opposition to bodily desires and 
pleasures, and the fact that we should identify with it has been supported by Socrates 
claim that it looks at the interests of the soul as a whole ( 442c4-7). By implication, 
since appetite has been presented as being solely one part of the soul and not the 
whole, and furthermore since it is presented as a part which tends to oppose reason, 
which is the element that represents one's interests, one understands that one has to 
restrain appetite and more generally not to identify with appetite in so far as it is in 
opposition with reason, rather to follow the beliefs that have been implicitly 
associated with reason. 
Now if one comes to consider this argument as circular or defective, and one 
needs still further or better reasons to pursue justice other than the division of the soul, 
one is encouraged in the following Books of the Republic to pursue philosophy 
further. Glaucon and Adeimantus on the other hand seem to be satisfied and 
convinced (445a5-b4). In my next chapter I will discuss more extensively Socrates' 
warning that one has to take a longer way ( 435c4-5) in the examination of the issues 
under question. A different method would allow one to acquire better knowledge of 
the soul and its virtues. 
72 See 375e-376b. 
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Part II 
The Unity of the Soul 
Chapter 3 
The longer road and the unity of the soul 
I concluded the previous chapter by suggesting that the understanding of the 
soul and its parts that the argument for the division of the soul in Book 4 provides is 
inadequate. That such understanding is inadequate is revealed in relation to the virtue 
of sophrosune, which suggests the unity of the soul and the unity and affinity of the 
parts of the soul. As a form of self-knowledge sophrosune appears to imply a 
conception of the soul as unity, and such conception was not available to the reader in 
Book 4. The argument for the division of the soul did not provide adequate insight 
into the unity of the soul and it appeared to preclude the unity of its parts, in particular 
the unity between reason and desire. More generally, the overall emphasis in Book 4 
was on opposition and the need to separate different mental functions. In this chapter I 
am going to suggest that a different approach to the soul is needed so that the soul's 
unity can be apprehended and the soul can emerge as a harmonious whole. 
The longer road 
Before expounding the principle of opposites and his conception of the 
divided soul Socrates pauses to provide a warning against the adequacy of his method 
for dealing with the question whether the soul contains these three kinds in itself or 
not (435c4-5). He suggests that the methods that he is using at present cannot provide 
exactitude/accuracy (aKQLpwc;) concerning the issues under question, and there is 
'another longer and harder way that conducts to this' (435e9-d4) (trans. by Shorey). 
Later in Book 6 Socrates refers back to his remarks in Book 4. Socrates focuses now 
54 
on the account of the virtues. He reminds Glaucon of his earlier account or definition 
of the virtues (o eKaa'tov Elll) which rested on the division or separation 
(bt.aa'tllaaf1£VOL) of three kinds in the soul (504a4-6). He also tells Glaucon that 'we 
were saying that, I believe that for the most perfect discernment of these things 
another longer way (MAll fllXKQO'tEQa 7t£QLOboc;;) was requisite which would make 
them plain to one who took it, but that it was possible to add proofs on a par with the 
preceding discussion. And you said that it was sufficient, and it was on this 
understanding that what we then said was said, falling short of ultimate precision 
(aKQL~dac;;) as it appeared to me, but if it contented you it is for you to say' (504bl-
7) (trans. by Shorey). 
Whereas in Book 4 Socrates' warning refers directly to the question of the 
tripartite division of the soul, in Book 6 it concerns more generally the question of the 
nature and definition of the virtues. On the grounds that the longer way in Book 6 
appears to deal with the question of virtues and that 'it is nowhere in the Republic 
expressly used either to confirm or to overthrow the triple division of the soul' Adam 
has suggested that 'tOU'to at 435d does not refer to the psychological question, rather 
to the ethical question (Adam, (1965) note ad loc.). It seems to me that Socrates 
makes it clear that the methodology he has used in relation to both questions is 
problematic, and that a different method should be applied both to the ethical and the 
psychological question. The difficult question that arises is whether a different 
methodology is expected to yield different results concerning the soul, and to 
supplement or to reject the results reached in Book 4. 1 In my opinion both the 
conception of the soul that is provided in Book 4, and the methodology that leads to 
such a conception are defective. I shall attempt to make suggestions as to why the 
1 Bobonich (2002) p. 528 n. 11 recognizes that the methodology adopted in relation to the soul may be 
problematic but he has suggested that a different methodology would not yield different results. He 
argues that there is no evidence that Plato would dismiss the conclusions of the argument for the 
division of the soul in Book 4. In his opinion it is one of the strongest arguments of the Republic, 
together with the argument in Book 5, for the division between belief and knowledge. On the other 
hand, Burnyeat (2006) p. 3-4 has suggested that the argument for tripartition and the principle of 
opposites on which it relies is dubious. He thinks that different and better arguments could be provided 
in order to distinguish three elelements or parts in the soul. 
55 
methodology is defective which may shed some light on the question why the results 
that the methodology produces are defective as well. It may be argued that Socrates 
does not take the longer way in the Republic. Nevertheless he provides indications as 
to where the longer way leads, and also indications concerning its expected results in 
both the middle books of the Republic and also in the context of the discussion of the 
soul's immortality in Book 10 (611a10-612a6). 
Let me first state in brief what the longer way appears to involve according to 
Socrates' remarks in Book 6 and 7. It becomes clear that the longer way leads to the 
form of the good (504c9-d3), which is characterized as the greatest lesson (504d2-3). 
Furthermore, it is suggested that the conception of the virtues is inadequate and lacks 
exactitude because one does not have a grasp of the good (504d6-8). Without 
knowledge of the good knowledge of other things is not beneficial (505a2-b3). More 
precisely it turns out that the virtues cannot be known adequately without knowledge 
of the good ( 506a6-7). Thus it is clear enough that an adequate account of the virtues 
presupposes knowledge of the good and their definition needs to involve reference to 
the good and specify their relationship with the good.2 The specification of their 
relationship with the good would render precision and exactitude to the account of the 
virtues. Knowledge of good is not necessary solely in order to provide an adequate 
account of the virtues. Rather it turns out that the good and reference to the good is 
necessary for the adequate examination and knowledge of any particular subject. 
Later in the context of the simile Socrates is going to say that the good is the cause of 
truth and knowledge in general (508e2-3). Thus the longer way as a method 
concerned with a particular topic, for example the soul or the virtues passes through 
the good.3 
We are provided with further information concerning the adequate method in 
the context of the simile of the line. I will mostly paraphrase in brief and without 
entering into the discussion of controversial details. In the context of the simile of the 
line Socrates provides an outline of dialectic, comparing and contrasting dialectic with 
2 See Irwin (1977a) p. 226: 'a complete account of the virtues must relate them to the good'. 
3 Shorey's comments (ad loc. p. 83) are pertinent: 'For metaphysics and cosmogony the vision of the 
idea of good may mean a teleological interpretation of the universe and the interpretation of all things 
in terms of benevolent design' 
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the method employed by the mathematicians. Philosophers and mathematicians 
employ hypotheses in a different way. Mathematicians rely on hypotheses that they 
do not question and of which they do not provide an account (510c5-d2) to proceed 
downwards to an ending or conclusion. Furthermore they make use of images or 
diagrams4 (510d5-51la2, 51la8-11), and thus they talk about sensible things even 
though their investigation concerns intelligible things (51 Od5-511 al ). Philosophers do 
not employ hypotheses as starting points (and thus as if they are known) to move 
downwards (511b4). Rather, they employ them genuinely as hypotheses, in other 
words as underpinnings and footings to move upwards towards a single non-
hypothetical principle which 'is the starting point of all' (511b5-6). It is not clear to 
me what the upward path involves. However, it seems to be clear enough that the non 
hypothetical principle is the form of the good, and by means of hypotheses possibly 
philosophers try to reach a definition of the form of the good. Having reached the 
form of the good, the philosopher now proceeds downwards 'making no use whatever 
of any object of sense but only of pure ideas moving on through ideas to ideas and 
ending with ideas' (511b7-c2) (trans. by Shorey). 
Later in Book 7 Socrates says that there is no other method that attempts 
(systematically) to determine what each thing is (533bl-2), and he refers to what in 
the earlier passage he has called noesis (511d8) while later he is going to call episteme 
(533e4). 5 I think this method can be identified with the dialectical method at 533c8-
dl that advances by doing away with hypotheses 'up to the first principle in order to 
find confirmation there' (trans. by Shorey). A dialectician is defined as the person 
who is able 'to exact an account of the essence of each thing' (534b2-3). And likewise 
concerning the good we need a man who is able 'to define in his discourse and 
distinguish and abstract from all other things the aspect or idea of the good'. If one is 
not able to do this one does not know the good itself or any particular good (534b8-
4 Presumably they make use of diagrams in order to illustrate and defend their hypotheses. Robinson 
( 1971 b) pp. 97-131 argues that mathematicians' use of the senses is connected with the fact that they 
treat their starting-points as certainties while they should treat them as hypotheses, in other words as 
not known to be true (p. 1 07). Robinson seems to think that the mathematicians are dogmatic and 
convinced of their 'hypotheses'because they rely on sensible experience. Irwin (1977a) p. 335, n. 44 
also suggests that in dianoia hypotheses are defended by use of sensible diagrams. 
5 See also 532a1-b2. 
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c5). Here Socrates seems to envisage a process of reaching a definition of the good 
by abstraction or distinction (btoq(mxa8cu 'tcfJ A6y4J ano 'tWV aMwv 71lXV'tWV 
cupt:Awv 'tl)v 'tOU aya8ou lbtav). I think that such process of division can be 
illustrated to some extent in his earlier rejection of the theses (or hypotheses) that the 
good is identical to pleasure or phronesis (505b5-cll). Such rejection of the thesis 
that pleasure is the good involves a distinction of the good from pleasure. I am 
inclined to believe that such a procedure can be associated with dialectic's ascent. 
However,,the dialectician should not solely distinguish the good from everything, and 
more generally particular ideas from each other but also associate the good with all 
other things (including knowledge, the other virtues and pleasure). More generally the 
philosopher has to reach a conception of the connection of all things, all reality, their 
community, kinship and affinity (531c9-d2, see also 537cl-3) and such conception of 
community or affinity is I think fully achieved by showing that they are all associated 
with the good and with providing a teleological account of reality. Even though a 
conception of the affinity of all things is something that education aims at 
encouraging prior to the ascent to the good perhaps such association of things with 
each other and the good can be fully achieved in dialectic's descent.6 
6 It seems to me that Irwin (1977a) pp. 222-3 is right in suggesting that the method pursued by Socrates 
in the definition of virtues in Books 2-4 is analogous to the method of the mathematicians: Irwin makes 
the following observations: a) The definitions of the virtues are hypotheses which do not rest on a full 
account of the good rather on certain beliefs concerning the good. b) They are defended through 
showing that their consequences are consistent with ordinary beliefs. c) Socrates more specifically 
defends them by use of images. Justice in the soul it is shown to be useful through a comparison with 
justice in the city, and also health in the body. He shows its goodness by comparing it with previously 
accepted 'goods'. It can also be noted that the principle of opposites which is accepted as a hypothesis 
is not defended by reference to further hypotheses, rather its clarified and also defended by reference to 
observable examples. Furthermore, I think that in general throughout Books 2-4 Socrates relies or 
presupposes certain assumptions concerning the nature of the good and also what is good for the soul 
and the city, that he avoids making explicit. Rather he somehow wants to draw the reader or the 
interlocutor towards such assumptions, by relying to a great extent on observable 'facts' or common 
beliefs concerning human behaviour and nature and by making use of examples and images. For 
example Socrates argues that if the city has been rightly founded then it is good in the full sense of the 
word (427e6-7) and thus it must have all the virtues (427e9-10). But one may ask what justifies one's 
assumption that the city is good. It seems to me that Socrates has not really provided an explicit 
account of what the city is and what a city is for, and thus what would make it good. Rather to a great 
extent he has rested on securing the agreement of his interlocutors in the successive steps of his 
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One conclusion that one can draw on the basis of Socrates' remarks in Book 6 
concerning the role of the good is that the argument in Book 4 concerning both the 
soul and justice was incomplete and lacked exactitude because the good was missing. 
Cooper and Penner have proposed solutions in this direction. Cooper (1977) pp. 152-3 
has suggested that the argument concerning justice in Book 4 is incomplete in that we 
are not provided an adequate grasp of the nature of knowledge which is necessary for 
justice and for reason to rule in the soul. Penner (2006) has suggested that there is no 
error in the argument in Book 4 (n. 14, p. 259) and its inadequacy lies in the fact that 
the argument lacks an account of the knowledge of the good, which it is the function 
of the rational part of the just soul to acquire in order to rule in the soul (p. 240). 
While the two commentators conceive the good in a different way, both of them seem 
to trace the inadequacy of the argument in the fact that we do not have a complete 
account of reason's function and purpose, which is also the purpose of the person. 
Furthermore they seem to trace no errors in the argument for the division of the soul. 
I am in agreement with Cooper's and Penner's suggestion that the good is in 
some sense missing from the specification of the function of the argument in Book 4. 
Indeed an account of good is needed so that one can fully understand the nature and 
function of reason and more generally the nature of the desire for the good. I think 
that their suggestion does not pay full justice to what Socrates says in Books 6 and 7. 
Socrates in Book 4 suggests that the longer way is needed to examine any topic and 
thus in my opinion reference to the good and knowledge of the good is not solely 
needed in order to specify the function of reason but rather the function of the lower 
parts as well. We are in need of a teleological account both of reason's role and also 
of the role of the lower parts as well. I will develop this suggestion in greater detail in 
what follows. 
building the city. Such agreement was secured by appealing to observable facts concerning human 
nature without fully exposing the principles on which the foundation of the city rests. However, in 
coming to apprehend the goodess of the city the reader also is coming closer to apprehending these 
principles. 
59 
First of all, I wish to suggest that apart from the good there is something else 
that is missing in Book 4. Socrates tries to provide an account or a definition of the 
parts of the soul but he does not provide an account or definition of the soul. It might 
be argued that an account of the parts of the soul constitutes an account of the soul, 
but in my opinion this is not the case. An account or definition of the soul would 
involve an account of the whole, or what the whole is, and what makes the whole a 
soul. Unless one assumes that a whole is reducible to the parts and the parts make a 
whole, an enumeration of the parts of the soul and their characteristics does not 
constitute an account of the soul. In Book 4 both in the case of the city and in the case 
of the soul it is assumed that the whole is not reducible to the parts. But we do not 
have a proper and explicit account of the whole or what the whole or the soul 
precisely is and its function, as we also are not provided with a definition of the city 
and what the city's function and purpose is. 
Crombie trying to trace the inadequacy of the method emplyed in Book 4 has 
made a similar suggestion. Crombie (1962) p. 96 has interpreted Socrates' warning 
against the inadequacy of the method concerning the division of the soul as follows: 
'Socrates means perhaps that one cannot establish conclusions by speculating about a 
subject without first answering the question what the thing under question is; they 
should have asked what the soul is before proceeding to ask whether it contains three 
distinct elements'. Later Crombie is going to suggest that the soul is essentially a pure 
intelligence (p. 1 00) and he seems to imply that it follows from such a definition of 
the soul that the soul does not have parts. I shall have to disagree with Crombie both 
in that the soul is basically solely a pure intellect and more generally that the soul is 
not complex. The reason why I think Crombie's remarks are important is that they 
reveal to a great extent that there is a real problem concerning methodology in the 
examination of the soul in Book 4, and that Socrates' concerns should be taken 
seriously. A dialectician is one who aims at reaching an account of the essence of 
something and we are not really provided with and we do not adequately grasp the 
essence of the soul in Book 4. To grasp the essence of the soul one of course would 
need to go up to the good and examine the way the soul is related to the good. 
Furthermore, as Crombie suggests, such an account is prior to the question of 
whether the soul has parts and what these parts are. One has to try to reach a 
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definition of the soul first before dealing with the question of the soul's complexity or 
partition. Therefore, if my interpretation is correct, the problem concerning 
methodology has to do with the fact that the question of the soul's partition has not 
been raised in the proper way. I would like to add that if such a question of what parts 
the soul has can be seen as a question concerning the soul's nature or what the soul is, 
the soul's nature is not adequately revealed by a list of its parts, whether it has these 
parts or not, unless we assume that the soul indeed does not have a nature or essence. 
Now I think that the conception of the soul as having a nature or essence 
involves a conception of the soul as having unity and as being something over and 
above the parts. It does not necessarily involve a rejection of complexity or partition. 
It seems to me that Plato believes that an aggregate of parts does not have unity and 
furthermore does not have a nature and is not properly speaking a whole. I think it is 
implied, even though not explicitly stated in Books 2-4 that order and harmony is 
essential to a whole and also what makes something one (443el-2).7 Thus the city 
really becomes a whole and city thanks to justice and sophrosune. These two 
complementary forms of arrangement are essential to the city. Without justice we 
cannot have properly speaking a city. Justice and harmony does not solely make a city 
a good city rather it makes somehow a city as an aggregate of people into one city and 
a real city. Somehow the less justice there is in a city the less there is a city. We learn 
that other cities apart from Kallipolis do not constitute one city and as consequence a 
whole. 8 In a similar way I think justice and sophrosune as forms of ordering unify the 
7 As I suggested earlier, the elements in the soul, as parts, do not account' for order and harmony. 
Rather it is in some sense the whole and reason that imposes order and harmony upon the parts, and 
thus such order and harmony primarily belongs to the whole, and in virtue of the whole to the parts. 
However, perhaps this relation between part and whole does not apply in the same way in the city and 
in the soul, since perhaps in the city the parts have a greater autonomy and can be seen as having a 
greater role to play in its unity and order. 
8 Socrates starts developing a notion of the 'whole' in Book 4 420b2-c5, explaining that his aim has 
been the whole and not the part (420dl-5, see 42lb8). We learn later that his aim is to make the city 
'one' 423 e3-c3 and also each citizen 'one' 423d2-7, so that the city as a whole is one. Finally unity is 
associated with education and nurture (423e2-3). While previously Socrates argued that the city has to 
be ·w; iKav~ Kat f-lla (423c4) education and nurture is said now to be one and sufficient: Eixv 'tO 
i\Ey6f.!Evov EV f.!Eya <j>vAanwm, f.!liMov b' av'tL f.!Eyci:Aou iKav6v (423e2-3) The discussion of 
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soul. This indicates that justice and sophrosune are essential to the soul, and without 
them we cannot properly have a soul.9 Thus indeed we have a kind of grasp of the 
essence of the soul in Book 4 but this is indirect and it is not made fully clear that 
justice and sophrosune are essential to the soul. 
As far as the argument for the division of the soul in Book 4 is concerned we 
do not learn that the soul has a nature or essence and is something in itself. If the soul 
had an essence or nature, its nature could be predicated to the whole in an unqualified 
way. If reason is essential to the soul, as I think it is the case, we could say that the 
soul (as a whole) is reason for example or that it is a rational entity. However, the 
activities that the soul is said to contain in Book 4 cannot be predicated to the whole 
in an unqualified because they are presented as opposites. Hence, according to Book 
4 reason is no more essential to the soul than appetite. In fact exactly because we do 
not learn whether there is something that can be predicated to the whole, we do not 
learn that the soul has essence or nature or is something in itself. Even though the 
argument for the division of the soul does not exclude that the soul is something in 
itself, it looks as though the list of mental activities Socrates provides is exhaustive 
and thus it looks as though nothing is left so that it may be attributed to the whole. 10 
The way the soul is portrayed in the argument for the division of the soul in 
Book 4 reminds one of the Trojan Horse in the Theaetetus that Socrates refers to 
illustrate an account of the soul and the role of the senses in it that he wants to reject 
the unity of the city is continued in Book 5 (having being left incomplete at 423e8-424a3) where unity 
and what binds the city and makes it a unity is said to be the greatest good for the city (462a2-b2). 
9 Harte (2002) argues that in the later dialogues Plato believes that wholes have unity or are ones and 
also that structure is essential to wholes (see Harte (2002) pp. 122-35 and also p. 159). See also 
Parmenides 157d-e, on which she bases her account. Harte also argues that 'a very striking feature of 
Plato's characterization of wholes is their normative character. Wholes are either good things or fail to 
be wholes at all' (p. 274). 
10 I previously argued that it turns out towards the end of the argument that reason and its activity can 
in fact be predicated to the whole, in other words the person, and it turns out indeed that the person is 
(essentially) reason. This activity can be identified with justice and sophrosune, and thus justice and 
sophrosune constitute both a mental activity which I think is to be identified with a certain way that 
reason functions, and also with the state, order, or structure that such activity produces. If the state of 
order is essential to the soul no less essential is reason, which is the cause of this order and harmony. 
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in this dialogue (184d1-5): L\nvov yag nov, w mii:, d noMa( nvec; tv J1~-tiv 
Wan£Q tv bOUQELOLc; LnnOLc; aia8ijanc; tyKa8T)V'raL, aN\a !-tTl ELC: IJlaV nva 
ibeav, EL'r£ 'lj!uxl)v £h£ on bet: KaAELV, naV'ra 'rat)'[a UUV'r£LVEL, lJ bu:X 'rOU'rWV 
oiov ogyavwv ala8av6~-te8a oaa ala8T)'ra. I find Bumyeat's overall discussion 
of the passage illuminating. Bumyeat (1976) p. 31 argues that the view Socrates 
rejects is that 'there are a number of senses in us ... only in the same sort of way there 
are a number of ... warriors ... in the Trojan horse'. In that case, as Bumyeat stresses 
we would have a mere collocation of distinct, autonomous items 'whose togetherness 
is an arbitrary imposition of ordinary language, not the constituting of a unified entity' 
(p. 32). 'The only role left to Socrates .. .is that of a mere container, like the hollow 
horse ... ' (p. 33). 'The perceiving subject is deprived of all unity, synchronic or 
diachronic' (p. 31 ). Bumyeat concludes that the view that Plato is rejecting is that the 
senses have the kind of autonomy that the parts of the divided soul have in the 
Republic' (p. 34). Socrates in the Theaetetus does not deny that there are many senses 
or sensations in the soul. The position he wants to reject is that what the senses are in 
the soul as if the soul is somehow a characterless container failing to unify them. 
Socrates puts forward the view that the many sensations are ·dependent upon and tend 
towards or converge a single form or idea, 11which can be identified with the soul, and 
which is presumably unitary and at the same time unifies the many senses. 
The argument for the division of the soul in Book 4 may be reasonably 
interpreted as providing a portrait of the soul analogous to the Trojan horse of the 
Theaetetus. We are told that the parts are parts of the soul and these are explicitly said 
to be in the soul, contained by the soul; but we are not told whether the soul is 
something in itself, which would involve its being a single idea or form, and thus also 
being able to unify its contents. Furthermore in Book 4 Plato makes use of the 'with' 
11 For the fonnulation compare with Parmenides 157d8, where a part is said to be a part of a whole 
which is presented as single fonn or idea: OUK tXQct '(WV noMwv ovbi: n£XV'rWV '(0 f.lOQLOV f.!O~HOV, 
t:XN\a f.Uii:<; nvo<; l6ta<; KC(L EVO(, nvor::,, 0 KAAOUf.!EV oAov, a, amXV'rWV EV 'rEAELOV yEyovoc;, 
'rOU'rOU f.!OQLOV av '(0 f.!OQLOV ELTJ. See Harte's (2002) p. 131 comments on this passage. It seems to 
me that there is a difference here because the passage from the Theaetetus does not convey a static 
picture. Rather, the senses are presented as being directed towards the whole, as if somehow they strive 
to become a whole. 
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idiom to express the relation between an activity of the part and the whole ( 436a8-b4) 
that he rejects in the Theaetetus, adopting the 'through' idiomY In the Republic he 
provides an answer to the question of whether we do something with a part of us or 
with a whole that he rejects in the Theaetetus. Thus the soul looks like a characterless 
container or in itself 'empty' locus of the parts like the Trojan horse, which without 
the warriors in it is not something in particular. But this is not Plato's view of the 
soul in the Republic. Hence, in my opinion the conclusions of the argument in Book 
4 are not just incomplete. They are misleading, in that one may take them to suggest 
that the soul has no essence and not unity in itself. This is because Socrates has raised 
the question of partition in the wrong way. He should have asked first for a definition 
of the soul, in order to discover what pre~isely this 'single idea' that the whole is. 
Furthermore, in order to reach such a definition of the soul, one has more generally to 
get rid of the senses and what the soul appears to be through the senses and 
observation of human behaviour. Rather somehow one has to rely on pure dialectic 
and the hypothetical method. 
That the soul has essence or nature and is something in its own right, 
independently from the body and the senses, and thus also by implication 
independently from the lower parts, eventually becomes clear in Book 10. This will 
be discussed in greater detail in a different section. I think we also learn a great deal 
concerning the nature of the soul in Books 6 and 7. It may be argued that in the 
middle Books of the Republic Socrates does not undertake to question the conclusions 
of the argument for the division of the soul, by using his dialectical method and 
entering into the longer way. However, it is characteristic of these middle Books that 
the soul is treated consistently as a unity or a whole and an essentially rational entity. 
Cooper (1977) p. 152-3 is right in suggesting that we have a more complete account 
of the function of reason in these Books. 13 However, it should be noted that there is no 
12 See Theaetetus 184cl-7, 184d7-e6 and Burnyeat (1976) p. 29-30. 
13 Also Irwin (1977a) p. 237-8 suggests that one understands better the rational part and its difference 
from the other parts only when one understands rational desire. Indeed to understand the desire for the 
good, and its difference from other desires, a division in the soul, which also involves a partial 
distinction of the desire for the good and its object from other desires and their objects, does not 
suffice. Rather to understand reason's desire one has basically to distinguish the good from everything 
(534b-c) and thus also grasp the desire for the good in its pure form. 
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mention of the three parts of the soul in these Books. This can be interpreted as 
suggesting that Plato in these Books is concerned with only one part of the soul, 
namely reason. This in my opinion is partly true and partly false. I think that Plato 
does not make reference to partition in Books 6-7 because he is concerned with the 
whole and the essential nature of the soul. And indeed it looks as though this essential 
nature appears to correspond to what he calls in the other Books logistikon. 
Three passages from Books 6-7 are particularly relevant in that they reveal 
Plato's conception of the nature of the soul. One is the discussion of the philosophic 
nature in Book 6 (485a4 ff.). In this context Socrates attributes all the virtues to 
philosophers resting on a priori grounds and in particular on the philosopher's love of 
wisdom, without trying to specify these virtues by reference to any parts of the soul. 
The account of philosophic nature that Socrates provides is basically an account of the 
nature of the soul, which is assumed to be essentially erotic and more specifically 
philosophical. Thus all the virtues are derived from a conception of the nature of the 
soul as eros. If one assumes that the soul has separate parts it is not clear how 
philosopher's eros and more generally the development of the erotic nature of the soul 
can produce and entail all virtue. Sophrosune is more precisely presented as lying in 
desire being directed towards intellectual pleasure ( 485d3-e5). Here we see that such 
eros seizes the soul as a whole altering the structure of the personality. 14 We are 
offered at last a conception of sophrosune where desire and pleasure are presented in 
agreement with reason and which involves no reference to suppression of desire or 
separation of desire from reason. 15 
14 I think that eros in general applies to the whole. It represents an overwhelming passion that seizes the 
person as a whole and deeply affects the structure of the personality or the soul whether negatively or 
positively. One can compare with the Phaedrus where the erotic reaction is presented as seizing the 
soul as a whole and leading it upwards as a whole. Eros is the wings of the soul which are attributed 
the whole and not with a part of it (251 b-d). I think that eros can represent both a force in the soul, 
which causes its unity, and also the structure or state of personality that unity has been achieved. Thus 
eros more generally when guided in the proper way by reason can unify the soul. 
15 Kahn (1976) p. 32 argues that the formal principle of unity of virtues in the context of Book 4 is 
justice. However, he notes that in Book 6 wisdom as indistinguishable from eros entails the other 
virtues and is their cause. He notes that 'in terms of psychological causation, it is wisdom and not 
justice that produces the unity of virtue' (p. 32). And he rightly in my opinion suggests that in Book 6 
we have a different notion of wisdom from book 4 (p. 33). Kahn also stresses that it is misleading to 
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The second passage occurs in the context of the discussion of the longer way. 
Socrates asserts that the good is the purpose of all human action and what each soul 
pursues in general, without qualifying his claim in any way (505el-2). The unity of 
the soul is indicated by the fact that there is unity of purpose. Socrates does not say in 
this context that the good is the aim of reason. Rather he says that the good is the 
ultimate aim or purpose of the soul and human action in general. In my opinion, if 
what this passage suggests appears to contradict the conclusions of the argument for 
the division of the soul, in particular with a conception of the lower parts as being 
somehow capable of generating action on their own, one has to be concerned about 
the adequacy of the conclusions that the division of the soul has yielded and not with 
what Socrates says in the context of Book 6. The thesis or hypothesis that all souls 
desire the good is a hypothesis concerning the nature of the soul by reference to which 
the conclusions or hypotheses in Book 4 have to be tested and accordingly rejected or 
endorsed and not vice versa. 
Finally, a third passage explains the purposes of the programme of higher 
education. Education proper is said to aim at turning the whole soul towards the 
intelligible realm and the good (518c4-d). No other method of turning the whole soul 
towards light is presented apart from the intense programme of intellectual t~aining 
that is outlined in Book 7. The previous form of 'education' treated the soul as 
something rather passive and uncritical, willing to adopt for itself whatever it is said 
to it to accept, while here the soul is somehow encouraged to draw from its own 
resources to find the truth and accordingly shape itself and its own character. We have 
apparently education, which consists in intellectual training and at the same time deals 
with the soul as a whole and not with a part of it. It is not exactly the case that the 
training of character is ignored or is somehow left out or is assumed to have been 
characterize wisdom as a part of virtue since 'it is the part which makes the whole what it is: namely 
excellence' (p. 36). I suggested in the earlier section that the unity of virtues in wisdom can also be 
found in Book 4 because justice which is presented as the cause of the other virtues can have a double 
meaning, as a state or order and as an activity which produces this state. As an activity justice can be 
identified with exercise of wisdom and self-knowledge and can also be connected with eros as self-love 
and self-care. The relationship between the virtues also I think corresponds to the relationship between 
the parts of the soul. 
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fully accomplished by the education described in the earlier books of the Republic. 
The previous educational stage was not expected to fully achieve the harmonization of 
desire with reason and left the soul still divided to some extent. 16 The harmonization 
of reason with desire is due to this intellectual training, which leads the soul to the 
good by simultaneously directing desire towards intellectual pleasures. In the context 
of this education formation of character is not taken to be a separate problem from the 
formation of reason and thus by implication character, pleasure and desire are not 
taken as somehow separate from reason. The soul thus is not treated as an aggregate 
of desire and reason. Rather desire and pleasure are treated as dependent on reason 
but also as able to support reason. More generally, the account of the soul given in 
Books 6-7 does not entail or imply that the soul is simple, let alone that it is a pure 
intellect or nous, which is presented here as the eye of the soul and not as exhausting 
its nature (518c4-dl). Pleasure for example is assumed to be 'part' of the soul. 
Nevertheless it implies that the soul is a rational, dynamic, autonomous and flexible 
principle, capable of drawing upon itself to realize its nature, which is to be directed 
towards the good. 
The longer road and the lower 'irrational' parts of the soul 
A conception of the human soul as being essentially rational and unitary does 
not entail that the soul is not complex. Furthermore it does not entail that it does not 
possess the lower parts that are identified in Book 4. 17 Plato is, I think, not dogmatic 
16 See also Gill (1985) p. 19-21 who suggests that the account of philosophers in Book 6 (485d) seems 
to presuppose a rather different notion of desire from that employed elsewhere in the Republic. And he 
also suggests that we have a theory here that 'stops short of maintaining that the sensual desires 
associated with the epithumetikon can themselves be reeducated, so as to participate in the overall goals 
of the psyche' (p. 21). But he argues that Plato provides now much better grounds that he has 
harmonized the soul (p. 21 ). It can be said indeed that srictly speaking even in the context of Book 6 
desire is not presented as something educable. It can be educated in the sense that it can be directed or 
channelled by reason. 
17 It may entail of course that these parts are not essential to the soul, as the argument in Book 10 
(611a10-612a6) may appear to suggest, and thus they do not belong to the soul as such. While the 
lower parts may not be essential to the soul as such, they may be perhaps essential to the human 
embodied soul or to the human soul qua embodied and thus the embodied soul cannot be adequately 
understood without reference to these parts. 
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as to whether the human soul has precisely these three parts or more or less18 and I 
shall not discuss this question. However, it seems to me that if the soul has to be 
conceived as essentially rational and unitary and what it is called the logistikon, the 
picture of the lower parts that Book 4 conveyed needs to be modified. Such a 
conception of the soul is not compatible with a conception of the lower parts as 
autonomous and independent, as they were presented in the argument for the division 
of the soul. A conception of the soul as unitary and essentially rational suggests that 
complexity or plurality is subordinate to unity, and more specifically that the lower 
parts are dependent on reason. Reason on the other hand, in so far as it represents the 
whole, and is not a mere part, is in principle at least autonomous from the inferior 
parts.I9 
More specifically I think that Plato believes that the whole is prior to the part, 
and a part depends on the whole of which it is a part. Thus if the whole has essence 
the lower parts are dependent on this essence and their own nature and identity is 
bound to this essence. In Book 4, for example, it is said that the parts are parts of the 
soul and they are in the soul, and this may be taken to indicate that they are dependent 
on the soul somehow and what the soul is in order to exist. But in Book 4 we were not 
told whether the soul is something in itself, and thus it looked as though the fact that 
the parts were somehow parts of the soul did not affect their nature in any way. As 
long as the whole is essential to the parts and the soul is essentially reason, the nature 
of the lower parts cannot be fully conceived and understood independently from 
reason.Z0 To conceive the lower parts as separate or independent from reason is not 
18 Compare also with 443d7-8, where it is allowed that there are further parts in between the ones that 
have been distinguished. 
19 Perhaps reason can be conceived as both one part among the others and as something above the other 
parts. 
20 Harte (2002) p. 174 has argued that according to Plato the parts are essentially parts of a whole and 
are dependent on the whole. She argues that Plato believes that structure is essential to the whole and 
there are two ways that the relationship between the whole and the part can be conceived. According to 
the first way of thinking the parts of the whole may be identified independently of the structure of the 
whole they compose. According to the second way of thinking,( ... ) 'structure is no less essential to the 
parts of a whole than to the whole itself. See also Harte (2002) pp.l58-167. She suggests in her book 
that Plato endorses the second approach.and that he believes that the parts are dependent on the whole 
and structure and get their identity in the context of the whole (p. 273). Thus structure is no more 
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really to conceive them as parts of a whole and parts of the soul. The parts 'become' 
parts of the soul if they are associated with reason and the desire for the good, thus in 
some sense they 'become' parts of reason and the desire for the good. 
In Book 4, the appetitive part, in being presented in essential opposition to 
reason and separate from reason did not appear genuinely as part of a whole and part 
of the soul. It can be said that in some sense the parts of the soul become parts of the 
whole only when they are in conformity with normative reason, and thus when reason 
can actually endorse them. But to present them or to describe them as participating in 
reason is to account for the fact that they are indeed psychic elements and also 
simultaneously for the fact that they are not in essential opposition to reason, rather 
they are essentially parts of their whole and their natural tendency or potential is to 
come to be in conformity with reason. 
Furthermore, as the whole is both epistemologically and ontologically prior to 
the part, in an analogous fashion a definition of the part, as a part of a whole needs to 
come after a definition of the whole and to involve reference to the whole. As 
Crombie (1962) p. 96 has suggested, a definition of the soul needs to be reached first. 
But such definition, I think, would not necessarily exclude the presence of parts in the 
embodied soul. Rather it would be needed in order to define the parts in the proper 
way. Thus, more generally, the lower parts were not defined as parts of a whole in 
Book 4 and thus their definition was incomplete and lacked exactitude. To define 
them in a proper way we need to connect them with the form of the good, and the 
whole. In defining thirst as a desire for drink (437dl-e6) Socrates did not present 
thirst as a part of the soul. Rather he depicted thirst as something preexisting the 
whole or as something outside the whole. His definition corresponds to what thirst 
would be 'before' coming to belong to the soul, and thus in some sense in Book 4 we 
have the constituents out of which a soul can be 'made', without the whole or what 
they may be said to come to constitute. I think that in order to show that the desire for 
essential to the parts than to the whole. Harte notes that this conception 'creates the need for an 
account of the relation between that which comes to be part of structure and the part which it becomes' 
(p. 165). However she does not provide such an account. Furthermore she suggests that there is another 
associated problem regarding the nature of metaphysical dependence (p. 278-9) of the part from the 
whole, but again she does not provide an account of the relationship of dependence. 
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drink is a part of the soul Socrates would need to define thirst as a desire for good 
drink. This kind of definition would show the fact that the lower part, in so far as it is 
a part of a whole, is connected with reason and aims at the whole and also at the form 
of the good. Defining thirst as simply a desire for drink does not show why thirst is a 
desire and a psychic state or activity. More generally the account of the lower parts in 
Book 4 indicated and underlined the difference of one part from the others and it did 
not show what the parts have in common since they are parts of the same thing, the 
soul. Exactly because the soul did not appear to be something in itself it appeared as 
though they do not have something in common, which also connects them and unifies 
them. 
I wish to suggest that this conception of the parts as parts of a whole 
corresponds to dialectic's descent, and more specifically perhaps, since the lower 
parts are to some extent necessarily sensible manifestations of the soul, to the descent 
into the cave. What characterizes dialectic's descent is a descent from the higher 
order of existence or reality to the lower and an elucidation of the lower by 
associating the lower to the higher?1 Such elucidation lends also intelligibility to a 
lower level of reality, which conceived in isolation or in separation or independently 
from the higher level of reality it does not possess. For example the forms, which are 
somehow lower than the good, acquire greater intelligibility when they are conceived 
together with the good, which is more generally conceived as the cause of 
intelligibility, truth and essence (508d10-509b9, 517cl-3). Dominic Scott (2000a) p. 1 
argues that 'an essential aspect of descending' is what he terms 'revisitation'. He 
suggests that philosophers' descent to the cave is paradigmatic of such revisitation 
and rightly argues that the descent to the cave 'has an epistemological dimension in so 
far as it continues the process of philosophical education'. Scott defines 'revisitation' 
as follows: 'making a departure from one level of reality to another and then 
comparing the two, so as to see one as derivative of another' (p. 1 ). I believe that this 
definition captures the significance of philosophers' descent to the cave and shows, in 
my opinion, that it constitutes an extension of dialectic's descent as it is described in 
21 See Rowe (2007) p. 45 who argues that in all three of the similes that Socrates introduces in Republic 
Books 6-7 ' ... It is entirely essential that the lower levels of objects relate to, and are informed by, the 
highest'. 
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the context of the simile of the line. I wish to add to Scott's account that the descent to 
the cave suggests an examination of the sensible world from a teleological point of 
view and allows a conception of the sensible world as sharing in truth and reality and 
being a product ofreason.22 The contents of the cave now examined under the light of 
the forms and the good acquire greater intelligibility, and the philosophers are able to 
'see infinitely better' than other people since they know the truth (520c4-6). 
Furthermore, in my opinion, it suggests that philosophers' beliefs concerning the 
sensible world are (in)formed by their knowledge of the good and the forms (or 
whatever they have managed to achieve in their ascent to the forms and the good). 
Philosophers have truer beliefs than other people because they are able to see the 
physical world in its relationship to the forms and in conjunction with the forms, the 
good, and reason, and not in separation from them, without simultaneously confusing 
sensible things with forms. It is more generally this relationship to the forms that 
allows the sensible world to have a share in truth, reality and intelligibility. In a 
similar way they are able to perceive how the lower parts of the soul can operate 
together with reason and understand in a much better way their function and purpose. 
The project of the descent is not undertaken in the Republic. I wish to suggest 
that it is undertaken both concerning the lower parts of the soul and the sensible world 
in general in the Timaeus, which are examined from a teleological point of view and 
shown to be products of reason. In the Timaeus more specifically the lower parts are 
presented as formed by the lower gods together with Necessity. Thus, unlike the 
immortal soul, which is the work of reason alone, the lower parts belong to the class 
of things23 that are joint products of Reason and Necessity, or alternatively reason and 
the senses. As joint products of reason and necessity they operate for the good. 24 But I 
22 Scott (2000a) pp. 1-20 argues that Socrates does not attempt to revisit his assumptions concerning 
the soul. Furthermore, he does not trie to speculate what this revisitation would involve). He argues that 
the only exaple of revisitation, where metaphysics are used to deal with psychological theory is the 
examination of pleasure in Book 9. 
23 For this distinction see Strange (1999) pp. 402-4. 
24 Johansen (2004) pp. 150-3 has emphasized that the lower parts of the soul in the Timaeus work for 
the good as a result of the activity of the lesser gods. He also argues that 'the result of the lesser gods' 
work is then, to create man as a telelologically ordered system in which motions that arise by simple 
necessity and rational motions are combined. Motions that were initially disruptive and chaotic are 
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think that Timaeus' claim that the lower parts of the soul are created by the lower 
gods indicates, not really that somehow the lower gods make something new, rather 
that these parts are in reality joint products of our reason or the immortal soul and a 
body. In my opinion these parts are not really independent or separate entities added 
to the soul after embodiment. Rather the 'gods' shape the body in such a manner that 
the sensations that originate in the body already have some shape and structure, and 
furthermore such sensations are 'taken over' and further shaped by our own reason, so 
that we have the lower parts of the soul. In shaping these affections reason is also 
affected by them and shaped to some extent. 
The view concerning the nature of the soul and the status of the lower parts of 
the soul that I am trying to defend is, I believe, almost in complete agreement with the 
account of Plato's psychology that has been suggested in a short article by Archer 
Hind long ago.25 Archer Hind argues that Plato has a consistent conception of the soul 
throughout the dialogues and that he is committed to the soul's unity. He argues that 
conceiving the lower parts of the soul as somehow two independent substances 
annexed to the soul after embodiment is not compatible with the view of the soul as 
unity: 'but surely Plato did not mean that the soul, being apart from the body a 
uniform essence, on entrance into a material abode all at once annexes two inferior 
substances, being parts of itself yet essentially different' (p. 128). He argues that the 
'mortal kinds of the soul' constitute terminable modes of the soul's existence (p. 128) 
or 'temporary modes of its operation' (p. 129).26 I think the definition of the lower 
harnessed to serve a rational end. The result is the creation of a tripartite psychology' (p. 152). 'The 
tripartitie soul is the lesser gods' way of furthering our rationality given that we have to be embodied' 
(p. 154). Johansen (2004) pp. 153-159 draws a contrast between the lower parts of the soul in the 
Republic and the Timaeus that I tried to diminish. However, he is right in contrasting the account of the 
lower parts of the soul in Book 4 with the account of these parts in the Timaeus and he argues that 'the 
change in emphasis between the Republic and the Timaeus reflects the fact that the Timaeus explicitly 
sets out to integrate the entire living being, body and soul, into a teleological account' (p. 158). 
25 See Archer Hind (1882) pp. 120-31. 
26 An account of the soul similar to the one by Archer-Hind has been suggested by Cornford (1971) pp. 
119-131. Cornford argues that the three kinds of impulse or desire are not 'ultimately distinct and 
irreducible factors, residing in three separate parts of composit soul, or some in the soul and some in 
the body'. 'They are manifestations of a single force or fund of energy, called Eros, directed through 
divergent channels towards various ends' (p. 21). An account of Plato's conception of the soul in the 
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parts as modes of the operation of the soul captures the fact that these parts are not 
separate from reason rather, in some sense, they are parts or lower manifestations of 
what Plato calls the logistikon in the Republic, which can also be identified with the 
immortal soul in the Timaeus. They look like qualities that the immortal soul takes on 
when it is embodied, and not as separate autonomous entities. More particularly, I 
wish to characterize the lower parts as modifications or qualifications of the logistikon 
and the desire for the good. Such modifications or qualifications are produced, as 
Archer Hind argues, from 'a 'combined action of soul and matter' (p. 127). In the 
next section I am going to discuss in some greater detail how I envisage the character 
of the lower parts of the soul. 
The lower parts of the soul as joint products of the soul and the body, reason and 
the senses 
More specifically one way to conceive the lower parts of the soul is as being 
mixtures or combination of the soul with the body, which result from the association 
or communion of the soul with the body. For instance 'thirst', as a desire for good 
drink and as a part of a whole, can be considered a mixture or combination which 
results from the association of two things, thirst as such and the desire for the good. It 
seems to me that conceived in this way the lower part constitutes a modified or 
qualified desire for the good, and it can be considered as a part or species of the desire 
for the good. I think that 'thirst as such' as something independent from the mixture 
can be identified with a bodily activity or motion, which plays a role in modifying 
reason or the desire for the good. Furthermore, I wish to suggest that thirst as a kind 
of ingredient inside the mixture or combination and not as prior to such combination 
can be identified with some kind of sensation, perhaps a kind of pain. However, ifthis 
Republic that has particularly influnced me is by Moreau (1953) pp. 249-57. According to Moreau, 
with whom I am in full agreement, Plato in the Republic intends to deny the fundamental Socratic 
theses concerning the nature of the soul, including both the thesis that the soul desires the good, and 
also the so-called Socratic intellectualism. Moreau rightly stresses that the distiction between different 
parts in the soul is not incompatible with the unity of the soul and the soul as essentially desiring the 
good (pp. 249-50). More generally he emphasizes that the argument in Book 4 does not provide one 
with insigh into the true nature of the soul (p. 253). 
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ingredient is considered as somehow pre-existing the combination, being independent 
or separate from such combination, it does not constitute a mental item, and thus it is 
not a form of pain or even less a desire. I think that it should be conceived as a bodily 
motion of which one is not conscious. Therefore, in my opinion, there are not really 
thought or reason or good-independent desires, since there are no desires in the soul 
whose source or cause is the body exclusively. 27 In so far as the soul is the source of 
certain desires, then reason is necessarily involved in their formation, since reason is 
an essential characteristic of the soul. Reason and the desire for the good may be 
perhaps involved in desire in different degrees or ways. 
Thus more generally the lower parts of the soul can be said to involve two 
ingredients. One is somehow provided by reason and the desire for the good and there 
is also an affective component. Perhaps there is an ambiguity when I am referring to 
the lower parts of the soul that I cannot fully avoid. To use the desire for good drink 
as an example, it may be said that such a desire constitutes a part of the soul, and as 
such it is I think a modification or perhaps alternatively a species of the desire for the 
good. Furthermore, this desire is not independent from the desire for good, since, I 
think, it is produced by this desire or it is a manifestation of the desire, but it has an 
amount of autonomy in the soul since it is a particular desire we have or actually 
experience in the soul. When talking about the lower parts of the soul one can also 
refer to an ingredient in this desire, which could be called thirst as such. This 
ingredient I think is not something that exists in its own right in the soul rather in so 
far as it is a mental item it is always 'mixed' with a cogntitive element and the desire 
for the good. In other words, if thirst always exists as an ingredient it is not separate in 
any case. An ingredient is always affected and never pure since it coexists in the soul 
with reason and the desire for the good. 
If my interpetation is correct, the lower parts of the soul, conceived as 
modifications or modes of reason's activity, have a status analogous to appearance 
(phantasia), which is defined in the Sophist as a mixture (aUfJ.fJ.Hl;H;;) of belief and 
27 Rowe (2007) p. 117-8 has argued that Plato in the Phaedo does not believe that there are desires of 
the body. Similarly Boys-Stones (2004) pp. 1-23 has argued that Plato in the Phaedo does not believe 
that the body determines the character of the soul and its desires. 
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perception (264b2).28 Phantasia results from belief and sensation but since phantasia 
constitutes a mixture, the two elements in so far as they constitute a mixture are not 
separate rather they are interdependent. In phantasia we do not have a mere 
juxtaposition of two independent things. Rather the two ingredients become 
inextricably connected, shaping or affecting each other. The 'initial' entitities come 
to constitute a third kind of entity, different both from pure belief and from pure 
perception or sensation. Appearance, therefore, is in some sense is a different part of 
the soul from belief. Appearance can be characterized as a kind of belief, and it can be 
true or false, as the Sophist shows but it does not constitute a pure belief which the 
soul reaches on its own (264al-4), rather it is somehow a belief in which the soul 
makes use of the senses and in which it is entangled with the body and the senses. 
Belief according to the Sophist is not necessarily or in principle dependent on 
perception. It is an originally different and independent thing. 29 Furthermore, belief 
can be seen as the cause of appearance and be conceived as something that is prior to 
appearance together with aisthesis. In a mixture however, or in so far as it constitutes 
an integral part of appearance, belief is dependent on and affected by perception, and 
equally aisthesis is dependent on and structured by belief.30 
I wish to argue that even though belief is at least in principle independent from 
perception and appearance, perception itself is not independent from belief and 
28 See 264 a4 ff: Ti b' O'taV flrl Ka8' atno aMa bL' aia8~aEwc;; naQf,] 't:LVL, '(0 '(0L0l)'(OV au 
m:X8oc;; &4 otov TE 6Q8wc;; dmi:v hEQov nnAr']v cpavTaaiav; Ovbev. OuKm)v £mimQ Aoyoc;; 
MTJ8r'Jc;; Tjv Kat tPEUb~c;;, 'tOt)'(WV b' i<:pavf] bLl:XvOLa flEV au'fiic;; 7lQOc;; tav'ti]v tPUXfic;; blaAoyoc;;, 
M~a bi: bLavoiac;; anoTEAEU'tfjaLc;;, '<Paiverm' bi: 8 AEyOflEV GUflflEL~LC:; aia8~m:wc;; Kai. M~fjc;;, 
avayKT] br'] Kai. 'tOU'tWV 'tctJ Aoy(fJ auyyEVWV OV'tWV tPEUbfj YE au-rwv EVLa Kai. EVLO'tE dvm. 
29 This is also clear in the Timaeus where belief is attributed to the world soul (Timaeus 37b), which 
also does not have perception. Reydam-Shils (1997) pp. 261-5 has argued convincingly that the world 
soul does not have perception. Even though the world soul has a body it does not perceive and have 
more generally, since it inhabits a body without sense organs and without environment, which can 
disturb it externally (33a-d). More generally if the circles of the different are to be associated with 
belief, we see that belief somehow preexists in the soul prior to its association with the body, and thus 
it is not dependent on the body. 
3° For an account of phantasia that I am mostly in agreement with see Delcomminette (2003) p. 223. 
Onphantasia in Plato see also Watson (1988) pp. 1-13. 
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reason, and does not exist in the soul on its own. Rather as I also suggested in the case 
of thirst, it exists as an ingredient in a more complex entity, which can be identified 
with appearance. 31 It seems to me that if perception is conceived as something pre-
existing the combination that constitutes appearance, again it should be attributed to 
the body and it would not constitute a mental phenomenon or state or activity. A 
motion of bodily origin is necessary for perception but apart from such a motion I 
think a psychic motion or activity is necessary and such activity is provided by reason 
or the immortal soul more generally. Thus if perception is a kind of affection of the 
soul, what ultimately is affected is reason and its activity. We can perhaps abstract in 
our mind this affective component from phantasia, and think of it in its pure form, 
and refer to it, but I think in such a case we have a genuine abstraction, in that while 
reason somehow can indeed (in principle) at least exist or be independent from 
sensation, sensation itself-at least in human and animal souls-cannot occur without 
some element of reason or belief. If this is the case we cannot have sensation or more 
generally we cannot perceive without reason and actual human perception must be the 
same thing as appearance. It seems to me that this follows from the Theaetetus if this 
dialogue is interpreted as stating that there is a single subject of consciousness that . 
can be identified with reason. 
Burnyeat (1976) p. 36 argues convincingly that Socrates rejects the view that 
sensation is cognitive and involves judgement. He argues that Socrates shows that the 
senses are not autonomous and they do not constitute subjects by depriving them of 
all judgement: 'Autonomy in a perceiving subject presupposes judgement 
(conceptualisation, consciousness) brought to bear by the subject on the objects of 
sense'. Moreover, Burnyeat (1976) p. 49 emphasizes that there is a single subject of 
consciousness, which is subject of both judgement and perception. Burnyeat 
implicitly associates 'subjecthood' with consciousness and consciousness with 
judgement and conceptualisation. I think that the association of consciousness with 
judgement is not self-evident but that Bumyeat is right in assuming that according to 
Plato the two are connected: to be aware or conscious of something is to be aware of 
something as something. If this is the case, and even though this is not clearly stated 
31 See also Watson (1988) pp. 3-4 who distinguishes sensation from 'human sense perception' and 
identifies the latter withphantasia. 
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by Bumyeat, I think that one can identify the conscious subject with reason. If in 
other words judgement is necessary for consciousness, reason can be seen as identical 
to this subject and reason more specifically is the subject of perception. 
Furthermore, I think that if consciousness is associated with reason, and if one 
assumes that consciousness or awareness is necessary for perception, and more 
generally that it is necessary for something to be part of the soul, we have a further 
reason why the senses are not autonomous from reason. It is not just the case that the 
senses are not autonomous from reason and they do not constitute subjects in their 
own right because they are not in themselves judgemental. If it were possible to have 
some sort of unconceptualized awareness in the soul, the senses also I think could still 
be considered as independent parts of the soul and subjects in their own right, even 
though their sphere of influence would have been minimized.32 They would not need 
reason or belief or appearance to exist in the soul. Their autonomy would be 
diminished but not fully denied. Bumyeat does not say explicitly that sensations 
cannot exist in the soul on their own. He argues that 'to perceive something is not as 
such to be aware or conscious of something as anything in particular' (p. 50). He 
suggests further that Plato's account has difficulties in that it is difficult to 
characterize perception in a positive way if all element of judgement, awareness or 
conceptualisation is abstracted from it (p. 50). I think that indeed Plato has some 
difficulties in explaining perception. However I do not think that he would accept that 
if all element of awareness would be abstracted it would be possible (unless really we 
talked about an abstraction that thought reaches) to talk about perception as something 
that actually occurs in human beings and is also informative. Perception as a psychic 
32 For this point see Bobonich (2002) p. 329. Bobonich argues that even if 'we think that perception 
has no conceptual or prepositional content, we might think that the senses (or the lower parts of the 
soul) serve as subjects ofunconceptualized awareness'. He argues nevertheless that even though such a 
subject is a logical possibility, 'it does no useful work' (p. 329, see alsop. 320). I want to deny that the 
senses can be conceived as subjects even in this minimized way because I think that Plato is in general 
committed to the unity of the soul, and I think allowing somehow a 'separate' subject of 
unconceptualized awareness in the soul would undermine the unity of the soul. 
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activity does presuppose consciousness and awareness. 33 I think that this entails that 
it presupposes reason and it is not autonomous from reason. 34 
33 M. Frede (1999) pp. 377-83 stresses that in the Theaetetus Plato restricts perception to a passive 
affection of the mind and that he emphasizes the activity of the mind in forming beliefs. Indeed also in 
the Timaeus perception as such does not constitute self-motion, rather it emerges as a psychic passivity 
(77b ). Perhaps in so far as judgement is involved in perception, and we have appearance, perception 
can be presented as something the soul does. 
34 In the Philebus for example sensation is defined as a joint affection of the soul and the body and it is 
clear that bodily affections or motions have to reach the soul so that it can be proper perception (33d-
34a). I think that more specifically it has to reach reason. I think that this is quite clear in the Timaeus 
(see 43a-e, 64b-c). The Timaeus may be interpreted as suggesting that perception or bodily motions 
have to reach the lower parts of the soul first, which are limited subjects of perception in their own 
right. For this view see Silverman (1990), pp. 148-75 who suggests that aisthesis in the Timaeus is a 
capacity of the non-rational soul, which is the locus and subject of aisthesis. Aisthesis in his opinion 
involves no recognition, awareness or conceptualisation (pp. 149-153). On the other hand Brisson 
(1997) pp. 159-63 argues that in the Timaeus reason is the final recipient of perception, but he seems to 
allow that the lower parts having some kind of awareness prior to reason. I think this is not strictly 
speaking the case. If this were the case perception indeed would be autonomous from reason. It could 
thus be seen as a part or capacity of the soul that did not exist before embodiment and is added to the 
soul by the lesser gods. However, it seems to me that the capacitiy for perception preexists 
embodiment. The lower parts of the soul are 'generated' by the fact that certain bodily motions reach 
reason. The lower gods generate sensation by placing the immortal soul in a body, which is endowed 
with sense organs and which belongs to a certain environment. In my opinion, the lower parts of the 
soul do not constitute peripheral recipients or subjects of sensations. Rather as I understand the 
Timaeus sensation can be seen as identical to a lower part of the soul, or a component in the lower part 
of the soul, whose subject is the immortal soul. Sensation is generated by the interaction of the 
immortal soul with the body and the interaction of psychic motions with motions that have a bodily 
origin. (Tim. 43b-c, 44a) Such motions become sensations after they have reached and affected the 
immortal soul. Nevertheless it can still be said that there are different levels of conceptualisation or 
awareness in the soul and this would not contradict my account. Furthermore, it seems to me that the 
'separation' of the affections from reason, which the inferior gods achieve, shows no more than the 
fact, that even though the soul embodied soul as self-motion is indeed affected and moved externally it 
can still retain or rather it has the power to regain· its autonomy to a great extent. This potential is a 
divine gift and is due both to the soul itself but also to the way the world and the human body is 
rationally organized. It is expressed at 44b-c without reference to partitition of the soul. However, 
there is the passage on plants in the Timaeus (77a-c) which may appear to partly at least contradict my 
account. Plants have pleasant and painful sensation even though they are deprived from belief and 
reasoning, self-consciousness and self-motion. This passage appears to reveal a tension in Plato's 
conception of the soul. Plato believes that the soul is essentially life and self motion and is something 
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Burnyeat (1976) also suggests that Plato has changed his mind concerning the 
relation between judgement and perception in the Theaetetus. He argues that in the 
Republic Plato assumes that aisthesis involves judgement while in the Theaetetus he 
deprives it of all judgement. According to my view perception is in any case always 
judgemental in the sense that as a matter of fact some element of judgement or 
conceptualisation is involved in perception and perception is not separate from reason 
and judgement rather it is always structured to some extent by reason and judgement. 
We do not have pure sensation rather we have perception as a component in 
appearance. 35 Plato would have changed his mind in the Theaetetus not if he came to 
believe that when one perceives things also appear to one in one way or another, and 
thus human perception is somehow informative, but rather if he believed in the 
Republic that belief is somehow reducible to sensation and sensation more generally 
is a sufficient source for belief. There are two different ways to attribute 'judgement' 
to perception. One is to say that human perception is always accompanied with 
awareness and an element of conceptualization and thought; an alternative view 
would be to say that this element of conceptualization is somehow due to sensation or 
perception itself, and thus that more gen,erally perception can fully account for 
conceptualization or beliefs. 36 And it is the second position more generally that one 
might argue that Plato adopts in the Republic, a view that one can further defend by 
immortal and rational. Still he attributes soul and life to plants, without attributing reason, self-motion, 
and immortality to them. The tension cannot be fully resolved but a partial solution is perhaps one that 
has been suggested by Karfic (2005) pp. 197-217 who argues that the soul of the plants depends on the 
rational soul that animates Earth (p. 215). Karfic argues that it is the world soul but earth is also said to 
be a goddess (Tim 40b-c). 
35 Compare with Delcomminette (2003) p. 223. It may be argued that Plato has changed his mind in 
the Theaetetus on the grounds that aisthesis in Republic 523a-524d is said to convey information to the 
soul. Thus Socrates uses expressions such as uno TI]<;; ai.a8f]aEW~ KQLVOf.H~va (523b2), 
ata8TJUL~ ... bT]i\Oi (c2-3), f] oljJL<;; EafJf.lTJVEV (523d5), naQayyti\i\n ~ tjJuxt:J (524a2-3), i\tyn 
(524a8), when he refers to aisthesis. Nevertheless it should also be noted that similar language is used 
in the Timaeus, which, most commentators agree, is written after the Theaetetus, in relation to bodily 
affections: f.lEXQLnEQ av eni '(0 cj>QOVLf.!OV ei\80V'(lX EE,ayydi\lJ '(QU noLf]aaV'(O~ 'rTJV bUVCXf.!LV 
(64b5-6). 
36 Cooper (1999) pp. 355-76 argues that in the Theaetetus perception as such involves some minimal 
capacities for judgement and certain concepts. 
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appealing perhaps to the thesis that Plato holds a radical dualism between the sensible 
and intelligible realm, according to which ordinary beliefs, for example, have a 
completely different source from philosopher's knowledge or at least philosopher's 
beliefs and thus sensation, or more generally the (according to this view) 'lower parts 
of the soul' for example must be their sole source and cause. 37 This, I believe, would 
almost amount to the view that beliefs somehow are reducible to the body and the 
body can have in some sense beliefs or fully account for beliefs. In other words, we 
would have beliefs whose exclusive source or origin is either sensation or more 
generally the lower parts of the soul and ultimately the body.38 On the other hand, in 
my opinion, saying that belief belongs to the soul also amounts to saying that the soul 
is needed ·to account for belief as something different from the body and as 
something, at least in principle, disembodied. In a different way perhaps the soul can 
account for sensation. It can be argued that the soul cannot account for the content of 
sensation whose origin is indeed exclusively the body or bodily motions, and thus 
strictly speaking reason is not responsible for what we perceive, even though I think 
reason as a component in phantasia/appearance can affect whether positively or 
negatively the way things appear to us, since appearance, unlike pure sensation or 
perception is not something totally passive. Perhaps it can be argued that sensation 
can trigger beliefs or reason somehow to operate in a certain way, but I think that 
without this operation we would not have any kind of awareness in the soul. Thus, in 
this sense, reason is somehow responsible for sensation being a 'part' of the soul. 
37Bobonich (2002) pp. 329-30 endorses the view in relation to the Republic that perception can account 
for belief, and in this way he can also maintain that the lower parts of the soul have beliefs of their 
own. On the other hand in relation to the later dialogues he is inclined to the view that the lower parts 
have not beliefs and involve no conceptualisation (pp. 314-331 ), and more generally he is inclined to 
believe that Plato gradually abandons the theory of partition of the soul. I do not believe that Plato 
needs to abandon anything concerning the soul in the later dialogues. 
38 Indeed if one is prepared to take what Socrates says in the Phaedo literally the body has apart from 
desires also beliefs (83d). Furthermore, in the Phaedo one can find an empiricist or materialist account 
of belief as coming about from perception (96b5-6: 6 b' E)'KE<j>lX/\6~ eanv 6 'ItX~ aia8ftaEL~ 
1taQEXWV 'WV UKOUELV Kat6QUV Kat oa<j>Qa(vwem, EK 'IOU'IWV N: y(yvOL'IO !-!VTJ!-!ll Kat Ml;a, 
eK bt 1-!VTJI-!ll~ Kat Ml;:fJ~ Aa~OUUfJ~ 'IO TJQE!-!Eiv, Ka'Ia mum y(yvw8m eman']~-AfJV;). I believe 
that Socrates does not endorse this account not only in relation to knowledge but also in relation to 
belief. For the view that Socrates or Plato in the Phaedo endorses such an account see Scott (1987) pp. 
346-66. 
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Furthermore, one might argue that the argument for the division of the soul in 
Book 10 (602cl-603b6) shows that sensation is autonomous from reason in that it has 
somehow judgment or belief of its own. We see there that a 'rational' belief is in 
conflict with an appearance or 'irrational' belief ( 602e4-603a2). It may be argued that 
their conflict indicates that the two beliefs have independent sources. In the same way 
it may be argued that when desire is in conflict with reason it has an independent 
origin. Thus one could argue that the conflict between the two opinions, and the 
persistence of appearance in the face of a more rational judgement, suggests that the 
two beliefs have completely independent origin, otherwise for example if the two 
beliefs had the same origin one would cause the other to disappear. Thus one could 
conclude that sensation can somehow fully account for certain beliefs or appearances. 
Now I think that in general Plato does not believe that 'appearances' cannot be 
affected or informed by reason and also by one's considered judgement. Exactly 
because in my opinion the soul possesses unity, appearances can be rejected or 
transformed or qualified by reason. More generally since the soul has unity one 
cannot really hold two contradictory judgements for long in the soul. One would 
rather somehow reject or qualify one of them or rather one would be led to a state of 
doubt and aporia. 39 The soul cannot be or cannot stay for long in direct contradiction 
with itself, because such contradiction would not be compatible with its unity. Rather 
its tendency is always to resolve contradictions, whether in good or in a bad way. 
However, certain things may indeed appear to us in a way that reason things to be 
false. This suggests that in some sense appearance has a certain amount of 
independence from reason and belief, and it is not exactly the same thing as belief, as 
indeed the account of appearance in the Sophist as well suggests. But if one needs to 
explain such conflict, assuming that somehow even in the most rational and consistent 
of souls sticks under water may indeed appear in the wrong way, one can infer that 
appearances have a partly independent origin since the senses indeed play a crucial 
role in their formation. But Plato's tendency and strategy in the Republic is to 
39 Compare with the Sophist 230b5-c3. It is suggested there that when one comes to realize that one has 
contradictory opinions one becomes angry with oneself and one realizes that one does not know. This 
does not indicate that there cannot be simultaneous conflicting judgements. It indicates nevertheless 
that when one becomes aware of the contradiction, one is inclined to withdraw judgement. I think that 
the fact that contradictions are not acceptable in the soul shows that the soul possesses unity. 
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distinguish between parts of the soul and speak as if there is no connection whatever 
between them. 40 
What I am suggesting is not that the lower parts of the soul have to be 
conceived as independent subjects of their own, somehow constituting autonomous 
sources of judgement. The position I am propounding is that these parts can be said 
to have beliefs because as psychic items they are not separate from a cognitive 
component that is provided by reason. If per impossibile they could exist in 
themselves they would constitute something like pure indeterminate sensation, but 
such pure sensation in my opinion does not exist in the human or animal soul. 
Furthermore I wish to suggest that since they are not separate from reason their 
direction is not determined by themselves or by the body, unless minimally, and thus 
the lower parts can be described as directions that reason or the immortal soul takes 
when conjoined with a human body. Exactly because reason is involved and reason's 
essential or general direction is for the good and truth, lower activities or elements can 
also be seen in practical terms as aiming at the good, and also in cognitive terms at 
truth. Aiming at the good can be seen, as I am later going to argue, as involving two 
stages. The affections and desires that are formed in the soul rather mechanically aim 
in some sense at the good since they involve a cognitive element which itself 
somehow aims at the good and the truth. But reason can somehow 'separate' itself 
from these affections and reflect on them and either direct them or control them or 
even reject them at a second stage. 
It may be argued that reason's impact in the human soul is not uniform. But I 
think that there is no 'part' of the soul that is completely outside reason's sphere of 
influence. We can see the soul as being ordered hierarchically so that different 
elements can be classified by the 'amount' of reason that is involved in them. Lower 
capacities are dependent on superior capacities or activities both in the sense that they 
are derived from superior ones and presuppose them, and also in that superior 
40 Similarly the part that is said to rely on 'measures' in Book 10 also presumably relies on the senses 
since literal measuring involves the senses. It should also be noted that Socrates in Book l 0 does not 
identify appearance with the senses. He clearly says that something appears to us as equal through the 
senses (602c8). 
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faculties or capacities can affect, direct and inform lower capacities. Something 
analogous can be applied to the relationship between reason and emotions and desires. 
Thus ultimately reason can control the soul as a whole. As we go down towards basic 
biological functions or desires such as thirst or hunger the cognitive element is less 
prominent and furthermore these desires are less easily controllable. Some conflict 
and divergence at this level possibly can occur even in the best and most rational of 
souls. But I believe that we cannot reach a point where we come fully outside the 
sphere of reason's influence and control and thus I think that reason does not have 
limits in the soul. 
To reinforce my sugggestions I wish to draw attention to a passage from Book 
5 in the Republic. I believe that this passage reveals that Plato has the same 
conception of the soul and its relationship with the body in the two dialogues. In Book 
5 Socrates argues that unity is the greatest good for a city and tries to make Kallipolis 
a unity ( 462a2-b2) and a genuine communion or community, a notion that can be 
associated with sophrosune. The communion of wives and children leads to unity in 
the city since it will allow communion of pleasure and pain which implies bonds of 
sympathy and friendship among the citizens (462b4-c8).41 Socrates aims at creating 
sophrosune in the superior classes of citizens as a harmony between reason and 
pleasure and pain, and thus conflict both inside the citizens and between them will be 
avoided. Socrates in this context uses the soul and the whole organism as a model that 
the city has to imitate in order to achieve unity and not the city as a model for the soul 
as he did in the previous Books of the Republic. It becomes clear in this context that 
the soul and the organism as a whole possess a kind of unity that the city can only 
approximate (462c9): 42 
41 See 462b4-6: 0UKOUV ~ f.-LEV t')bovf]c; 1:£ Kai AunTJc; KOLVWVLa avvbei, chav on f.!MLa-ra 
mxv-rec; oi noAi-raL 'rWV au-rwv yLyvOf.!EVWV 'rE Kai anoMVf.!EVWV naQanAT]atwc;; XctLQWaL 
Kai Aunwv-rm. 
42 More generally from the moment that the whole soul emerges as an agent in its own right and also it 
becomes clear that the lower parts of the soul do not possess autonomy from reason, the city-soul 
analogy carmot be fully maintained. We see here more generally that the soul, and the organism as a 
whole even a bad soul is something that a city strives to imitate. The parts of the city indeed constitute 
autonomous entities or agencies while the parts of the soul do not. And the soul as a whole has 
autonomy from its parts that the city as a whole, cannot possess in relation to the people in it. 
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Kai. iln<; bil EYYUTlXTlX EVO<; av8QW7WV exn; otov chav nov i]~wv 
baKTVi\oc; TOV ni\T)yfj, mxaa i] KOLVWVla i] KlXTCx TO aw~a 1lQOc; ~v ¢vxilv 
n:Ta~EVTJ de; ~(av aUVTlX~LV ~v TOU tXQXOVTO<; EV au'Iij 1Ja8ETO TE KlXL mxaa 
a~a avvi]i\YT)UEV ~EQOV<; novi]aavToc; OAT), Kai. oihw bil i\£yo~EV on 6 
av8Qwnoc; TOV baKTVi\ov cXAyEi; Kai. 71EQL ai\i\ov 6TOUOUV TWV TOU 
av8QW1lOV 6 lXUToc; i\oyo<;, 71EQL TE i\unT)c; 710VOUVTOc; ~EQOV<; Kai. 71EQL 
i]bovf]c; c?aT(ovToc;; ( 462c9-d5) 
And the city whose condition (constitution) is closest to that of a single human 
being (?). I mean, when perhaps the finger of one of us is injured the whole 
community that exists in the body in relation to the soul, stretched as it is so as to 
constitute the single ordering that belongs to the ruling element in it observes the 
injury to the finger and all of it feels the pain, the whole feeling it when one part 
suffers and it is in this way that we say that the person is feeling pain in his finger? 
And for any other member of the man the same statement holds, alike for a part that 
labours in pain or is eased by pleasure. 43 
A comparison between this passage and the one I previously discussed in the 
Theaetetus (184dl-5) reveals great similaritities. In particular the phrase 'cXi\i\a ~ll 
de; ~(av twa i.biav, ELTE ljJvxilv ELTE on DEi Kai\Eiv, navTa TlXVTlX UUVTELVEL' 
(184d3-4) corresponds to the phrase 'm:Xaa i] KOLVWVla i] KlXTCx TO aw~a 1lQO<; 
~v ¢vxilv TETlX~EVTJ de; ~(av aUVTlX~LV ~v TOU tXQXOVTOc; EV au'Iij in the 
Republic. There is the same emphasis on unity. In the passage in the Republic it is 
particularly emphasized that unity, which the term KOLVWVLa indicates, presupposes 
order (auvTa~Lv) and not random association. The passage suggests that there is a 
community inside the body, and between the body and the soul. It becomes clear that 
it is the soul that unifies the body, and everything in the body is directed towards and 
43 I am indebted to Christopher Rowe for helping me with the translation of this passage. Nevertheless 
the responsibility for the translation is my own. The translation of the last sentence is by P. Shorey. 
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is unified through reaching the soul.44 More specifically it can be said that we have 
sensations of pain and pleasure that are directed towards the soul. These affections 
bind the bodily parts together through binding them to the soul. A unitary subject of 
consciousness is necessary so that what happens to a part of us concerns the whole, 
and we can say that the person (as a whole) is the subject of pain (in his finger). If for 
example the parts of the soul were really or completely separated, the pleasures of the 
lower part would not concern, or be experienced by reason. Here it is emphasized that 
pleasure and pain concerns the whole, including all the parts. The unity of the soul 
and the relationship between unity and order is indicated by the expression 'a single 
ordering' (El'.; ~(av aUV'ral;Lv), which recalls the expression 'a single form/idea' (El'.; 
!-llaV nva ib£av) in the Theaetetus. If there is a correspondence of the two passages, 
aUV'ral;Lv here refers primary to the order that constitutes the soul and only 
derivatively perhaps to the body: it is an ordering or structure that the soul more 
specifically possesses or constitutes, and which unifies the bodily sensations and 
organs. Furthermore the ordering and the unity of the whole system is ultimately due 
to the 'ruling element' in it, which can be presented as a part or member of the whole 
community and at the same time as something outside this order like a general who 
watches over his army. 45 The ruling element can be associated with the person who is 
the ruler of his soul and his body.46 More strictly it should be identified with reason, 
which in any case is the ruler in the city. Thus it can be said that the unity and order of 
the soul and the whole organism is ultimately due to reason.47 
44 There is here a teleological dimension, in the sense that the soul I think can be presented as the end 
of the motions or sensations of the body. 
45 The term suntaxis has military connotations. 
46 Thus Adam (1965) ad loc. identifies the ruling element with the man and the whole. In my opinion it 
is reason in the sense that reason is or represents or constitutes the whole. 
47 The idea here that the body and the soul constitute a unity and there is agreement between them has a 
negative and positive aspect. This unity between the bodily and the soul can lead to the corruption of 
the soul. The very opposite of genuine sophrosune as agreement between pleasure, pain and reason lies 
in the body 'dictating' reason what to believe. In the Phaedo it is said that pleasure and pain bind the 
soul to the body, because they make it agree with the body in what is true (83d). In the Republic 
Socrates seeks the reverse agreement, which constitutes genuine unity. The body itself has to be in a 
good state so that it supports the activity of the soul. In the Phaedo the rational soul is bound to the 
body exactly because it is impossible when one experiences pain or pleasure or desire, not to form a 
belief concerning the value, or truth of the objects of these affections. Socrates says in the Phaedo that 
85 
Conclusions 
As I suggested earlier, and also as the passage I have just cited indicates, 
order, justice, and reason are essential both to the soul as a whole and the lower parts 
of the soul. This notion of the whole and the parts indicates that both the whole 
conceived as without the parts, and also the whole as including the parts tends 
towards the good and unity. In the argument for the division of the soul, order and 
reason are not presented as essential to the lowest part of the soul in particular, which 
is simultaneously taken to be the greatest part of 'us' (439d4-8). Rather this part was 
presented as being in opposition to reason, order, and justice and the whole, and it 
looks as though it does not deserve its place in the soul. Furthermore, the emphasis 
was on the suppression and separation of this part from the other parts and not on its 
incorporation. This part can somehow be allowed to belong to the whole solely in a 
negative way, by not interfering with the function of the other parts. Justice in some 
sense separates this part from the other parts and almost places it outside the whole so 
that it does not undermine the whole. 
philosophers avoid intense pleasures, pains or desires because these cause the greatest evil for the soul. 
The greatest evil is the fact that when one suffers intense pleasure or pain it is impossible not to think 
that the objects of these affections are truest and clearest (Phaedo 83c ). In evaluative terms I think this 
indicates that pleasure makes one think that what is happening to one is absolutely good and also when 
one feels pain one also necessarily thinks that it is bad. Thus reason comes to fully identify with the 
body and becomes entangled or mixed with it and cannot separate itself from it. As it is clear in the 
Republic when one's finger hurts it is impossible not to think that the fmger is one's own finger, in 
other words not to identify with one's finger and correspondingly not to care about it and not to think 
that what happened to it is bad for the person as a whole. Plato I think in the Republic does not expect 
people not to identify with the body and its sensations. Rather what he expects is one not to think that 
the body and bodily pleasures are absolutely good or bad and represent the whole of one's interests, 
rather to see the body as a part in a whole, and as being subordinated to and informed by more general 
aims. Thus one has to ident!fy with the body and its pleasures only in so far as they are in conformity 
with reason's demands. One's immediate reaction when one's finger is in pain is somehow to forget 
anything else and to fully identify with one's finger. But since we are rational creatures and we are not 
solely fingers, and more generally our fmger is not the centre of our personality, we can also partly at 
least distance ourselves from our finger and reflect on our broader interests. 
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Now I think that to a great extent the way that the parts of the soul are 
presented serves the general purpose of the argument in Book 4. By presenting the 
lower parts of the soul as opposites, Socrates shows that they do not constitute a unity 
in themselves. This does not mean that they cannot be unified. Rather it shows that 
order, structure and harmony needs to be imposed on them so that conflict may 
diminish. Also the person needs to intervene and to engage reflectively in the ordering 
and unification of the soul. In some sense thus we are provided with the materials out 
of which the soul is composed. We are invited to disentangle them from each other 
and consider them as separate, without the compositon of the soul, as if these 
materials somehow preexist the composition. And we are also provided with certain 
rules as to how to make a soul and to combine them for ourselves. In presenting the 
materials as themselves in opposition the need and value for justice and also the need 
for our engaging with our souls is exalted. However, to a great extent we are not 
invited to unify the lower part with reason, rather to conceive the lower part in 
separation from reason and also as something, which tends to oppose reason. This I 
think happens because recommending such integration and unity between the 'bodily' 
desires and reason would be dangerous for a soul which does not know the good, and 
more generally does not know how to achieve it. 
In so far as particular desires one may experience are directed towards objects 
which are not compatible with what is objectively good, such desires should not 
indeed be part of the soul, and one should try to suppress them and ideally completely 
eliminate them. But there is a difference in saying that the soul may happen to have 
desires whose objects are not compatible with the good, and saying that a part of 
human nature is in opposition with the good. Furthermore, there is a difference 
between saying that it can be said that if desire is conceived on its own, or without 
any element of reason is something that lacks order and saying that desire as such is 
something opposed to order and not amenable to order. It is true that Plato is inclined 
to present certain desires not merely as lacking order in themselves and thus as 
something to be ordered by reason but also to a great extent as recalcitrant and 
resistant to order and reason.48 However, I think that desires, even the desires that are 
48 Annas (1999) p. 123 ff. suggests an account of the virtues and the relationship of the parts of the 
soul in the Republic based on Alcinous's understanding of virtues (Handbook 183.37-184.10). She 
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associated with the appetitive part, are always to some extent shaped and directed by 
reason, and their opposition to reason is not necessarily their own fault, but also 
reveals reason's deficiency and incomplete development. More generally, I believe 
that the opposition between reason and desire in Book 4 and also in Book 9, where the 
lowest element is presented as something monstrous, a many-headed beast (588c7-10) 
is exaggerated perhaps in order to prompt the reader to be involved with his soul and 
to pursue justice as a psychic condition. 
What more generally underlies Socrates' strategy is an understanding of the 
soul as a self-making something, an entity that is responsible for its own order and 
structure and as something that can shape and unify itself. 49 Thus the unity of the 
person is something for the person to achieve. Such a conception of the soul 
corresponds to the notion of self-motion as the soul it is defined in the later dialogues 
which suggests the soul's autonomy.50 I think that this notion of the soul presupposes 
its unity. If the soul were a collection of independent factors autonomy perhaps would 
characterize these factors but not the soul as a whole. But there is a sense perhaps that 
the soul's autonomy itself is something that can be achieved as an integration and 
coordination and direction of the different factors or desires that can appear to operate 
stresses that according to this account 'desire lacks the capacity to develop on its own'. 'To the extent 
that desire can be trained to function according to principles and not at random, this is the work of 
reason supplying the necessary goal and structure to the desiring part, which on its own supplies merely 
the capacity to be habituated and trained to work in some ways rather than others' (p. 123). She shows 
that according to this interpretation of the Republic the 'lower parts are receptive to reason in that 
reason has an internal hold on them, and can control them from the inside, by changing and 
restructuring them' (pp. 124-5). However, Annas hesitates to accept that this is the correct 
interpretation of the Republic (p. 126). Annas later argues that there is an ambiguity in Plato's 
conception of desire (pp. 134-5) and she suggests that Plato may be tempted by two quite distinct 
models of the composite soul (pp. 135-6). 
49 See also Broadie (2001) p. 307 who argues that self-determinability is essential to the soul according 
to Plato. 
5° For the notion of the soul as self-motion in the later dialogues see in particular Mason (1998) pp. 18-
28 who associates self -motion with the soul's autonomy and the ability to control one's motions. 
Broadie (2003) pp. 28-9 has argued that self-motion in Plato implies possession of reason. 
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in the soul.51 Furthermore, I think that the soul's autonomy and also its unity is 
primarily due to the presence of reason in it. Reason causes order and unity and more 
generally accounts for the fact that the soul has autonomy and is a self- shaping thing. 
The soul fully becomes autonomous and simultaneously exercises its autonomy when 
it adequately deploys reason to produce order and unity in itself, and thus it is able to 
direct itself wholly to the ends that it sets out to achieve. Nevertheless, reason always 
works to some extent towards the integration and coordination of the different 
functions in the soul and thus the human soul, even the worst one, possesses some 
amount of order and unity. It never functions as if it is a collection of independent 
unconnected factors. 
The danger with Socrates' strategy in Book 4 is that order and justice may not 
appear to be eventually either essential to the parts or to the whole. For example, if the 
soul can persist and survive without justice, order and unity, then these features are no 
more essential to the soul than their opposites. More generally, in dividing the soul 
into a 'good' and a 'bad' element, it may still look as though the soul is partly driven 
towards justice and partly towards injustice and both are equally natural to it. 
Furthermore, as I am going to argue in the next section presenting justice as 
something that needs to be 'imposed' upon parts or elements of human nature that are 
somehow unwilling to accept it, undermines its depiction as something good and 
desirable. 
I believe that a different approach to the soul would not involve moving from 
the parts towards the whole, as Socrates did in Book 4, where he tried to provide a 
glimpse into the nature of the whole by providing us first, an account of the parts and 
then, by showing how the soul can function as a whole because of justice. A different 
and better approach would first attempt to get a glimpse of the whole, in 'separation' 
from the parts and thus define the nature of the soul, its purpose and function as a 
whole, and then move on to show how the parts operate in the context of the whole 
and how their functions are both subordinate to and also informed by the function and 
51 In the Phaedrus immortality follows from the conception of the soul as self-motion since it never 
abandons itself (Phaedrus 245c). Perhaps it could be said that the soul is immortal because reason 
always somehow keeps the parts or elements together and never allows them to acquire complete 
independence and autonomy from each other, which would coincide with a destruction of the soul. 
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purpose of the whole. I believe that the examination of the soul in Book 4 was 
inadequate because it did not provide the reader with adequate insight into its unity. A 
complete understanding of the unity of the soul would also involve understanding of 
the unity of the parts, their connection and affinity and the fact that they work for a 
common purpose, and not merely their differences from each other that the argument 
in Book 4 emphasized. 
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Chapter 4 
The soul in Boolk 10 
Immortality, the desire for the good, and the soul's complexity 
I suggested in the previous section that the question of the nature of the soul is not 
directly raised or addressed in the first nine Books of the Republic. Socrates raises this 
issue finally in Book 10 in the context of the discussion of the immortality of the soul. 
Initially he provides a proof of the immortality of the soul without relying on an 
account of the soul's nature (608d2- a9), but at 611a10 he changes course indicating 
that a proper proof of the immortality of the soul requires such an account. In raising 
the question of the soul's nature, he argues that the picture of the soul that has been 
provided until now, which involves much 'diversity, unlikeness and contradiction in 
and with itself (611a10-b3) is not compatible with the soul's immortality. Socrates 
makes it clear that the acceptance of the soul's immortality requires adopting a 
different approach to the soul from the one he has adopted until 'now'.52 Socrates 
here is referring not solely to the preceding argument (608d2-a9) but also to the 
account of the soul that has been provided in the earlier Books of the Republic, 
52 See also Adam (1902) (note ad Joe.), who argues that Socrates refers back to Book 4 and that he 
suggests a revision of the psychology of Book 4. One can also notice how temporal language is used, 
and in particular how the 'now' comes to gradually acquire a more extended dimension. Initially the 
term 'now' appears to refer to the immediately previous argument in the Republic, in which injustice in 
the soul were said not to kill it. Then it becomes clear that it encompasses the whole conversation in the 
Republic, and finally it looks as though it encompasses human life in general. From saying that we 
'now' have seen the soul in a certain way (611b6, 611cl, 611c4) Socrates moves to saying that we 
have 'now' seen the soul as it is 'now' or at present, and more generally to how the soul is or appears to 
us 'now' (first at 611c5 and then at 611e4-612al). It looks as though this 'now' refers to human life in 
general (612a5). And he suggests then that we have to see the soul in the past, as it originally used to be 
(611 c7 and, d4-5) and also in the future (612e2). Eventually the discussion itself of the truest nature of 
the soul and the question of its complexity is itself postponed to the future (612a3). It may look as 
though one will be able to apprehend fully the nature of the soul only in the afterlife. Socrates wants to 
emphasize not only the provisional and inadequate character of his own account but also, more 
generally the narrowness of people's point of view in general. 
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including Book 4. His remarks can be seen as being concerned with and criticizing 
both his overall approach to the soul and the portrait of the soul that such approach 
has conveyed. 
What one learns here is that we have not really reached the truest nature of the 
soul, what it is in reality ( 611 b 1, 611 b 1 0). Also it is expected that in its truest nature 
the soul would appear to be something far more beautiful than the soul appeared to be 
(61lc3). Socrates tries to justify his earlier account and to protect himself from a 
possible accusation of being insincere by saying that he has told the truth about the 
way the soul appears 'now' ( c4-5). Towards the end of the section he says that he has 
dealt with the affections and forms in human life in a decent way ( 612a4-6). 
Nevertheless it is suggested that the approach has been inadequate because Socrates 
has relied on the senses and he did consider the soul adequately in the light of reason 
( 611 c2) and also on how the soul appears to be 'now' ( 611 c5). This suggests that the 
account that has been given rested on common observation or experience and 
simultaneously on a provisional or narrow point of view that can be identified with 
what Socrates calls 'human life'. 
One can guess that an adequate account of the soul would involve abandonment of 
the senses and observation of human life and behaviour, on which the account of the 
soul in Book 4 has rested, and it would rely on the hypothetical method that has been 
outlined in Books 6 and 7. 53 I wish to suggest further that such approach would aim at 
53 Thus according to Moreau (1953) p. 250 the account of the soul in Book 4 had as its starting point 
observable conflict. Moreau understands this conflict as being accessible through introspection. But 
'introspection' is not the only form of experience that Socrates had relied to. We have more generally a 
'naturalistic' approach to the soul throughout Books 2-4, and also Books 8-9, where different human 
characters are distinguished. The basis for such distinctions is both some sort of 'introspection' and 
also observation of external behaviour. Different characters can be distinguished by reference to 
external behaviour and the objects, which their desires appear to be directed to. In my opinion, Moreau 
is right in interpreting the argument for the division of the soul as aiming at 'saving the appearances' 
('sauver les phenom<!mes de Ia vie psychologique') (p. 251). In other words, one accepts conflict 
through observation and one accommodates such conflict in the soul in such a way that the principle of 
contradiction is not violated (p. 251). But an account of the soul that makes appearances a starting point 
can never reach the truth, nor can it provide access to the nature of the soul and its essence (see Moreau 
(1953) pp. 250-1). Showing that the soul is not something self-contradictory is not the same thing as 
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associating different hypotheses concerning the soul, in order to reach a definition of 
the soul, which would also specify its relationship with the good. The assumption that 
the soul is immortal, which according to Socrates here reason and arguments compel 
us to accept ( 611 b9-1 0), would be one of the hypotheses that Socrates would seek to 
defend by reference to an account of the soul's nature. 54 
It emerges here that relying on observation, or how the soul appears to be, is not 
only insufficient in revealing the nature of the soul, but can also be misleading. 55 It 
can lead for example to the assumption that the soul is not something beautiful, rather 
something that contains much variety, conflict etc. Observation more generally and 
the senses interfere with our apprehension of the nature of the soul and hide its real 
nature. In a similar way the divine nature of Glaucus is hidden behind the barnacles 
that have covered it and one would have difficulties in guessing it ( 611 c6-d6). 
Socrates seems to detect not only a difference but also to a great extent a conflict 
between how the soul appears to be and how it is in reality. 
Now Socrates gives some more precise directions as to how the question of the 
nature of the soul can be approached. He argues that one has to look at the soul's love 
of wisdom (cpv\oaocp(a), and he suggests that by looking at it the soul's kinship with 
the divine would be revealed (611d8-e2). Presumably the soul's affinity with the 
divine also accounts for the soul's immortality. 56 Moreover, he argues that we have to 
imagine that the soul follows the divine as a whole (611e2-612a3). That Socrates 
showing that it possesses unity, and in any case one can never reach the notion of the soul's unity 
through experience. Furthermore, as Moreau suggests, the division of the soul in Book 4 and the fact 
that experience becomes the starting point, does not constitute a theoretical stance ('une prise de 
position theorique') (p. 250). More generally, I believe that the basic fundamental 'Socratic' tenets, 
such as the thesis (or hypothesis) that we all desire the good, that badness is involuntary, and that 
badness involves ignorance, which all have to do with the nature of the soul, are not theses (or 
hypotheses) to be confirmed or rejected on the grounds of experience of human life or introspection 
and observable conflict. That Plato is still committed to these tenets is clear at 505d5-e5. 
54 Thus in the final argument of the Phaedo (105c8-107al) immortality is derived from a conception of 
the soul as being essentially a life-principle, while a similar strategy is adopted in the Phaedrus where 
immortality is derived from a definition of the essence of the soul as lying in self-motion (245c5 ff.). 
55 See also Rowe (2007) pp. 170-1. 
56 Nevertheless I am going to suggest later that this affinity does not entail simplicity. 
93 
conceives philosophy and more generally a desire for the good as essential to the soul 
can be inferred by the fact that such desire or love can be applied to the whole (micra 
bnarro~-tEVll 611e2). 57 Also when the soul comes to follow the divine 'unreservedly' 
(as Shorey translates), it manages to make itself clean of all the dirtiness and pollution 
that it has collected because of its association with the body. 58 Socrates further argues 
that such a transformation of the soul would allow one to see the true nature of the 
soul and also to deal with the question of whether the soul in its truest nature is 
complex/manifold or simple, or precisely what it is and how it is made ( drr£ 
rroAunbil~ dn: 1-!0VOELbf]~, EL'r£ 07IlJ EXEL Kai. orrw~) (612a3-4). Thus he makes it 
clear that the question of the soul's complexity has to be discussed in relation to a 
pure, beautiful and unitary soul. He also seems to imply that the soul that would 
adequately examine this question of the nature of the soul would be itself purified and 
unitary. This is because the understanding of the nature soul is basically self-
understanding, or self-knowledge. For one cannot be said to comprehend the nature of 
the soul if the account one would provide would not be compatible with one's 
conception of oneself and also one's experience of oneself. Nevertheless, Socrates 
does not make it very clear, whether the purified soul has to be literally disembodied 
or not. 59 
57 Compare with 518c8 (oihw aUV o.Ar;J Tij tjJux(J EK 'rOU yLyvOf..lfVOU 7tEQLClK'rfOV dvm), and 
contrast with 436b2-3 ( ... f) oA1;1 Tij tjJux(J Ka8' EKaa'rov mhwv nQano~-tev, omv OQf..lr'Jawwv). 
In the latter passage where learning for example is something that the soul does not engage with 
(6Qj.!r'JGOf..lEV) as a whole, while here the OQf..lrl is attributed to the whole. I believe that miaa at 611e2 
and oAr] at 518c8 are equivalent. Compare also with the relevant passage from Aristotle's De Anima 
where the two terms are treated as equivalent (mhEQOV oA1;1 Tij tjJux(J 'rOtn:wv EKaa'WV t.l7tllQXEL, 
Kal. naGl;J voouf..ltv 'rE Kal. aia9av6f.!E9a Kal. KLVOUf..lEBa Kai 'rWV MAwv EKaawv noLOUj.!fV 
'rE Kal. miaxof..lEV, fJ f..lOQLOL~ htQOL~ E'rEQa;) (411a6-411b3). The desire for the good is also 
implicitly associated with the whole soul at 577dl3-e2: Kal. r'J 'rUQaVVOUf..lfVT] aQa tjJvx~ ~KLG'ra 
nmf]an & av ~ouAT]S(J, w~ mQl. OAT]~ Eimiv tjJuxfi~. 
58 Compare also with 519a7-b5. 
59 One cannot I think argue that here Socrates is referring to a disembodied soul solely on the grounds 
that Socrates talks about a soul which is wholly directed to the divine and comparing this passage with 
the argument for the division of the soul where love of learning has been attributed solely to a part of 
us. The turning around of the soul as a whole from becoming towards being and the good has been 
presented as the goal of the higher programme of education. See also Rowe (2007) p. 141-2. One rather 
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I believe that Socrates is implying that the desire for the good and the divine is 
essential to the soul since it can apply to the whole. However, it looks as though 
Socrates is arguing that in the soul as it is now the desire or love of the divine is only 
a part of it. This would appear to contradict the suggestion I made previously that the 
desire for the good characterizes the whole. In my opinion Socrates wants primarily to 
deny in the context of Book 1 0 that the soul has a dual nature and is something 
intrinsically divided, of which badness and the tendency towards injustice is an 
essential part. It is the latter conception of the soul that ordinary experience supports 
and that reason when it operates without the senses cannot endorse. If one assumes 
that this passage implies that somehow in the embodied soul a desire for the good 
represents a part of the soul's nature, while in the disembodied soul the desire for the 
good represents the whole, two problems would arise. One would be that the 
embodied soul does indeed have such a dual nature and it is not really a beautiful 
thing, and the other would be that the nature of the soul changes between embodiment 
and disembodiment; hence we do not have the same soul. 
It seems to me that what Socrates wants here to suggest in saying that we need to 
examine the soul's nature in a soul which has assimilated to the love of the divine, is 
that only in such a soul will one be able to discern the beauty of the soul's nature. In 
ordinary, every day souls, such beauty exists but is hidden from us and cannot be 
easily detected. Furthermore, in suggesting that the soul as it is 'now' may desire the 
good only 'partly', I think Plato is indicating not that the desire of the good is only a 
part of our present nature rather that it is only partly or inadequately manifested in 
ordinary human souls, or perhaps in embodied human souls in general, so that it looks 
as though it characterizes solely a part of us. There is here an underlying conception 
of the soul's nature as something that one already has, something with which one is 
endowed because of one's own constitution, (or had originally) but one 
simultaneously has to achieve and to realize 'in the future' and that one only 
imperfectly realizes 'now'. This conception also applies to the desire for the good. 
has to argue that Socrates believes that such turning around is not fully attainable in human embodied 
life. But if he believes that it is not obtainable in the embodied life he has no much better grounds to 
maintain that it can necessarily be achieved in a disembodied soul, since in any case death does not 
guarantee purification of the soul and justice. 
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The good for example is what every soul desires (as a whole), and still only perfect 
philosophers' souls manage to reach an adequate conception of the good and 
simultaneously are wholly directed towards the good. In a sense philosophers desire 
the good no more than ordinary people, since the nature of the soul in both is the 
same, and still in another sense such desire is fully expressed only in philosophers. 
Now it may be argued that even though Socrates here is denying one kind of 
dualism, a dualism and conflict inherent in the soul, he imports a different kind of 
dualism, one between the body and the soul. While, for example, in the preceding 
argument for the immortality of the soul it was the soul and not the body that 
appeared to be somehow responsible for badness and injustice, and the body's own 
badness was not presented as somehow responsible for the badness and injustice in 
the soul ( 61 Oa5-8), 60 here it looks as though it is the body's fault or that the soul 
somehow involves injustice and badness (6llbl0-cl). Furthermore a dualism and 
conflict between experience and reason is maintained, which corresponds to what the 
soul should be or what it is essentially, and what it appears to be. This dualism 
becomes even stronger if Socrates actually believes and wants to suggest that it is 
impossible for the embodied human soul or for the human soul more generally to 
realize its nature precisely because the body is always undermining its function. 61 
This would also indicate that experience of human life can never conform with 
reason's assumption that the soul desires the good, and may appear eventually to 
undermine this assumption. The passage may be taken indeed to confirm such a 
conception, by associating badness with the body. I am not inclined to accept this 
dualism and it seems to me that to a great extent Socrates adopts it so that he may 
avoid the other kind of dualism, and show that the soul is something essentially 
beautiful, but I am not sure I can provide fully convincing arguments to reject it. 
60 Socrates in fact did not exclude that the body can play a role in the soul's badness. Rather what he 
seemed to exclude is that the body necessitates such badness (610a1-3) and thus that psychic badness 
can be reducible to bodily badness or disease. The problem of evil is more generally indirectly raised 
here in the context of Book 10, and I think that Plato provides no clear answer to such a problem. 
61 For this suggestion see T. Robinson (1970) p. 52 and also Gerson (2003) pp. 124-131 who suggests 
that embodied soul is always, or always remains, an image of the disembodied soul 
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I wish to make some observations concerning the question of whether the soul is 
conceived by Plato to be simple or complex. First of all I think that the passage makes 
it clear that according to Plato a conception ofthe soul as following wholly the divine, 
does not entail that this soul be simple. If Socrates believed that a soul which is 
basically love of wisdom and which follows the divine as a whole is necessarily 
simple he would not go on to say that one has to discuss the question of the soul's 
constitution and complexity in relation to such a perfect soul (612a3-4). Unless we 
have to accuse Socrates of dishonesty, here Plato really believes that such a purified 
perfect soul might be complex. Earlier Socrates indicated that it is possible for 
something composite that has the most beautiful composition to be immortal ( 611 bS-
7: ou Q~bLov ... a(~nov dvaL m)v8er6v n: £K noMwv Kai. 1-ltl rrij KaM(an~ 
KEXQllf-lEVOV auv8£aEL, w~ vuv TJf-lLV £cpavll i] t!JuxJ1.) What is not compatible 
with the thesis of the soul's immortality is not complexity, but rather conflict and 
opposition. Thus more generally Socrates seems to believe that immortality requires 
some sort of perfection and harmony, or the potential for such perfection but he does 
not appear to endorse the opinion that perfection or the soul's perfection requires 
simplicity. 62 
What is important to notice is that Socrates here implies that the question of the 
soul's complexity should be addressed and can also be dealt with only in relation to a 
pure and perfect soul. In such a soul, which displays perfect unity and uniformity of 
purpose, one could not easily detect any complexity or variety. I think that this 
strategy indicates not that there are no reasons to acknowledge complexity in the soul, 
but if there are grounds that complexity has to be admitted these grounds would not 
be observable conflict and opposition, for in such a soul one could not observe any 
opposition. Thus one's starting point would be indeed different from Book 4, where 
Socrates' grounds have been conflict and opposition. Accordingly, complexity has to 
62 See also T. Robinson (1970) p. 53 who argues that Plato accepts the possibility that something 
complex be immortal. Furthermore Robinson argues that Plato here is not committed to the immortality 
of the intellect alone (p. 53). However, Robinson eventually does not ftnnly argue in favour of a 
complex immortal soul (p. 54). For a strong defence of the thesis that the immortal soul is taken here to 
be simple and identical to the superior part of the soul see Szlezak, (1976) pp. 1-58. For the view that 
the immortal soul in this passage simple see also Guthrie (1971) pp. 232-3, who, more generally, 
argues that Plato believes in all dialogues that the soul in its essence is simple and perfect. 
97 
be discussed by reference to a soul which simultaneously displays perfect unity and 
this indicates that if, for whatever reasons, there is complexity, complexity has to be 
able to be fully subordinated to the soul's unity and it has to be admitted only in so far 
as it does not undermine or is in conflict with the soul's unity and its desire for the 
good. On the other hand if one makes complexity and plurality as it is manifested in 
the senses one's starting point one may fail to discern unity, and the potential for 
harmony, and one more generally may not conclude that the soul is not such an 
intrinsically beautiful immortal thing. 
I suggested in an earlier section that the question of the soul's partition has to be 
dealt with after a definition of the soul has been reached, a definition that would apply 
to the whole and would also indicate the soul's unity. It seems to me that the same 
thing is indicated here in the context of Book 10. I am not sure whether complexity 
and plurality can be derived or deduced from a definition of the soul; for example 
from a definition of the soul as eros, or as self-motion as it is defined in the 
Phaedrus. 63 What is clear to me is that complexity has to appear to be compatible 
with such a definition, so that the soul's unity is not undermined. 
Despite the fact that in Book 10 Socrates does not explicitly commit himself to the 
soul's complexity I believe that there are strong reasons to accept that Plato is 
63 C. Rowe (1997) p. 436 has suggested that the conception of the soul as self-motion entails that the 
soul cannot be 'pure rationality' rather it requires passion and desire: 'thinking about things, even 
including doing them, by itself moves nothing'. Thus perhaps complexity can be derived from a 
definition of the soul as self-motion. More generally it seems to me that a conception of the soul as 
self- motion, minimally requires both reason and desire, and it also suggests the soul's unity. It requires 
desire, if desire is seen a motive force or power or as energy, and reason necessarily because 'self-
motion' implies directed or purposive motion, motion or change which is directed or has direction and 
purpose and is structured by purpose and thus by reason. That Plato considers self-motion as directed 
and as necessitating reason can I think be minimally be seen in the Phaedrus by the fact that self-
motion is associated with self-preservation (Phaedrus 245c): the self-moving thing never abandons 
itself, it aims at its perpetuation or preservation. Self-motion is associated with reason and self-care in 
the Timaeus at 77b-c. Furthermore, by suggesting that self-motion is purposive and directed, if 
complexity is admitted, the unity that this notion suggests implies that there is coordination or that in 
principle coordination can be achieved. Thus even if the soul is analyzed in different motivating factors 
these factors can in principle be coordinated and all directed to and be conduce to a single purpose. 
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thinking of the soul in its 'truest' nature as something complex involving some 
plurality or variety. Ignoring for the moment the differences or apparent differences 
between the account of the soul in the Timaeus and the Phaedrus, what both dialogues 
have in common is that in both dialogues the immortal or 'disembodied' soul, whether 
human or divine is portrayed as complex, being unitary and still involving internal 
differentiation. 64 Thus, to put the case rather briefly, in the Timaeus there are the 
circles of the different and the circle of the same (36c4-dl), while in the Phaedrus 
there is the charioteer and the horses. In the Timaeus more specifically, we have an 
effort on Plato's part to show that the soul, in particular the world soul, despite the 
fact that it involves 'some variety and difference' (but not 'much') involves the most 
beautiful composition, and is divided and composed in accordance with mathematical 
principles ofharmonics (Tim. 35al-37a5). The soul emerges as participating in reason 
and harmony (Tim. 37al). Thus I think in allowing for the immortality of something 
composite, the Republic clearly points to the direction of these two later dialogues. 
Socrates in Book 1 0 of the Republic is implying that the soul has to be examined 
by reason alone. This approach corresponds to an apprehension of the soul's nature in 
separation from the body and the senses. In other words both the cognitive subject has 
not to make use of the senses, and also the soul, the object, has to be fully stripped 
from the body and the senses. Socrates furthermore, indicates that the forms that one 
may discover in a soul in separation from the body may not correspond to the kinds 
that one can observe in human life (612a4-5). His remarks constitute an indication 
that the immortal soul or the soul that will apprehended by reason alone will not 
correspond to the appetitive and the spirited part that have been 'discovered' in Books 
2-4. I cannot imagine how it would be possible to discover spirit and appetite as forms 
or kinds in the soul without making any use of observation. Furthermore, such parts or 
64 I am in agreement with Hall who has suggested that the immortal soul has to be considered as a 
'differentia tied unity'. Hall ( 1963) p. 64 has stressed that the more fundamental question is not 
whether the soul has the three particular aspects, or more or less, rather is whether the soul is a simple 
or differentiated unity. He argues that a theory of individual immortal soul as a complex or 
differentiated unity is discernible in all relevant dialogues (Phaedo, Republic, Phaedrus, Timaeus and 
Laws). He also points out that in Book 10 'what is denied about the nature of the soul is not that it may 
be a complex unity but rather that its parts are necessarily in conflict with one another' (p. 73). 
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affections indeed presuppose the body and could not exist in a soul, which is stripped 
from anything that presupposes the soul's association with the body. 
In saying that one would not find the appetitive and spirited element in a soul that 
is examined by reason alone, I do not mean to say that literally a part of the soul 
would be missing. 65 What I wish to suggest is that if one examined the soul in the 
abstract one would not find the specific kinds or forms of behaviour and life that can 
be detected by observing human and animal life. The soul remains the same 'stuff 
and the potential and the capacity for such forms of life is already there. 66 Rather it 
seems to me that if complexity and plurality or difference were discovered in such a 
soul they would be somehow conceived in more abstract terms, as happens in the 
Timaeus. 
As I suggested in the previous section, a proper understanding of such observable 
forms of human life strictly speaking requires understanding of the soul by reason 
alone. Ideally reason has to deal adequately with the nature of the soul in complete 
abstraction from the body and experience of human life before undertaking to 
examine and classify the kinds of human character and behaviour. I wish to add here 
that complexity and multiplicity have to be introduced in the soul and examined in the 
soul before reintroducing the senses and the complexity and multiplicity that the 
senses provide. 67 One reason for this is that one has to discuss the more general 
question of how and how much plurality, variety and difference can come to fit in 
with unity, and more generally the rules and recipes for a harmonious composition in 
the abstract, without being disturbed or influenced by what the senses would appear to 
recommend. It seems to me that another reason that complexity has to be introduced 
in the soul and discussed prior to the senses and observation is that reason has to be 
able to account for the fact that soul is a principle of life, and also for the fact that life 
65 For this point see also T. Robinson {1970) p. 54. 
66 For these points I am particularly indebted to Christopher Rowe. See also Rowe (2007) p. 141-2, and 
pp. 169-170. 
67 For a discussion of the importance of harmonics in Plato's scheme of education in the Republic and 
also a discussion of the composition of the world soul in the Timaeus in relation to such harmonics see 
Bumyeat (2000) pp. 47-63. 
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manifests itself in a variety of ways, before coming to face such variety and 
multiplicity through the senses. 
Hence, it is possible that one mam reason why the immortal soul has to be 
conceived as complex or as involving complexity is exactly because a simple soul, 
being identical to nous or a pure intellect, could not account for the variety and 
multiplicity of forms oflife.68 A related reason is that perhaps Plato believes or comes 
to believe that plurality and variety in the soul is not solely due to the 'body' or the 
senses. If the soul were conceived as something completely simple, the body or the 
senses could not fully account for the 'apparent' transformation of something so 
simple to something so variable and complex as human life and mental or observable 
behaviour. 
It might be argued that such variety in a plurality in the soul is a mark of 
imperfection and the fact that Socrates suggests here that the immortal soul might be 
complex indicates that the soul is never fully purified from badness.69 Then the ideal 
would be somehow to become something simple like nous, if nous is taken to be 
something simple. However, I am not sure whether this interpretation is correct. I 
previously suggested that Socrates leaves it open that complexity can be discovered in 
a soul that has been assimilated to the divine. In such a soul complexity would not 
look like imperfection or impurity. I believe that Socrates wants to discover 
complexity in a pure soul precisely because in such a soul complexity would not look 
like imperfection. If one assumes that complexity has to be admitted in the soul so 
68 This seems to me to be quite clear in the case of the Timaeus. The circles of the different for example 
together with the motions that are due to 'necessity' account for the various 'directions' that human 
motion in space can take (43a6-b5), and thus I think it is implied that it accounts more generally for the 
variety of human action. 
69 For this view see Gerson (2003) pp. 129-130, who argues that in the Republic the disembodied soul 
can be complex because it carries still the marks of embodiment. See also Gerson (1987) pp. 81-96. A 
similar view had been suggested by Guthrie (1971), who understands complexity more generally as a 
mark of imperfection and pollution from the body that persists after death (pp. 236-7). This is how 
Guthrie explains the fact that human disembodied souls in the Phaedrus are presented as composite, 
and he implies that divine souls are simple. However, this account cannot explain the fact that the 
world soul in the Timaeus is explicitly presented as something composite and in principle at least 
dissoluble into its constituents (Tim. 41a6-b6), and still as much perfect as a created thing can be. 
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that one can be able to account for the soul's association with the body, perhaps it 
may be more generally argued that the soul's general aim is not exactly to get rid of 
the body. It can be argued maybe that its association with the body helps the soul 
fulfil its function, which does not solely lie in associating with the 'realm' of forms 
but also in governing the body and producing order in the physical world. 70 
I think that both in the Symposium and also in the Timaeus one can find a 
conception of the nature of the soul and its function as being one of an intermediary. 
In the Symposium (202d1l-203a8) the function of eros, which I think can be 
identified with the soul or its essential character, is presented as being one of an 
intermediary that to allows the communion between the 'human and the divine', 
which in themselves do not mix together. In the Timaeus the being of the world soul, 
which is made in accordance with reason or mind, is an intermediate kind of being 
due to a mixture of two kinds of ousia, being or essence, one divisible which pertains 
to the body and the other one indivisible (Timaeus 35a1-4: Tf)c; a~EQLU"COU Kai. aEi. 
Ka"Ca 'tatna EXOVallc;; ova(ac; Kai. Tf)c; au 71EQL 'ta aw~a"Ca yLyvO~EVllc; 
~£QLU'tfJc; "CQL"COV £E, a~cpOLV EV ~Eacp UUVEKEQlXUa"CO OVaLac;; dboc;). 71 The 
70 Gerson (1987) p. 93 has argued that the Republic can be reconciled with the Phaedrus. He suggests 
that 'the discarnate human soul is a permanently divided self because it is never wholly absorbed into 
intellectual activity. Gerson believes that the person is not identical to the soul rather it is identical to 
nous, and the ideal would be such a perfect absorption into nous (p. 94). Nevertheless Gerson's 
position is not consistent in my opinion because, as he himself admits, the world soul in the Timaeus 
and also the divine souls in the Phaedrus are presented as not being solely nous, and also as not being 
solely absorbed into intellectual activity (at least in relation to forms) and still there is no conflict in 
them (p. 92). Furthermore Gerson identifies the immortal world soul in the Timaeus with nous (p. 94). 
However, perhaps nous should be primarily associated with the circle of the same, which is presented 
as being undivided and governing the soul (Tim. 36c8-d2) and also as what brings the soul in contact 
with indivisible being (37cl-3) generating nous and episteme. 
71 For a discussion of the ontological and epistemological implications of this difficult passage see D. 
Frede (1996). Frede (1996) p. 38 asuggests that the underlining principle is that like is comprehended 
by like and that the mixture reflects the fact that the soul needs to be in contact with both worlds. 
Eventually Frede suggests that this passage undermines a 'two world theory' that the Timaeus appears 
to involve. She argues that the passage shows that the physical world has two aspects in itself. Frede 
also emphasizes the unity of the world soul and the world as a whole: 'there are not two souls living in 
(~: ~ -' ; ., . 
_,: 7 \ __ .' 
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mixed constitution of the world soul indicates its intermediate character and its 
placement in between the physical world and the world of forms. The world soul 
indeed is presented as having a complex nature, prior to its association with the body. 
This dual nature, which expresses an affinity with both the body and the forms, 
enables it to be in touch with both the physical and the intelligible 'realm'. The 
different ingredients out of which the world soul is made are perfectly integrated and 
thus it is also capable of uniting the two orders of reality or at least filling somehow 
the gap between the two orders of reality and also or simultaneously unifying and 
producing order the world as a whole, by allowing it to be in contact with the forms 
and be directed by nqus. 72 
Furthermore, the world soul in the Timaeus is presented as discharging both 
aspects of its function, without any internal conflict or imbalance and without one 
activity or aspect of activity undermining the other. Rather the circle of the same is 
presented as controlling and informing the circles of the different. This indicates that 
knowledge informs belief. I believe that this description of the soul, and the emphasis 
that Plato lays on the cosmic role of the soul in the later dialogues indicates that the 
soul's purpose then is not exactly to go up, and to retreat in one place together with 
the forms, rather to be in constant motion and to associate both with the forms and 
also with the physical world, and overall to stay in between. If my interpretation is 
correct, and in spite of what Book 1 0 of the Republic may appear to indicate, the 
soul's association with the body, or at least certain forms of such association, is not 
necessarily bad. Rather it can be seen as the fulfilment of the soul's function, even 
though it may be said that the human soul's association with the human body opens 
up the possibility for corruption and badness and the soul's 'fall'. 
its breast, an eternal one that longs for reunition with its transcended brethren, the Forms, and a 
temporal one that ties it to the world of change. No such split exists within the world soul' (p. 38). 
72 The demiurge reasoned that in order for the world to be most beautiful it needs to have nous. And 
nothing can have intelligence without having soul, and thus he put intelligence in the soul and the soul 
in the body (30bl-5). In this line of reasoning one can perhaps detect the thought that nous cannot be in 
direct contact with the body, rather the soul allows somehow the body to have a share in nous, and thus 
the soul can be said to be an intermediary both between the forms and the body and between nous and 
the body. 
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My suggestion is not immune to the objection that the later dialogues present 
us with a development in Plato's thought, which involves for example a denial of 
many elements of the metaphysics and epistemology of the Republic and more 
generally a more positive approach towards the sensible world. It may be argued 
furthermore that a rejection of a certain conception of the forms or epistemology has 
more general implications on Plato's understanding of the soul. Thus it may be argued 
that we can see Plato moving away from a kind of radical body-soul dualism that 
corresponds to and complements a radical dualism between the forms and the sensible 
world. According to many interpreters Plato endorses this radical dualism in the 
Republic and in the Phaedo. I have attempted to emphasize elements of continuity in 
Plato's thought and to suggest that the Republic can be interpreted in ways that allow 
it to appear compatible with later dialogues such as the Theaetetus, the Phaedrus, the 
Sophist and the Timaeus. 
In conclusion, the argument in Book 1 0 leads us towards a conception of the 
soul as being something essentially rational and desiring the good, but as something 
complex. I furthermore suggested that in the immortal soul we cannot find precisely 
the appetitive 'part' of the soul, or the spirited one, because the affections these 'parts' 
involve presuppose an actual body. At best 'in a disembodied soul' which is not fully 
purified we can find memory of such affections and not the affections themselves. 
However, I believe that the lower parts can be conceived as modifications of the 
immortal rational soul, which is also necessary, and by implication reason, for their 
formation. In the abstract, without the help of the senses or the experience of human 
life, one may not be able to detect such formations but one will be able to detect 
complexity that can account for such formations together with the body. Thus the 
soul, considered as pre-existing the body, and as something potentially at least 
independent from the body, is fully equipped with the capacities that will allow it to 
connect with a body and bring life into a body. The principle that one will examine 
will be unitary and one will be able to apprehend it in its unity or as a whole and 
provide a definition of it that applies to it as a whole. One may also detect complexity 
and internal differentiation prior to dealing with the soul in association with the body 
and more generally before 'introducing' the senses or observation, as happens in the 
Timaeus. Furthermore I suggested that a conception of both the unity and also the 
complexity in a purified or 'disembodied' soul, can help one reach better 
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understanding of the specific kinds ofhuman life, and also achieve harmony and order 
among these kinds. 
Appendix: the Phaedrus and the Timaeus 
I believe there is much greater agreement in the position that these two later 
dialogues represent regarding the nature of the soul than it is often recognized. In both 
dialogues the soul, both human and divine, is presented as complex. In the Timaeus 
the immortal soul has many levels of complexity and at a deepest level it is presented 
as being a mixture of ingredients, which are fully integrated (35a-b). Perhaps this 
indicates its unity and the common origin of all its parts or aspects. At a second level, 
we are presented with differentiation, which is also a functional differentiation. The 
mixture is divided in accordance with mathematical principles, which constitute 
harmonious proportions. This indicates that the parts that are divided are at the same 
time united because of their harmonious relationship (35b-36b ). Eventually there is a 
basic dichotomy (36b5-d7) between the different and the same. The circle of the 
same, which remains undivided, is the governing circle to which the circles of the 
different are subordinated (36c4-5). This I believe suggests that even though 
difference and plurality are not eliminated, unity and simplicity govern and regulate 
plurality and complexity and the whole is bound together and integrated. Furthermore, 
all the circles are interconnected. Thus when for example the circles of the different 
are in contact with something, the logos that is generated is transmitted throughout the 
whole soul (37b). This suggests that despite its functional differentiation the soul 
remains a unitary cognitive subject and congnitive operations inform one another. 
Furthermore, it seems to be the case that both in the world soul and in the human 
soul the circles of the different are in direct or immediate contact with the body and 
affected by bodily motions. In the case of the human soul the circles of the different 
are affected by aistheseis (43d-44a). Furthermore, the circles ofthe different appear to 
account for the variety of human action, since they account for motion in different 
directions (43a7-b5). Thus I think that the lower parts of the soul constitute 
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modifications of the circles of the different and not of the circle of the same. Owing to 
its simplicity the circle of the same accounts for consistency and order in action. The 
circle of the same, perhaps because of its simplicity is disturbed because of 
embodiment only in the sense that it does not function at all ( 43d). Unlike the circles 
of the same, its operation is not presented as being altered and thus when it works it 
works well. Furthermore, it is implied that when the circle of the same works, 
everything in human life works well. 
It seems to me that one can follow Robin's73 suggestion and with some amount 
of speculation associate the circle of the same with the charioteer in the myth of the 
Phaedrus and the circles of the different with the horses. The circle of the same in the 
Timaeus appears to be associated with the governing function in the soul, and it is also 
associated with nous and in a similar way the charioteer in the Phaedrus is associated 
with nous (Phaedrus 247c). The circles of the different represent a potential of 
irrationality in the soul, due exactly to their complexity and they are said to move in 
an irrational, disorderly and uncoordinated (Tim. 43e3: alogos) manner in the human 
soul. This is because they need to be regulated by the circle of the same. 74 Thus the 
rationality of the circles of the different may be said to depend on their relationship to 
the circle of the same. Perhaps the same applies to the horses in the Phaedrus. In a 
similar way the potential for irrationality in the Phaedrus in the human soul is 
associated with the 'bad horse'. It has also to be noted that both in the Timaeus and in 
the Phaedrus the human disembodied soul is said to differ from the divine, and thus 
there is a greater potential for irrationality. In the Timaeus the mixture of ingredients 
out of which the human soul is made is said to be inferior (Tim. 41d). In the Phaedrus 
such inferiority is associated with the 'bad' horse (Phaedrus 246a-b). 
The main difference between the two dialogues is that Timaeus may appear to 
suggest that the immortal part of the soul is identical to the logistikon of the Republic, 
while in the Phaedrus it looks as though the immortal soul comprises the logistikon 
and the two inferior parts, with which one is familiar from the Republic. But as I 
suggested, in both dialogues the immortal soul displays structural complexity and also 
73 See Robin (1944) p. CXXIII. 
74 Cf. Johansen (2004) p. 144. 
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such complexity has to do with the fact that the soul has to associate with the 
phsycical realm 75 and the forms. If one does not insist on the details of the myth it can 
be argued that that in both dialogues we can see the immortal soul as the logistikon of 
the Republic if it is assumed that the logistikon is not something simple. Furthermore 
a difference is that while in the Timaeus the two lower parts of the soul seem to be 
added after embodiment in the Phaedrus the disembodied soul comprises the same 
'parts' as the embodied. I think that the two dialogues can be fully reconciled if one 
assumes that the lesser gods in the Timaeus do not literally add something 'new' to 
the soul. In so far as the lower parts of the soul are associated with certain affections 
the lesser gods do not literally make these affections, nor do they provide the 
immortal soul with the capacity for experiencing such affections. They generate such 
affections in the sense perhaps that they place a soul in a body of a particular 
character, and they structure the body in such a way that such affections or the 
motions that are associated with such affections display some order and consistency 
prior to reaching the soul. Ultimately I believe that the ordering function of the lesser 
gods corresponds to our reason's shaping of certain bodily motions and affections, 
and more specifically to the shaping of these affections by the circles of the different, 
which have already been shaped or structured by nous. The ultimate aim is the 
regulation by and subordination of such affections to the circle of the same (Tim 42 c-
d). Furthermore I think that the horses in the disembodied souls in the Phaedrus myth 
are not exactly identical to the parts of the soul that one is familiar with from the 
Republic, rather they represent the potential for such parts. The 'bad' horse in the 
Phaedrus represents a potential for irrationality and conflict, but I think in a 
disembodied soul cannot be identified with sexual desire, in so far as sexual desire is 
something for which the body plays a role and which requires embodiment. 76 
75 Taking care of what is soulless is presented as an essential function of the soul in the myth of the 
Phaedrus (Phaedrus 246b). 
76 There are different stages in the examination of the soul both in the Timaeus and in the Phaedrus. 
Timaeus deals with with the works of reason alone, which involve the immortal 'part' of the soul and 
having dealt with necessity then he deals with the works of reason together with necessity, which 
correspond to the mortal parts of the soul. Perhaps this distinction corresponds to a distinction of the 
soul as it is discovered and apprehended by reason alone and the nature of the human soul as it is 
discovered by reason together with the senses. In relation to the Phaedrus it may be argued that the 
examination of the soul starts in the wrong way, as in the Republic. In Socrates' first speech we have an 
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Final remarks regarding the notion of justice in the Republic 
Before finishing this section devoted to the discussion of the soul's 
immortality in Book 10 of the Republic I wish to make some final remarks concerning 
justice. 
Socrates here says that justice and injustice can be appreciated in relation to a 
soul in its pure state (611c3-4: Kai. 1toAu KMALov av1:o t:VQTJUEL Kai. 
EVlXQYEU'l:EQOV bLKaLOauvac; 'l:E Kl.XL abLKLac; bLOtPE'rl.Xl Kal 7tUV'l:l.X a vuv 
bLf)A8o~Ev). Socrates does not mean to say that in such a pure soul one could detect 
injustice; 77 rather he wants to indicate that understanding of the soul in its pure form 
would also help one understand the nature and value of justice, and· also the badness 
of injustice. One may argue that Plato wants to suggest that apprehending the beauty 
and harmony of the 'original' nature of the soul in its pure form almost 
simultaneously involves apprehending the value of justice to which it can be said that 
this harmony is due or is identical. More generally, we can see here that 
understanding of the nature and value of justice is.inextricably associated with one's 
conception of oneself. In so far as one's conception of oneself or one's soul is 
inadequate, so is one's understanding of justice, and vice versa. To understand the 
nature and value of justice one needs to reach understanding of the soul that is 
compatible with the view of justice as something inherently good. Fully 
understanding justice as something inherently good involves or leads to a different 
understanding of oneself. It can also be said that in the 'longer way', for example an 
account of division and complexity in the soul, which presents the person as divided between opposite 
factors and passively dragged by these factors (237d ff.). Then Socrates provides a definition of the 
nature of the soul, as self-motion, which, I think, indicates its unity and its autonomy (245c-246a). In 
the myth (246a ff.) complexity is introduced but now we can see complex divine and quasi-divine self-
moving souls operating in a coordinated way or quasi-perfect way in the case of human souls. Then 
Socrates moves down to the human soul and human life again (249d ff.) and re-examines complexity 
and love in the context of human life. 
77 See also Adam (1902) ad loc. 
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understanding of the soul and understanding of the nature and goodness of justice go 
hand in hand. 
I think here one can detect a change of strategy in relation to Book 4. In 
Book 4 the value and nature of justice was approached in relation to a soul that 
exactly was not what Socrates here says that the soul should be or is in its true nature, 
in other words it was a soul divided by conflict, and not particularly beautiful, and a 
soul which appeared to be partly at least inclined towards injustice or ni\.wvEc;ia. 
Socrates did not try to show the value of justice by inviting us to appreciate and enjoy 
a soul in its perfection rather mainly by invoking the soul's imperfection and disorder 
and defending the need for justice and order by reference to this conflict and disorder 
that justice in the soul at least may diminish even though not perhaps completely 
eliminate. To a great extent this soul indeed corresponds to the average human soul. 
Socrates' arguments did not aim at appealing to perfect individuals or ideal 
philosophers but people who do indeed have such inclinations and these people were 
invited to oppose the tendency towards injustice, which was presented as solely a part 
in them, for the sake of goodness and order in their souls as wholes. I think that here 
in Republic Book 1 0 it is also indicated that this approach has its limitations. These 
limitations, I believe, concern the assumption that justice is something essentially 
good, good in virtue of what it is. I feel that Socrates has not adequately shown that 
justice is something good in itself, or alternatively he does not expect the reader to 
have reached adequate understanding of the fact that justice is good. 
First of all, it may be argued that in so far as justice is defended by reference 
to its opposite, conflict and disorder, it may appear that its value to a great extent 
depends on its opposite and the presence of its opposite. So for example justice would 
be of no use in a soul that does not experience any conflict, or more generally which 
does not have parts in opposition to each other. Furthermore, since justice appeared 
to oppose an element in human nature, from the point of view of this element justice 
still appeared to be something undesirable and unwelcome. In so far as justice appears 
to involve constraint and compulsion in relation to a part of human nature, it cannot 
appear to be something completely good, both in relation to the part and also the 
whole soul that performs it. Finally, I think that the comparison between justice and 
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health, injustice and disease tends to collapse in Socrates' proof for the immortality of 
the soul. Socrates argued that injustice for the soul is like a disease, which 
nevertheless does not kill it (608d2-610d4). Socrates wanted to show that the soul is 
capable of suffering from its disease in eternity and there is no death and relief for the 
bad man (610d5-7). But, one may object, since injustice does not kill the soul, it is not 
after all like a disease for the soul, or at least no more like a disease than justice is also 
health. What Socrates characterizes as disorder, might not be eventually such a 
problem for the soul, rather the soul fares no better with justice than injustice and both 
of them are equally natural or essential to it. Furthermore, in comparing injustice with 
disease, justice as health appears still to have primarily a remedial value, as something 
that is needed and desired only as long as its opposite exists. 
In relation to a soul which may not be perfect in the way that the divine is 
perfect, but rather involves no badness and conflict whatever and nothing that 
undermines or disfigures its tendency towards the good, justice would not be justified 
by reference to conflict and through negative terms, since such a soul would not 
involve conflict, rather perhaps its value would only be appreciated by reference to its 
necessary or essential connection with the good and also the soul's relationship with 
the good, as the primary object of the soul's desire. Furthermore, in a simple soul, or a 
soul which appears to be a perfect harmony, and which follows the divine as a whole, 
justice would not appear as a constraint upon the parts or the whole, rather it would 
solely constitute its natural tendency or the aim of this tendency. Nevertheless, to 
emphasize that justice is somehow natural to the soul Plato resorts again to some 
extent to badness and negative terms, now as something external to the soul and alien 
to its true nature that pollutes it, and as something the soul seeks to get rid of. In 
relation to such a soul then the 'badness' and undesirability of injustice would also 
become manifest, as something to be avoided by all means. 
Now if justice is defined by reference to a purified soul, perhaps justice could 
first and foremost apply to the whole soul, and would be a virtue of the soul without 
reference to the parts. In an analogous fashion, I suggested, the soul has to be 
examined initially without reference to parts, and thus also justice has to be 
considered in relation to a soul considered as a unity. Then justice in a soul would 
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consist in 'doing' one's own' for the soul as a whole78 and this would involve caring 
for itself. One may also think of what Socrates says in the Symposium 79 where he 
suggests that what is one's own is the good. It can be said that doing one's own is 
doing the good and/or aiming at the good. Saying that the good is one's own would 
suggest that the performance or fulfilment of its function for a given entity contributes 
to the general good, and is objectively good, but it is also one's own, and thus I think 
what is good in general, or contributing to what is general is also benefiting the 
particular entity and is good for this entity. Thus perhaps doing one's own for the soul 
is doing what is good for the soul, but simultaneously involves contributing to the 
general good, or what is objectively good and not solely good for the self but also 
good for the others and the world as a whole. More generally, in so far as the nature of 
the good is understood there is no conflict or disparity between doing one's own as 
doing what is good for the self and also functioning well in such a way that others can 
be benefited. 
However, if Socrates leaves open the possibility that the soul might be 
complex and involve functional differentiation, I think that one need not exclude the 
possibility that justice could also be seen as simultaneously corresponding to a 
relationship between elements in the soul. I do not think that one conception of justice 
precludes the other. In one case justice could be associated perhaps as an activity of a 
whole or a given entity, and in the other case as a relationship between different 
activities or functions inside a whole. I attempted previously to reconcile the two 
notions by suggesting that the soul is a self-making thing and the function or purpose 
of the whole soul is self-care, which can be identified with justice. If the soul is 
viewed as something complex, self-care involves and aims at establishing the proper 
order and unity in itself and justice in the sense of internal order. A proper order 
78 N. D. Smith (2001) pp. 128-30 has suggested that the soul is simple and that more generally the 
notion of justice does not depend on the question whether the soul has three parts or more, or no parts 
at all. He has suggested that in a simple soul justice would lie in 'doing one's own'. He argues 
convincingly that justice is the proper functioning of something and 'doing one's own for the soul' lies 
in the proper functioning of the soul in regard to the management of one's life and thus the conception 
of justice is in conformity with Socrates account of the soul and its function at the end of Book 1 
(353d-e) (pp. 131-2). 
79 Symposium 205e6-7. 
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inside the soul can be seen as both the result of the soul's proper activity, but also as 
supporting and maintaining such activity by allowing particular functions or 
operations to work in such a way as to support the unity, purpose and good 
functioning of the whole. 
Now, it can also be said that justice as doing one's own could also apply to 
the parts of this entity, not solely as a relationship between the parts of the entity, the 
proper order in other words of the parts, rather perhaps as a virtue of these parts. If 
justice is seen as a relationship between the parts of an entity, the parts cannot be said 
to be just in virtue of the fact that they are doing their own. Justice as virtue would 
constitute a characteristic of a whole, whose parts do their own. Nevertheless, in so 
far as justice can be simply identified with 'doing one's own', then the parts can be 
also said to be just in virtue of the fact that that they do their own. Again, I think that 
justice can be seen as somehow both a relationship between certain things, which 
belong to a whole, and thus a virtue of the whole and also a virtue of these things, 
which in been virtuous contribute both to their own well being, but also to the whole. 
Furthermore, if something is taken to be just in virtue of the fact that it 'does 
its own' a proper definition of justice for the part or the whole involves reference to 
the good, which in general terms is 'one's own'. This, as I suggested, means that even 
though there is a particular function or purpose in relation to a given agent, the agent's 
function contributes to the good and also one's own good. If doing one's own is the 
same thing as justice then one should perhaps say that 'doing one's own' regarding 
the parts of the soul should not merely involve reference to their particular functions 
and exclusion from other functions but also reference to the good, which can be seen 
as part of what it is one's own. This I think would indicate that the parts also share a 
common purpose and aim together at the good. Furthermore, it would indicate that in 
participating in this common purpose or function the parts benefit as well. Now the 
lowest part in doing its own, both in the case of the city and in the case of the soul, did 
not exactly participate in a common purpose, or even appear to share a common 
purpose, even though in some sense it contributed to the good of the whole. 
Nevertheless its contribution was primarily negative, and consisted in it not disturbing 
the operation of other parts. Furthermore, as I am going to argue more extensively, the 
lowest part was not said to be just or virtuous in virtue of the fact that it did its own, 
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even though in this way it certainly did not inflict injustice, and also it was not said to 
benefit itself. I think that in order to see 'doing one's own' as involving virtue and a 
positive contribution to the good both of the others and of oneself, one needs to 
consider 'doing one's own' as involving functioning in accordance with reason and 
together with reason and one's functioning being informed by reason. In this way I 
think more generally justice would not solely involve differentiation between the parts 
of an entity but also it would connect them. Thus it would not involve the radical 
separation of parts that justice appeared to involve in Book 4. Perhaps then it would 
be indistinguishable from sophrosune or would presuppose it. 
In a disembodied soul, which is complex, one would not find separate parts, or 
at least parts so radically separated from each other as in Book 4. As I argued earlier 
reciprocal separation of parts or functions was necessary and advisable for the 
moment the soul appeared to involve opposition and thus functions appeared to 
undermine each other. But one can imagine a complex soul where different activities 
or functions are performed in certain order and some are given priority over others 
and yet do not need to be radically separated from each other since one does not 
undermine the other. Rather they can be seen perhaps as mutually enhancing or 
supporting each other, one contributing to the good operation of the other and the 
purposes of the whole. 
If one considers the soul as something essentially complex justice as an 
internal state may involve the proper order and arrangement of functions, which thus 
come to be subordinated to the function of the whole, but it would not involve the 
radical separation of parts that was recommended in Book 4. Such separation was 
presented as necessary and was legitimised because of conflict, and because the 
elements were presented as being opposites, but I think that if in the disembodied soul 
there is no conflict, there is no need to see the parts or elements as separate. As a 
relationship for example or order of different functions or activities, which applies in 
an internally differentiated whole it need not involve the radical separation that 
appeared to involve in Book 4. Such separation was presented as necessary not 
because of complexity of function as such, but in particular because one function 
appeared to oppose and undermine the other. We could perhaps see different 
functions performed in a certain order but one function could appear to complement, 
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inform and reinforce the other and not undermine it. Then perhaps in a unified soul 
justice could appear to be indistinguishable from harmony and sophrosune. 
I wish also to note that in the argument in Book 4 justice is not attributed to 
the parts of the soul, and more generally justice is not presented as exactly the same 
thing as 'doing one's own'. Socrates does not say that the parts are just in virtue of the 
fact that they do they do their own, rather in the case of the city the city is said to be 
just in virtue of the fact that they do their own and not the parts of the city and the 
same applies to the soul. Thus justice emerges primarily as a relation or order between 
parts of a complex whole, and is not strictly speaking identical to 'doing one's own' .80 
Indeed, as I suggested earlier, justice emerges as identical to 'doing one's own' at 
443b9-dl (and also at 441dll-el) where at last Socrates was able to give the 
expression the meaning he wanted. This definition of justice was applied to the whole 
and not to the parts. Socrates there presented justice as an activity of the whole, and 
showed that just activity is responsible for the parts doing their own, and certainly it 
was not the parts themselves, which made the whole just by being just.81 We could 
also say that the soul as a whole is able to make its parts just, or reason in a soul can 
make the parts just. 
80 McCabe (1994) p. 269 has argued that 'that Plato has difficulty, at this stage in his thought, in seeing 
relations as supervening on (or contextualizing) the relata and sees them as real properties of the relata 
is witnessed by his reluctance to treat the relations of the parts as the definientia of justice and self-
control. Instead he suggests that that each part will have those virtues, just as the whole does, and just 
as the state of which the whole is a citizen, will'. However, I think that Plato has no such difficulty and 
more generally that Plato treats justice and sophrosune in a different way from courage and wisdom. In 
fact nowhere in Book 4 Socrates says that the city is just because the citizens are just. Thus justice and 
also sophrosune are conceived as relations and not 'properties of the relata'. Unlike justice and 
sophrosune, which characterize the whole, wisdom and courage are primarily virtues of parts. Justice is 
a characteristic of the whole (implying separation or domination of one part in relation to the other), 
which allows the virtues of the two superior parts to characterize the whole. Thus more generally, it is 
not sufficient for a complex entity to have a characteristic (such as wisdom) in a part of it so that it may 
be called 'wise' as a whole. Rather the part has to have a certain relation to other parts, and this relation 
is guarantted by justice. Different cities may have wise people, but these cities cannot be called wise 
because they 'lack' justice, in other words, the proper relationship and position of wise people in 
relation to the other people. 
81 This sense of 'doing one's own' cannot be perhaps applied to the city in any case, since the city 
cannot be presented as an agent in the way that the soul or the person can be presented. 
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Furthermore, Socrates in Book 4 does not try to prove, whether in the case of 
the city or in the case of the soul, that justice as the proper order of the parts, and 
'doing one's own', is beneficial to the parts and makes the parts happy. Rather justice 
as doing one's own for the parts was said to benefit the whole and be good for the 
whole. Also, he did not try to argue that the good of the part, and happiness for the 
part is due to happiness of the whole, and that greatest happiness for the part is 
compatible with greatest happiness for the whole. For example, when, in the case of 
the city Adeimantus says that one could object that Socrates is not making the 
superior classes in the city happy (419al-420a2), Socrates agrees that the rulers are 
not happy in terms of what is commonly believed to be happiness (420a3-8). Socrates 
states that it may indeed prove to be the case that these people are most happy ( 420b3-
5) but he built the city looking at the happiness of the whole city and not at the 
happiness of a particular class in it (420b2-c4). He also argues later that 'as the entire 
city develops and is ordered well, each class is to be left to the share of happiness that 
its nature comports' (421c3-5) (trans. by Shorey). Therefore he shows that the 
happiness of the classes does not correspond to what is commonly believed to be 
happiness, and doing as one likes, but he does not try to argue yet that the citizens are 
happy even though he indicates that he believes that they may tum out to be happy as 
much as it is possible for them. The same I think applies to the parts of the soul; his 
goal is to make the soul good and happy and not the parts. Thus Socrates did not try 
to argue either that doing one's own for the part is justice and parts of a whole are 
just, or that it made the part happy, rather justice was something that belonged to the 
whole and made the whole happy. In the case of the soul this means that the person is 
happy even though a part of him may not be quite happy, since justice involves 
suppression of a part, which would rather pursue injustice. 
There is, however, a passage later in Book 9, in the context of the discussion 
of pleasure in which the relationship between part and whole becomes clearer. There 
justice is attributed to the part, in virtue of the fact that it does its own and also the 
lower parts are presented as happy in being just. It is also made clear in this context 
that one's own is the good: 
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SaQQOVVn:c; Atyw~-t.EV on Kai. 'ITEQL '[0 qnAoKEQb£c; Kal '[0 <j>lAOVLKOV 
oaaL E'ITL8U~-t.LaL dai.v, ai 1-t.EV, av rrt:J E'ITLUull-llJ Kai. A6ycp E'ITO~-t.EVal Kai. 1-t.E'rCt 
'[QU'[WV rrac; i]bovac; btWKOVaat, &c; av '[0 <j>QOVL~-t.OV tE,llyfJ'ral, Aa~-t.~avwat, 
rrac; M118Earrarrac; '[E Af)¢ovrrat, we; ot6v '[£ aurrat:c; M118Et:c; Aa~ELV, ihE 
M118EL~ E'ITO~-t.EVWV, Kai. rrac; eavrrwv OLKELac;, El'ITEQ '[0 ~[Anarrov eKliarrcy, 
rrourro Kai. olKEL6rrarrov; AMa ~-t.fJv, e<j>11, olKEL6rrarr6v yE. T<f> <j>lAoa6<j>cp aQa 
E'ITO~-t.EVllc; anaUllc; rriic; ¢uxfic; Kai. 1-lll arraata(ovUllc; eKliarrcy rr<f> 1-t.EQEL 
tJ'ITclQXEL Eic; 'rE rrai\i\a rra EaV'rOV 'ITQcl'r'rELV Kai. btKa(cp ELVaL, Kal bf1 Kal rrac; 
i]bovac; rrac; eavrrov EKaU'[OV Kal rrac; ~EArr[arrac; Kai. de; '[0 bvvarrov rrac; 
M118Earrarrac; KaQnova8at. (586d4 -587a2) 
'May we not confidently declare that in both the gain-loving and the 
contentious part of our nature all the desires that wait upon knowledge and reason, 
and, pursuing their pleasures in conjunction with them, take only those pleasures 
which reason approves, will, since they follow truth, enjoy the truest pleasures, so far 
as that is possible for them, and also the pleasures that are proper to them and their 
own, if for everything that which is best may be said to be most its 'own'? But indeed, 
he said, it is most truly its very own. Then when the entire soul accepts the guidance 
of the wisdom-loving part and is not filled with inner dissension, the result for each 
part is that it in all other respects keeps to its own task and is just, and likewise that 
each enjoys its own proper pleasures and the best pleasures and, so far as such a 
thing is possible, the truest.' (trans. by Shorey) 
In this passage we can see that goodness and truth are more or less equated 
and shown to be dependent on what reason recommends. It is reason that finds what is 
best for the part, which is the part's own. Also what is best for the part corresponds to 
the truest or more genuine pleasure for the part, thus what is best corresponds to 
genuine or real satisfaction of the desires of the part and the greatest happiness for the 
part. We can see furthermore that what is good for the part is dependent on the good 
of the whole, and also compatible with what is good for the whole, since what is good 
for the part is dependent on reason. Satisfaction for the part is also compatible with 
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justice as 'doing one's own'. However, it should be noted here that the lower parts are 
116 
presented as potentially following objective reason and therefore positively endorsing 
reason. At the same time it is indicated that the pleasures of the lower parts can be 
themselves endorsed by reason since they can have a share in truth. Finally, it is 
implied that the lower parts in reality desire true pleasure, which corresponds to their 
true or real satisfaction. To imply that the lower parts desire true pleasure shows that 
the lower parts have a share in reason and cannot be fully conceived as separate from 
reason. The lower parts cannot be said to have a sense of truth in themselves or as 
such. In suggesting that they will be happy with this arrangement Socrates is implying 
that the desires of the lower parts are dependent on reason and are not separable from 
reason. By consequence, pleasure in general, including bodily pleasure, is also not 
something fully separable from reason. I believe that the assumption that the lower 
parts can have positive relationship with reason, and the fact that they follow reason, 
and thus in some sense act together with reason which allows Socrates here to say that 
these parts can be just, in virtue of the fact that they do their own, and thus to have a 
share in goodness, virtue and truth. 'Doing one's own' thus itself can be said to 
include or comprise 'following reason', and 'aiming at the good'. 
This passage occurs in the context of the discussion of the nature of pleasure, 
which is crucial in that it fully establishes the connection between justice and 
happiness. I am going to discuss Plato's treatment of pleasure more extensively in a 
different section. Suffice it to say that the common conception of happiness involves 
pleasure and more generally satisfaction of desire, and Socrates in Book 4 has not 
shown that justice involves satisfaction of desire, rather the emphasis has been on 
suppression of desire. To show that justice involves satisfaction of desire, Socrates 
needed to reexamine the nature of pleasure, and thus what consists real satisfaction 
and also to imply a different notion of desire as well, in which desire is not something 
essentially opposed and independent from reason. 
One may ask why Socrates in the context of Book 4 did not directly say that 
'doing one's own' is benefiting both the agent, and also the whole of which the agent 
is a part, and it is also just. Why more generally did he avoid saying that one's own is 
the good? I think that one answer is that to attribute virtue to a part, but also to allow a 
conception of the part as both aiming at the good and as simultaneously benefiting 
itself, we need to see it as operating together with reason and thus we need to allow 
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that the part has a share in reason, and in Book 4 this was not the case in relation to 
the lowest part of the soul and the city. In the case of the city Plato would need to 
attribute some kind of virtue to the lower class that has not really been educated and 
in any case did not show how it can be involved with reason. But in the case of the 
soul I think that it can be said that all the parts have even a minimal share in reason, 
and thus they can be involved in virtue and goodness, and this I think becomes clear 
in connection with pleasure, where even bodily pleasure can be said to approach truth 
if its pursued with reason and together with reason's pleasures. 
Perhaps there is a more general problem here in that Socrates seeks to avoid 
saying directly that something is just in virtue of doing one's own and also that doing 
one's own and justice is good for the thing that does its own, but also contributes to 
general goodness. One could object that if justice is doing one's own, either justice 
basically lies in doing whatever one likes and thus one would be led to a 
Thrasymachean or Calliclean notion of justice, or alternatively justice is not 
something good for the person rather it is something that benefits others. This 
objection would display a confusion or lack of understanding of the good, and more 
generally lack of understanding that the good of the individual is compatible with and 
connected with the good of the others. 
I believe that Socrates in Books 2-4 of the Republic attempted to achieve a 
kind of middle ground so that he does not appear to fully contradict common 
assumptions concerning justice. At the same time he is able to lead his interlocutors to 
a better understanding of the notion of justice and more generally of where the good 
lies, and what the good involves or at least what the good does not involve. Socrates 
did not try to say that doing one's own for example involves doing as one pleases, and 
makes one happy. Rather doing one's own was not acting as one's pleases. For 
example in the case of the lower part of the soul it involves restraint of this part, and 
Socrates did not try to show that the lower part is happy. Instead he tried to argue, and 
here he did not deviate much from common opinion, that doing one's own benefits 
the whole of which one is a part. In saying that the whole is just in virtue of its parts 
doing their own, he also showed that what is just is also good and happy. From the 
moment the person was presented as a complex whole, justice appeared to benefit the 
person, though not necessarily her parts. Yet it was quite clear that one should not act 
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as one pleases, at least as the lower part of the soul desires, and in accordance with the 
ordinary conception of what it means to do as one likes.82 Thus the whole's goodness 
and happiness does not lie in what people would commonly understand to be 
happiness. Eventually Socrates managed to show that doing one's own for the agent 
as a whole is justice and is good for the agent, even though not quite identical to what 
people commonly conceive to be good and also not quite the same thing as ordinary 
justice, since it involves caring for oneself not in the way perhaps that most people 
would take caring for oneself to involve rather as working towards the proper state in 
one's soul. 
With a proper understanding of the good, and also with a proper understanding 
of the relationship between a part and the whole it can be said that doing one's own 
involves being virtuous and contributing to one's own good and benefits oneself, also 
to the good of the whole, and also even doing as one pleases, and as one desires if one 
understands the nature of pleasure and where genuine pleasure is to be found. But for 
such a notion of 'doing one's own' I think to be possible, it is necessary to present 
someone as involving reason, and as working together with reason. A proper 
understanding more generally of the good involves there being no clash between the 
part of the whole, and the goodness and order of the whole is conducive to the 
goodness of the part which itself realizes its nature as part of a whole. 
In conclusion I have attempted to argue that an understanding of the nature of 
the soul and more generally the relationship between the part and the whole, is 
inextricably connected with the conception of justice and how one considers justice to 
be good. 
82 Compare with 420e5 and 445bl-2. 
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Part Ill 
Desire, Reason, and Pleasure 
Chapter 5 
The conflict between reason and appetite in Book 4 (437d1-439b5) 
Glaucon's account of desire and self-control 
In this section I shall examine the account of the conflict between reason and 
appetite in Book 4. I attempt to argue that Plato's primary aim in this argument is not 
to deny the thesis that the soul desires th~ good, rather to establish reason's 
independence from desire and simultaneously to help the reader reach a more 
adequate conception of the good. 
Having clarified the principle of opposites and its application (436b9-437a9) 
Socrates moves on to demonstrate that there can be opposite attitudes in the soul in 
relation to the same object (437bl ff.). In order to divide the soul into parts, Socrates 
needs to demonstrate the autonomy of reason from desire and simultaneously the 
possibility and intelligibility of reason's restraint of desire. In order to achieve this he 
needs to show that reason can be in direct opposition to desire. 
I believe that a possible objector to Socrates' argument could be Glaucon or 
someone like Callicles. Glaucon in his speech in Book 2 argues that justice, for most 
people at least, is involuntary (359c2-4, 359b7-9, 360c6-8). It is practised as 
something necessary and not as something good, because of fear and inability to avoid 
the consequences of injustice, which is considered to be good (358e4-5, 359a7-b2). 
Glaucon explains that justice is involuntary, practised due to inability to commit 
injustice, because the natural tendency of people's desire is towards injustice (359b8-
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c6). Self-advantage (TIAt:ove~(a) is something that 'every creature by its nature 
pursues as a good, while by the convention of law it is forcibly diverted to paying 
honour to equality' (trans. by Shorey) (359c4-6). Glaucon indicates that justice 
involves restraining desire ( ETIL8U~-tLa: 359c3) and inability to do what one wishes 
(359cl :TIOLEiv on av ~ouArrrcu). Glaucon finds no conflict between ~oUAT)mc; and 
ETIL8U~-tLa and draws no sharp distinction between them. As everybody wishes to do 
what one desires, no one wishes to practise justice, since justice opposes desire. 
Thus in this passage the general thesis that justice is involuntary is associated 
with the thesis that justice is not good in itself. More speCifically, the involuntariness 
of justice is related to a conception of human desire as naturally leading towards 
injustice. Hence justice emerges as something that opposes and restrains human 
desire. A further more general assumption seems to be that restraint of desire is 
something involuntary. Such a conception therefore does not allow reason to be 
presented as something that directly opposes desire and more generally as something 
autonomous in the soul. 
The notion of what is involuntary here is associated with a choice of the 
lesser evil that one feels compelled to make. 1 One in some sense chooses justice, as 
one chooses to restrain one's desires and not to act as he wishes, but one feels 
compelled to choose something one does not really want. Restraint of desire emerges 
as a form of weakness (359b2: lXQQWU'tlq, 359b8: abuva~-tl.q). In an analogous 
fashion Callicles in the Gorgias repudiates self-control, which Socrates may appear to 
put forward as something good (Gorgias 491d10-13). Again Callicles associates the 
good with the object of desire ( 492b6) and suggests that the majority of men restrain 
their desires because of weakness ( 492a5). 
1 Involuntary 'choice' can be found in the Gorgias, where the notion of what is voluntary is associated 
with ~ouArJOu; (Gorgias 509 e5-7). Socrates says that he would choose to suffer injustice if he had to, 
but he would not want to (Gorgias 469cl-2: BouAOLf.!TJV f.!EV av i:ywyE ovbETEQa·d b' avayKaiov 
ELTJ abLKELV fJ abLKEiaSm, I':AOLf.!TJV av f.!aAAOV abLKEi:a8aL fJ abLKELV). 
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Socrates' challenge is to demonstrate that justice in the soul is good in itself 
and not merely good in its consequences? He needs to show that justice can be or is 
voluntary, and can be chosen as something good, and not merely as a form of painful 
remedy. However, Socrates is not going to directly reject the Glauconean conception 
of desire as naturally tending towards pleonexia, and by implication he does not fully 
reject the conception of justice as involving restraint of desire. Instead of directly 
rejecting such a conception he wants to indicate that human nature is more complex 
than one might assume. What he needs to do is distinguish between parts of the soul 
and more specifically to show that reason can directly oppose desire and its object as 
something bad. The opposition of reason to desire indicates and presupposes that the 
object of desire is something that can be believed to be bad and thus, by implication, 
that it is not absolutely good. More generally in demonstrating the opposition of 
reason to desire Socrates indicates that certain objects that are commonly conceived to 
be good are not necessarily good, and thus, as I am going to argue more extensively, 
he basically directs the reader and the audience to a more adequate conception of the 
good; also at the same time, he indicates that the arbitrator concerning what is good 
should be reason, whose potential autonomy from desire suggests that it can conceive 
the nature of the good resting on its own resources. Thus room is more generally 
made for justice - and by implication self-control as an ordering of the soul - to be 
conceived as something that comes from inside, something good and voluntary. 3 4 
In Book 4 it emerges that self-control is voluntary from the point of view of 
the two superior parts of the soul (and by implication on the part of the person and the 
whole), but not from the point of view of appetite. Rather restraint and justice are 
2 See Republic 358al-3, 367c6-e4. 
3 Then one can also argue that yielding to desire or appetite is the real form of weakness, and not, as 
Callicles would maintain, restraint of desire. 
4 What is voluntary in Plato ultimately is what is really good, which is what one wishes. But in 
Glaucon's speech there is no distinction drawn between what is voluntary in the sense that it is 
something that one believes to be good and also what is really good. In order to show that justice is 
something voluntary Socrates needs to show nevertheless that it can be believed to be good in itself. 
Since it is not clear that he can manage to demonstrate that justice can be believed to be good in itself, 
he at least manages to leave room for this possibility. 
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imposed to the lower part from outside and do not appear to be natural to it. 5 
However, apart from acquisitiveness, another two natural tendencies have been 
discovered since Book 2, the spirited and philosophic characters. Socrates has made 
use of empirical observation, focusing in particular on the nature of dogs,6 to discover 
a mild and an aggressive character that can be combined and harmonized (375c6ff.) 
One character is presented as being aggressive, but it has a natural aversion for 
(suffering) injustice (whether internal or external) and is obedient to what is 
considered to be just ( 440c9-d6). The other is presented as mild and sociable, loving 
what is familiar to it, and being attached to what has become familiar to it through its 
education (376a-b). The 'compresence' of these two characters, mild and aggressive, 
in dogs indicates more generally that they can be combined and harmonized. Spirit 
later is characterized as the natural ally of reason (441a2-3). These two elements are 
'naturally' attached to justice and law and thus human nature does not tend wholly 
toward injustice. Rather there is also a natural tendency for society, moderation, and 
restraint. Socrates in Book 4 builds upon this account showing that the two superior 
elements are independent from appetite and can oppose it as something external to 
them. Thus justice and self-restraint can be voluntary, coming from inside and not 
imposed externally. 7 
I argued in my previous chapter that Plato believes that the soul is essentially 
unitary. Thus the conflict between reason and desire is not essential, and also the 
conflict between wish and one's epithumia is not something unbridgeable. 
5 See 442a4ff: Kal. 'rOlhW bij oihw 'rQa<j:>evu Kal. w~ Mll9W~ 'ret aV'rWV f.la96vu Kal. 
nmbwetvn: nqoa'r<a'r>-nlae'rov 1:oD tm9Uf.111UKOU, o bij nAeia1:ov Tii~ tjJuxfi~ tv i:l«Xmi{J 
EU'rl Kal. XQllf.lthwv <j:>van anAllU1:0'ra'rOV, 0 'rllQTJUE'rOV f.lTJ 'r(jJ 7tlf.17tAaa9aL 'rWV mql. n) 
UWf.la KMOVf.lEVWV r'Jbovwv noAu Kal iaxuqov yt:VOf.lEVOV OVK av 'ret avwu nqanq, aAAet 
Ka'rabovAwaaaem Kai aqxnv E7tLXELQTJU!J wv ov 1tQOafjKOV av'r(j) yevn, Kal. UVf.l1taV'ra 'rOV 
~LOV 7ttXV'rWV ava'rQEtP'J. 
6 In relying on observation of animal nature in order to examine human nature Socrates may be said to 
be undermining Calliclean naturalism with its own weapons. (Cf. Gorgias 482d-484c.) One can fmd 
loyalty and sociability in nature and not solely aggressiveness. 
7 Nevertheless in the context of Books 2-4 justice and law can still appear to be an external constraint 
imposed upon the soul since the method of ingraining beliefs by indoctrination (see e.g. 429c7-430b5) 
has not allowed the soul to find the truth on its own and adopt it for itself. 
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Furthermore, in my opinion, Plato would not accept that one's reason fully opposes 
one's desires as something bad and alien or could do this. In so far as one desires 
something, one will be inclined to regard both the object of desire and the desire itself 
as good to some extent. Since a desire is still one's desire, one and one's reason might 
identify to some extent with the desire and also conceive the object as good.8 This is 
more generally one reason why restriction of desire cannot be fully voluntary, and 
justice, in so far as it involves suppression of desire, cannot emerge as something 
good. However, if desire is conceived as not being separate from reason, then reason 
can in principle affect desire, 'persuade'9 it, and direct it towards proper objects. 
Nevertheless it is ultimately reason that has to reach a conception of the good that is 
not 'dictated' by desire, and thus reason has to govern human life. The involuntariness 
of wrongdoing can be associated with the notion that one's desires can come to be in 
conformity with the good. 
However, since Plato seems to believe that desire can be affected by the body 
and other factors, and not solely by reason, then the soul's virtue and autonomy 
depends on the possibility that reason resists particular desires. Also that, in certain 
cases, we can act against the stronger urges. Reason's supremacy in the soul is related 
to its power, at times, to lead us in a direction different from the stronger desires, and 
in the long term to bring desires into agreement with it. 
8 Gerson (2003) p. 107 has correctly maintained that as long as one's desires are one's desires one 
cannot avoid identifying with them to some extent. He argues that the self which is the subject of 
desires is the same as the self which is reason (p. I 07). However Gerson seems to regard this 
identification as necessarily problematic. The embodied person according to Gerson is one and at the 
same time divided (p. 109). While Gerson maintains that the self is unitary he seems to regard the 
lower parts of the soul as completely separate from reason. He maintains that the parts of the soul are 
different principles of action, ultimate and sufficient explanations of action (pp. I 00-1). While I agree 
with many points it seems to me that a unitary self is not compatible with fully separate parts of the 
soul. Gerson more generally seems to conceive the embodied soul as a self-contradictory entity. 
Opposition, in my opinion, always tends to be qualified, and the tendency of the whole is to resolve 
opposition and contradictions. Furthermore I believe that it is not problematic for the self to identify 
with desires or appetite, in so far as this identification is approved of and mediated by reason. One thus 
can identify with desire if one primarily identifies with reason. 
9 Inability to persuade themselves is a mark of the less virtuous characters. See 548b6-8 and 554c 12-
d3. 
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Still, it is not clear to me to what extent Plato believes reason is able to resist a 
persistent desire, without already being supported by passion and desire, or without 
being able to generate support from passion and desire. 10 In general if reason can 
oppose desire then this opposition presupposes that desire to some extent supports 
reason.
11 In Book 4 for example it is suggested that reason's success in confronting 
desire depends on spirit listening to reason, which itself is a form of passion. 12 
Philosophers in Book 6 are said to be 'self restrained' because their desires in general 
are directed to intellectual pleasures (485d-e). 13 Nevertheless, I am committed to the 
10 One example that can, perhaps, be interpreted as a case where reason leads to action against desire is 
the philosopher's return to the cave. Such return is presented as a form of compulsion, but I think that 
the necessity (520 el-3, 540b3: oux we; KMOV n aM' we; avayKaiov 1IQlXT'WVTac;) that compels 
philosophers to descend into the cave is different from the necessity or compulsion of ordinary people, 
according to Glaucon's experience, when they have to suppress their desires and do what the law 
demands. In this case the philosopher's experience has to do with their commitment to justice (and 
ultimately their commitment to the good) and their knowledge of justice, which involves knowledge 
that justice is intrinsically (or necessarily) good (540d3-e2: omv oi we; M118wc; <j:>tA6ao<j:>oL. . . TWV 
j.1EV VUV Tlj.1WV KlXTlX<j:>QOV~aWaLV •.. n) bi: OQ80V m:ql. MELOTOU 7IOLllOlXj.1EVOL KlXL -rae; arro 
TOUTOU TLj.1tXc;, IJEYLOTOV bi: Kal. avayKmOTlXTOV TO bLKlXLOV. KlXL TOUT4J b~ urrnQETOUVTEC TE 
Kal. aul;OVTE<; aUTO bLaaKEVWQ~aWVTlXL ~v ElXVTWV rr6i\Lv;). Doing what is just in relation to 
their_ co-citizens, and fashioning the city in accordance to justice, can be seen as an expression of this 
commitment and a form of servitude to justice itself. However, in so far as this commitment is 
presented as being in opposition to desire and pleasure, it may still appear to be a form of constraint in 
relation to desire, whether it springs from philosopher's own reason or from external law. 
11 I am not referring here to the desire for the good. 
12 See also 431 b-d, where it is argued that the many and manifold desires of the lower classes are 
restrained by the simpler desires of the ruling class, which are led by reason and true belief. Reason 
together with desire restrains the many desires. 
13 Joseph (1935) pp. 53-4, argues that we do not always act on the stronger desire, and that real 
contrariety exists between reason and desire, not between desires. Gerson (2003) p. 103 follows 
Joseph's earlier analysis and maintains that the conflict that Plato wants to establish in Book 4 is not a 
conflict between desires, rather a conflict between reason and desire. Also that the acratic and the self-
controlled person is not someone who acts on the stronger desire. I am in agreement with the 
suggestion that Plato in Book 4 wants to distinguish between reason and desire, however, in many 
places (see 431 b-d) the conflict in the soul is presented as a conflict between desires. Perhaps, in so far 
as a conflict can be presented as a conflict between desires we do not have direct and straightforward 
opposition in the soul. See also Nettleship's useful notes (Nettleship (1901) pp. 158-159): 'When Plato 
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thesis that Plato takes reason to be supreme in the soul, and prior to desire. Reason's 
priority perhaps makes it necessary to accept that reason, in certain cases at least, can 
be presented not solely as directing desire but also as, at least momentarily, blocking 
desire. 
Discussion of the remainder of the argument 
In the remainder of the argument for the division of reason from thirst we do 
not see reason being in opposition to desire for the sake of justice, since this would 
make Socrates appear to be begging the question of whether justice can be voluntary 
and chosen as something good in itself. Reason's grounds for objecting to the 
satisfaction of desire for drink are not provided. However, I think that one is 
encouraged to assume that reason, on reflection, thinks that drinking is not conducive 
to health. 14 Such a simple example allows one to see that there are cases where one 
opposes one's desires not because one feels externally compelled to do so, but for the 
sake of one's well being. More generally justice in the soul is compared to health 
(444c6-445b4) and we are invited to restrain our desires for the sake of psychic health 
and not solely for the sake of bodily health. 
The conflict that Socrates 
tries to establish is the conflict between a desire for and an aversion to, the same thing 
suggests that a difficulty might be raised on the grounds (apparently) that appetite or desire is for 
something good and therefore is never unqualified attraction to the particular object desired, he is on 
the point of passing from epithumia in this narrower sense, which is best conveyed by our word 
'appetite' to epithumia in the wider sense of any desire, any consciousness of a want. Taking the word 
in this latter sense it is difficult to apply the opposition between reason and desire on which he bases 
his conclusions. In every desire there is an element of rational activity, and in the most reasonable 
direction of our activities there is an element of desire. So we may say that the real conflict is not 
between reason as such and desire as such, but between different kinds of desires, and accordingly in 
Book IX we find that each of the three forms of the soul has its own special epithumia'. 
14 Socrates allows for the possibility that thirst may be due to disease at 439d 1. 
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(436bl0: n:Qoc; -ra1rrov, 437al: n:Qoc; -ro av-ro, 439b5-6: n:t:Qi. -ro au-ro) 'drink' _IS 
The conflict does not concern any particular kind of drink or any particular drink. 
Rather, as I understand the passage, the fight concerns the kind 'drink' .16 Thirst is 
defined as a generic desire for drink (437d5, e4-6, 439a4-7), while in a similar fashion 
reason objects to drinking in general ( 439b3). An objector could perhaps try to 
interpret all cases of apparent opposition in relation to a particular object as not being 
strictly speaking in relation to the same thing. We may have a 'pro attitude' and an 
'anti attitude' towards the same lemonade, but an objector might dismiss the case as 
irrelevant, for example, on the grounds that desire is for lemonade while one is averse 
to the fact that this particular lemonade is sweet. Furthermore, an aversion to 
lemonade would be in direct opposition to a desire for lemonade and not thirst as 
such. In this case opposition to thirst would be incidental, if only lemonade is 
available. 17 I think that we need to imagine a case, where the problem does not 
concern the availability of an object that can satisfy a desire in the proper way. 18 
Rather we need a case where the doctor for example forbids drinking for a certain 
period of time and thus one should not drink anything. The example shows that one 
can be in opposition to one's desires at their very basic character or their core. 19 
15 See also Murphy (1951) p. 28, Lorenz (2006) pp. 30-31, and Anagnostopoulos (2006) p. 175. I 
believe that desires here are taken as referentially transparent. See Reeve (1988) p. 123. 
16 Compare with Rep. 475b4-6. 
17 It may be argued that since reason opposes drink as bad or unhealthy, both 'unhealthy' and 'bad' are 
different features of an object from 'drink'. However, 'bad/unhealthy and 'drink' are not connected 
incidentally: what makes something bad is exactly what makes it a drink and not a further feature in 
this case. 
18 See Bosanquet's (1925) useful comments ad loc.: 'The main argument would have been equally well 
supported if Plato had simply alleged as a fact that that desire can be restrained when its precise and 
full satisfaction is attainable'. 'To use the kind of instance which he suggests, we cannot fairly say (so 
he contends), 'I restrained my thirst' if I was only offered dirty water which I do not like to drink. In 
such a case I did not squarely meet and baffle the thirst as such, i.e. the sheer craving for drink. I 
desired clean drink and that I could not get'. Bosanquet (1925) goes on to argue that 'every counter-
desire may be regarded as a modifying desire, and therefore Plato is ultimately taking a side in the 
psychological dispute, whether desire can be restrained by anything but desire. His point at present is 
that restraint of desire by desire is not genuine restraint at all, but restraint by 'reason' alone deserves 
the name. This is hardly consistent with the implication of 431 d.' 
19 See Anagnostopoulos (2006) p. 175. 
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Socrates introduces an objection that threatens his argument. The objection 
concerns the specification of the object of thirst, which Socrates has defined as being 
for drink. The objector argues that the object of thirst should be specified as 'good 
drink'. The objector's grounds are that everybody desires good things: Tiavn::<; yaQ 
lXQCX 't:WV aycx8wv bu8U~-tOUaLV. Ei ouv 1'1 b(\(Jcx bu8U~-tLcx EU'rl, XQT]U't:OU av 
eLf] dn: TIW!-!CX'rO<; dn: &Mou (hou ea't:LV ETIL8U~-tLcx, Kat cxi &MaL oihw 
(438a3-5). The objector's reasoning is taken to be fallacious. The premise that 
everybody desires good things does not entail that thirst, having being defined as a 
desire for drink (437d5) is a desire for good drink. Socrates thus does not object to 
the premise that the objector uses, rather to the conclusion, namely that thirst as such 
should be defined as being for good drink. 20 
Why is the objection a threat to Socrates' argument? It seems to me that the 
problem is that if the object of desire is defined as 'good drink' it would make no 
sense, according to the objector, to develop an aversion to it, since it makes no sense 
to develop an aversion towards something that is good. The good is by definition 
something that one cannot reject. Furthermore, I think that the objector tries to make it 
impossible for reason to think of good drink as bad. Even though Socrates does not 
say here that reason thinks of drink as bad, if an aversion toward something entails or 
20 Many commentators, relying on this passage, have maintained that Socrates' rejection of the 
objector's reasoning involves or presupposes a partial rejection of the psychology of the earlier 
dialogues on Plato's behalf. See Murphy (1951) pp. 29, Penner (1971) pp. 106-7, Irwin (1977) pp. 
191-2, Irwin (1999) pp. 206-11, Lorenz (2006) p. 28. Anagnostopoulos (2006) p.172-3 argues that 
Socrates in this context is not rejecting the thesis that one desires what appears to one good, rather the 
thesis that all of one's desires are for the real good, which in her opinion is the position of the earlier 
dialogues. Hoffman (2003) pp. 171-4 points out that Socrates does not argue against the premise that 
everybody desires good things. Also Carone (2001) pp. 107-48 does not understand the passage as 
involving a rejection of the thesis that we all desire the good. Moreau (1953) pp. 234-50, and more 
recently Pondopiddan Thyssen (1998) pp. 59-79 have maintained that Plato is not rejecting the 
psychology of the earlier dialogues. I am inclined to believe that Plato's ultimate aim is not so much to 
reject the Socratic position, the substantial premises of which he accepts in the Republic, but rather to 
prevent a misinterpretation of this position. 
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involves thinking of something as bad, how could reason think of good drink as bad, 
without absurdity?21 
It is I think important to clarify the potential objector's reasoning, in order to 
understand his identity. In my opinion, the potential objector is not assuming that 
thirst, as desire, is for the good and desires drink only in so far as it is good, as 
Socrates maintains in the earlier dialogues.22 This would mean that the desire is 
subservient to reason and if reason indicates that drinking is good, desire is no longer 
for drink. Desire, in other words, desires drink conditionally, as long as reason 
permits it and desire does not confuse (in principle at least) goodness with drink. 
Drink is not the primary or essential object of desire rather its object is the good or 
things that are essentially good. It should also be noted that, according to my 
understanding of what Socrates says in the Gorgias (in particular 467c5-468e5), a 
particular desire for good drink strictly speaking is not what makes us not drink?3 If 
reason decides that drinking is bad, the desire itself changes or disappears, and it no 
longer is a desire for drink. Therefore reason is ultimately responsible for our not 
drinking and not desiring, insofar as it is for drink. 
The objector here assumes, as I think Callicles would do, that if one desires 
something then this something is (essentially or unqualifiedly) good?4 Desire here 
21 I am in agreement with Murphy (1951) p. 46: 'Plato is therefore using the phrase 'a good drink' as if 
it meant a drink such that both it itself and its total outcome are good or belong to what is good. In 
other words, Plato holds that if a desire were for a good drink, to logistikon would never oppose it'. 
22 I endorse in its basic lines the interpretation of 'Socratic psychology' in the Gorgias, the Meno and 
the Lysis propounded by Penner and Rowe in Penner (1991) and especially in Penner and Rowe (1994) 
and Penner and Rowe (2005). 
23 For an explanation of wrong action despite the fact that everybody desires the (real) good, see Penner 
and Rowe (1994) pp. 8-9. 
24 I am to a great extent agreement here with Adam's (1965) comments ad Joe, who detects a confusion 
between the apparent good and the real good on the objector's part. I quote Adam's remarks: 'Why 
should thirst be restrained? An objector might ask. You yourself Socrates hold, (I) that desire is always 
of the good; consequently (2) thirst is always the desire for good drink and (3) is therefore always 
good. The fallacy lurks in (2), for 'good' drink is ambiguous. If 'good' drink means drink which desire 
thinks good, then (2) is true; if it means drink which is in reality good (2) is not true desire cannot 
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does not desire its specific object in a conditional or qualified way. Desire does not 
need to change its object, because desire and pleasure is basically the criterion of what 
is good and not reason. Something is good insofar as it is desired. Desire would be for 
the good both according to Callicles and according to Socrates, but according to the 
former the good would be something dictated by desire, whereas according to the 
latter it would be dictated by reason. The difference between the role of reason and 
desire in specifying the nature of the good ultimately suggests a difference concerning 
the nature of the good. The objector makes no distinction, or no clear distinction, 
between what appears to be good and what is really good, between the good and 
pleasure. However, I should note that even Callicles would not argue that desire in 
general is for the apparent good, he would maintain that desire is in accordance to 
nature and indeed its object, pleasure, is objectively and really good since it is dictated 
by nature. 
The imaginary objector in Book 4 perhaps assun:Ies the identity of the good 
with the particular objects of the desire. If for example he assumes that all desire is for 
the good, and also at the same time that each desire is for a particular object (or for 
what it is: see 438a4-5) such as drink, food, etc, then identity of desires would entail 
identity of the good with drink, food, etc. Alternatively, all desire is taken to be for 
(really) good things, things that are essentially or intrinsically good. According to the 
objector, if one desires drink, drink is essentially good. 
The reasoning perhaps can be presented as follows: one premise is that all 
desire is for good things (that is not provided, rather perhaps the objector derives from 
the thesis that everybody desires good things), another premise is that thirst is a desire 
and is for drink (that Socrates provides), from which it follows that since thirst is 
(identical to) a desire, and it is for drink, thirst is identical to a desire for good drink, 
and also correspondingly 'drink' is identical to 'good drink'. As I understand the 
argument, the objector does not deny that thirst is for drink, rather he assumes that 
drink is identical to good drink. Thus thirst can be defined as being both for drink and 
for good drink, since drink and good drink are the same. 
know what is good. We must therefore amend (2) by omitting 'good' for in reality it is sometimes good 
and sometimes bad to drink'. 
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The objector's reasoning becomes clearer if one looks at the way Socrates tries 
to deal with the objection. Socrates rejects the identity of the desire for good drink 
with the desire for drink, and also the identity of good drink with drink (438a7-b2). 
He assumes that since a desire is defined by reference to its object, identity of desires 
entails identity of objects, and identity of objects entails identity of desires. He 
suggests that 'good drink' is a complex object and a complex object requires a 
complex desire, not a simple one ( 439a4-7). In claiming that good drink is a complex 
object and not a simple one, he assumes that drinking is not essentially good. Good 
drink, drink that is good, is drink qualified or modified. Thus it turns out that 
goodness is not an essential property of drink in general, rather it is a poiotei5 (of 
drink) and when drinking becomes good it becomespoion (438e5-7, 439a4-7). In a 
similar way direction towards what is good is not something essential to thirst as a 
desire, rather it is something that happens to it. If drink were essentially or 
unconditionally good then indeed, it seems to me, 'drink' and 'good drink' would be 
the same thing. Also, the desire for drink would essentially be desire for the good and 
the same as the desire for good drink. Thus, if the two desires are not the same, and 
also drinking is not essentially good, then reason can be averse to drinking and be in 
opposition to the desire to drink. 
Socrates' reasoning may be said to be correct, since 'desiring to drink' is not 
identical to 'desiring good drink' and also drink is not essentially good. However, the 
problem lies in Socrates' apparent recognition of thirst as a desire.26 In other words, 
25 The term is used for the first time in the Theaetetus (182a8-10) but we can see how its use develops 
in Book 4 in the Republic. 
26 Bosanquet (1925) p. 154 seems to be perplexed: 'Plato probably means that a desire can exist in the 
mind as a general desire, though it would be enough for his argument to say that in referring to it in the 
abstract we disregard its modifications'. Santas (2001) p. 124 and Anagnostopoulos (2006) p. 168, 
have argued convincingly that 'thirst as such' is reached through a process of abstraction. More 
specifically Santas (p. 124) rightly stresses that most of our desires are mixed with reason, while 
Anagnostopoulos, who follows Santas, suggests that thirst, constitutes the origin or basis and the core 
of a more complex attitude which is a genuinely executive desire (p. 175). However, they do not 
clearly state that thirst becomes combined with the desire for the good. For the latter view see Adam 
( 1965) ad loc. It should also be noted that Socrates in the context of Book 4 does not make it clear that 
desire is mixed with reason. 
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while we can now come to realize that a desire for drink is logically distinct from a 
desire for good drink, a mere desire for drink may not exist in the soul, or rather it 
may not exist by itself.27 Socrates does not exclude the possibility that thirst becomes 
qualified (437d7-e6). However, he does not clearly argue that thirst may pre-exist its 
modifications as a desire, or be in some sense simultaneous with them. 
Perhaps room can be made for denying that thirst is a desire that can exist on 
its own in the soul. In other words, the objector here accepts the presence of thirst, 
and also its definition for drink, and more generally the definition of desire as being 
for whatever we might think we desire. On the grounds that everybody desires good 
things, the objector could have argued not that thirst is for good drink, but rather that 
thirst is not a desire. The objector furthermore could have asked what the object of 
desire is in its generic nature. He could have argued that desire is not (essentially) for 
drink, since desire in general tends towards what is really or essentially good and 
drink is not essentially good. Thus desire should be defined by reference to the good, 
which is the proper object of desire?8 Desire can 'become' for drink, only 
derivatively and in a conditional way, when it becomes qualified by something that 
one may call 'thirst', and by a belief that drinking is good in the circumstances. 
27 Furthermore, we may ask why Plato needs to postulate thirst in the soul. One reason of course is that 
without something like thirst as such he cannot discover straightforward opposition in the soul. On my 
understanding of Plato's psychology thirst is dependent on the desire for the good, and thus there is, 
properly speaking, only a desire for good drink. However, it may be argued that appeal to thirst may be 
necessary in order to explain a desire for good drink. In other words, insofar as a desire for good drink 
is taken to be 'partly' for (real) drink, and since drink is not essentially good, then perhaps it is 
somehow logically necessary to conceive of it as a combination of two components, which may or may 
not be desires. 
28 One can compare this with the discussion of knowledge. Socrates suggests that there is knowledge 
that can be defined as being perhaps of mathema (438c6-8) but particular kinds of knowledge are for 
particular kinds of matheinata (438c7-e9). It may be argued that knowledge itself is for the good itself 
(the megiston mathema: 505a2), while particular kinds of knowledge are for particular kinds of goods 
(e.g. medicine is for health, etc). In an analogous way, particular desires are for particular goods and 
not exactly for the good itself, and still their origin is a desire for the good itself. I think particular 
kinds of knowledge also somehow depend in some way on knowledge itself. Shorey notes (ad loc.) that 
Plato does not want to complicate his logic with metaphysics. He also argues that the objective 
correlative of knowledge is a difficult problem. However, it seems to me that it becomes quite clear 
later that the objective correlative of knowledge is the good. 
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However, someone like Callicles wants 'desire' both to be essentially what he thinks 
it is, e.g. drink, pleasure, and also to be for the good. Thus the best available option is 
to distinguish two kinds of desires and their objects. 
Socrates may agree with the objector, on the grounds that everybody desires 
good things apart from thirst there is also a desire for good drink in the soul. 29 He 
does not exclude the presence of such a desire, when one is thirsty. What he excludes 
is the identification of this desire with thirst. However, it is significant that Socrates 
does not suggest in this context that there is a desire for the good itself, despite the 
fact that he suggests that there is a desire for thirst itself. The existence of a desire for 
the good would imply that the good is an object that exists in its own right. 30 We do 
not know yet that there is something like the good itself apart from particular good 
things or kinds of good things. Therefore, one may think at this stage that the desire 
for the good is a desire that exists solely as a modification of other desires, 
presupposing them, and being dependent on them. 
Furthermore, both the desire for the good and its object are not presented in 
opposition to particular desires such as thirst etc. Also the good is not clearly 
presented to be an object, which might stand in opposition to particular objects of 
desire. What is said to be in opposition to thirst is an aversion to drinking. Socrates 
does not argue explicitly that there is, in this case, an opposition between the desire 
for the good and thirst. Indeed there is opposition between the two desires if one 
assumes that drinking is objectively bad. However, I believe that the good is not yet 
taken to be something 'objective' and existing in its own right or having its own 
nature. Rather, it may be said to be relative to particular things and to one's desire for 
particular things. 
29 I disagree with Murphy (1951) p. 49 who argues that the man who desires to drink desires just that 
and nothing further. Socrates does not say that there cannot be a desire for good drink and a belief that 
drinking is good. Rather he says that in so far as one is thirsty ( Ka9' oaov buKi) one solely desires to 
drink. Thirst itself here is one aspect in the soul and does not exhaust the soul qua desiring. 
30 I think that if Socrates wanted to distinguish not only drink from 'good' but also 'good' from drink, 
he would have argued that drink and good might be opposed. 
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Hence, while drink itself may not be (absolutely) good, drink can be or appear 
to be good in relation to appetite, as it may be bad to reason. In this case neither desire 
nor reason are true from the point of view of the other. Each part of the soul 
constitutes a different measure of the good. For instance, if thirst desires drink, it may 
also (even though Socrates does not directly say so) appear that drinking is good for 
the soul, and this appearance is true in relation to thirst. However, reason's aversion 
may also involve a judgement that drinking is bad, which is true from its point of 
view. Socrates does not exclude the presence of an appearance in the soul that 
drinking is good, as he does not exclude the presence of a desire for good drink. I 
should make it clear that both the appearance, and the desire for good drink do not 
belong to thirst as such. Rather, they are attached to thirst and depend partly on 
thirst. 31 In the course of the argument in Book 4 Socrates demonstrates that we may 
have an aversion to drinking and also that drinking can appear to be bad to reason 
when one desires to drink. He does not argue that it cannot or should not appear to be 
good from a different point of view. Similarly, the desire for the good can appear to 
depend both on reason's aversion and on thirst as well.32 So I believe that the desire 
for the good is not associated with any part of the soul at this stage. 33 
However, the reader may infer that when reason is in opposition to appetite 
reason is right and drinking is bad. From the moment separate parts are distinguished 
in the soul the question arises, for whom reason is right. Since reason is defined as the 
part of the soul that looks at the interest of the whole soul (442c4-7), reason's point of 
view is the point of view of the whole; hence what reason says emerges as true for 
31 See again Anagnostopoulos (2006) pp. 72-3. Nevertheless I am not in agreement with 
Anagnostopoulos insofar as she maintains that in desiring drink one desires the apparent good and not 
the real good (pp. 180-2). 
32 Thus Bosanquet (1925) p. 154 notes that 'Plato seems to urge that, as relatively speaking every 
object of desire is a good a desire for good is not prima facie an influence in conflict with desire as 
such, and (I suggest to complete his thought) any desire for good which could so conflict with or 
remould ordinary desire must have its source outside the region of desire proper'. Nevertheless, it 
seems to me that the desire of the good is basically one, even though it may acquire different 
qualifications. 
33 At any rate, the desire for the good is a characteristic of the whole. Unlike particular desires that are 
for particular things and cannot be attributed to the whole in an unqualified way, the desire for the good 
is something that in principle belongs to the whole in an unqualified way. 
134 
us. 34 If reason thinks that drinking is bad, then drinking may not be bad for appetite, 
but it is bad for the soul as a whole. Thus I think that in separating reason from desire, 
and in associating what reason approves or rejects with the good of the whole, Plato 
encourages the reader to reach a more objective conception of the good. The good 
may still be regarded as relative to the parts, and here we come to see that since the 
soul has different parts, it also may have different and conflicting points of view, as it 
has conflicting desires. But a point of view in the soul emerges as privileged and at 
the same time encompasses different points of view and rises beyond them. Thus, if 
by 'good' one means what is good for the person, or good for the soul as a whole, the 
desire for the good can be associated with reason, even though its nature is not really 
clarified. 
Since it turns out that drinking is really bad for the whole or the person, a 
desire for good drink is false involving a false evaluation. If such a desire is false then 
perhaps reason can oppose it as false, in so far as such a desire persists in the soul. If, 
in other words, the good (of the whole) and drink are not merely different but also 
'opposed' then there is no such thing as good drink in these circumstances. While 
both 'drink' and 'good' are each legitimate objects of desire, when drinking is bad for 
us, then a desire for 'good drink' is incoherent and problematic. A desire for good 
drink, however false, is not I think in direct opposition either to the desire for good or 
to an aversion to drinking. Such a desire can be opposed by reason, perhaps not 
completely or straightforwardly since it is still a desire for the good, but at least in so 
far as it involves 'drink' in the specification of its object.35 
34 One may ask whether Plato's association of reason with the whole has been adequately defended. I 
think that Plato relies partly on the city-soul analogy and also he expects that as soon as reason is 
distinguished from appetite the reader will identify with reason. 
35 Penner and Rowe (2005) pp. 255-7 have maintained that Plato would recognize false or incoherent 
desires which are involved in wrongdoing. See also Penner and Rowe (1994) pp. 8-10. As far as I 
understand, while thirst itself is not false, and also the desire for the good itself is not false, their 
combination or mixture is illegitimate and involves contradiction since in these particular 
circumstances 'good' and 'drink' are incompatible and should not be combined. I also believe that it is 
this false desire in particular which accounts for our drinking and not thirst itself. 
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I wish to suggest that Plato in the context of Book 4 avoids defining the 
desires associated with the lowest parts of the soul as being for the good. Here then 
there is a case where one could argue that one would confuse the good with the 
particular objects of desire. More generally, in my opinion his aim is to help the 
audience reach a more adequate conception of the good, by showing that the lower 
parts of the soul may be in conflict with the good of the whole, or what is good from 
the point of view of the whole. We reach a more objective conception of the good by 
coming to see that the good of the whole is different from what the parts desire. It is 
not only different in the sense that it contains other 'goods' in addition, but also in the 
sense that it is not reducible to the objects of particular desires taken collectively or 
independently.36 At the same time the need for restraining the part becomes clear. The 
non-reducibility of the good of the whole, which is more generally connected to the 
non-reducibility of the whole to the part, emerges through presenting the part in 
conflict with other parts. 
If, however, we were able to fully conceive the good of the whole as not 
reducible to the parts, and if we could reach a more adequate conception of the good, 
then Socrates could have argued that while the whole is not reducible to the parts, the 
parts are dependent on the whole. Hence what is good for the part is not in conflict 
with the whole rather it presupposes what is good for the whole. A more adequate 
conception of the good perhaps would involve the assumption that the good of the 
whole depends on the form of the good and the good of the part depends on the good 
of the whole. More generally, both the whole and the part could be said to aim toward 
the good, and what is good for the part is essentially in accordance with the good of 
the whole and the form of the good. Thus if what is good for the part may appear to 
diverge from what appears to be good for the whole, then a desire for good drink, 
when drinking is bad for the whole, is false both in relation to the whole and also in 
relation to the part. 
36 The fact that it is not reducible has to do with the fact that such epithumiai may be for conflicting 
'goods' in general. However, I believe that particular desires are dependent on the desire for the good. 
Their dependence on the desire for the good entails that their objects can at least in principle form an 
ordered whole. 
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In conclusion, I wish to argue that Socrates does not clearly present thirst as 
being solely a component of a complex desire. Therefore it may look as though thirst 
itself is an independent desire that exists on its own and on a par with the desire for 
the good. According to my understanding of the argument, Socrates needs to postulate 
something like thirst itself, in order to specify the opposition in relation to the same 
thing. If the desire for good drink is a complex desire, and is what exists in the soul, 
strictly speaking there is not the direct and straightforward opposition that Socrates 
tries to discover in the soul in order to separate the parts. Rather we have to admit that 
the desire for drink always becomes qualified to some extent by the desire for the 
good. 
More generally, the co-presence of the desire for the good with other desires 
in the soul necessitates that the desire for the good qualifies other desires, which in 
turn qualify the desire for the good. However, the combination of the desire and the 
good with other desires is problematic, insofar as the objects of particular desires are 
bad and lead to an incoherent mixture that needs, in some sense, to be dissolved and 
its components 'separated'. Such 'separation' of the desires is needed, whether one 
experiences conflict in one's soul or not, since their unity is problematic. It may be 
said that is better for one to conceive the lower element of the soul as separate from 
reason in so far as problematic combinations tend to be formed. 
The achievement of the argument for the division primarily lies in the 
establishment of autonomy of reason in the soul, which paves the way for 
understanding its priority, and is supported by the notion of justice as the rule of 
reason. Moreover, the independence and priority of reason in the soul indicates that 
the human good is not to be identified with the objects of desires, as they are 
commonly or empirically understood, and that the nature of the good is to be 
established by reason. Thus more generally I think that the problem of the relation 
between reason and desire is intimately connected with the problem of the nature of 
the good. 
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Chapter 6 
The desire for the good and action 
In this section I shall discuss more extensively and attempt to make sense of 
Socrates' assertion in Book 6 that all souls desire the real good. Furthermore, I shall 
discuss the relation between knowledge, ignorance and right action and I shall make 
some remarks regarding weakness of will. 
Socrates in Book 6 states that every soul pursues the real good, which is 
identified in this context with the form of the good: 
T( bE.; 'rObE ou cpaVEQOV, w<; b(KaLa ~-teV Kal. KW\a 710Mol. av e.AOLV'[Q 
'rtX boKOVV'ra, WV d 1-!ll Elfl, O~-tW<; 'raV'ra 71QlX'r'rELV Kal K£K'rf]a8aL Kal 
boKELV, ayaea be ovbevi. en lXQKEL '[tX boKOVV'ra K'raa8aL, liMa 'ItX OV'ra 
i',;fl'IOUaLV, ~v be bol;av EV'ravea f1bf1 71CX<; an~-taC:n; Kai. ~-ta.Aa, Ecpfl. 
"0 bil bLWKEL ~-teV aTiaaa lJlvxil Kal. '[QU'[QU EVEKa 71lXV'ra 71QlX'r'rEL, 
aTio~-taV'rEUO~-tEVfl n dvaL, aTIOQovaa be Kal. ouK £xovaa Aa~eiv iKavw<; 'rL 
":l0'I1 EU'rlV ovbe 71LU'[£L XQr)aaa8aL !-!OVL!-!<f> o'Lq Kal. 71£QL '[U iiMa, blix '[QU'[Q 
be aTio'ruyxavn Kai. 'rwv iiMwv d n 6cpe.Ao<; f)v, 71£Qi. bil n) 'rOLouTov Kal. 
'roaov'rov oihw cpw~-tEv beiv £aKo'rwa8aL Kai. £Kdvou<; 'rOD<; ~EA'rLa'rou<; £v 
'OJ TI6An, ot<; TiavTa £yX£LQLOU~-t£v; (505d5-506a2) 
Socrates suggests in this passage that the good constitutes the aim of all 
action.37 Failure to obtain the good and to be benefited from other things is attributed 
to ignorance of the good. As I suggested in an earlier section, Socrates in claiming 
that the soul desires the good, indicates the unity of the soul, which is expressed here 
in terms of unity of purpose. The passage here is strikingly similar to Gorgias 468a-b: 
TIO'IEQOV ouv 'ItX 1-!E'ral;v 'rav'ra EVEKEV '[WV ayaewv 71QlX'r'rOUaLV chav 
37 In my opinion the good is the aim of both 'internal' and 'external' action. 
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1lQCXT'TWaLV, fJ 'Taya8a 'TWV !-l£'Ta~u; ( ... ) To aya8ov cXQa bu:{JKOV'T£C Kai. 
~abll:o!-!ev (h:av ~abll:o!-!ev, oi6!-levm ~tAnov eivaL, Kai. 'TO E:vav~(ov 
EU'Ta!-!£V (hav EU'TW!-!£V, 'TOU atJ'TOU EV£Ka, 'TOU aya8ou ( ... ) "EveK' cXQa 'tOU 
aya8ou tX'TlaV'Ta 'TaU'Ta TIOLOUaLV oi. TIOLOUV'T£<;;. 
The difficult question that this passage gives rise to is whether and how far it 
can be reconciled with Socrates' characterization of the lowest element of the soul as 
desiring merely drink and nof good drink38 and thus more generally with the apparent 
acceptance of good-independent desires in the soul in Book 4 (437dl-e5).39 The 
passage contradicts the assumption that the lower parts of the soul, when they rule in 
the soul, dictate the end of action, whether weak action is concerned or not. It may be 
38 Perhaps any desire could be defmed as being for a particular object and not for the good as long as 
its object can be in conflict with the good and nonnative reason. 
39 Commentators have tried to reconcile Book 6 with the division of the soul in Book 4 in different 
ways. According to Irwin (1977) p. 224 Socrates at 505e1 is not arguing that people pursue the good in 
all their actions (p. 224), rather that one would 'go to all lengths' for the sake of the good (p. 336). In 
my opinion this interpretation does not pay full justice to the similarity of the passage with Gorgias 
468a-b. I am in greater agreement with the interpretation propounded by Kahn ( 1996). Kahn argues 
that one desires the real good and that the desire has to be understood as referentially transparent (Kahn 
(1996) p. 139 n. 14, p. 140, p. 244). However, Kahn accepts the existence of good- independent desires 
and more generally understands Socrates' claims in Book 6 as referring solely to the rational part of the 
soul (pp. 243-7). Kahn furthermore suggests that weak action does not count as action at all (p. 244, p. 
254): 'behaviour against one's judgement as to what is best will (it seems) scarcely count as an action 
at all'. He further suggests that 'such behaviour may either be ignored or assimilated to ignorance. For 
if one's grip on the good, or the apparent good, is so weak as not to prevail in action, it cannot count as 
knowledge and is scarcely better than ignorance' (p. 254). On the other hand, Murphy (1951) p. 48 has 
suggested that when Plato says that we do everything for the sake of the good 'it cannot be intended as 
historical description but as a regulative principle which we all acknowledge and act upon in our saner 
moments'. On the other hand Anagnostopoulos (2006) p. 182-3 argues that while people do what they 
believe to be good, only philosophers' action is directed to the real good. Lesses (1987) pp. 147-61 has 
tried to reconcile Socrates' claim that we do everything for the sake of the good with the division of the 
soul and has argued that the lower parts of the soul possess beliefs concerning the good (p. 150-1 ), and 
that weakness involves a judgement that what one does is good but it is against reason 'all things 
considered' judgement (p.l55). Carone (2001) (pp. 108-48) has maintained that we desire particular 
things qua good. She argues more generally that the lower parts of the soul have beliefs concerning the 
good and also that 'akrasia does not occur since the soul has been made to believe at that time that 
what the lower part believes to be best is actually best 'all things considered" (p. 123). 
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argued that the oligarchic man in Book 8 does what he does for the sake of money and 
not for the sake of the good (553dl-7). It may be said that he acts with the belief that 
money is good. Yet it appears that he aims at what appears to him good, i.e. money 
and not the real good, as Socrates seems to be suggesting here. And it is even more 
difficult to accept that the tyrannical man acts for the sake of the good. 40 
I suggested in the previous section that Socrates appears to claim in Book 4 
that a desire for a drink is an autonomous desire in the soul. Furthermore, such desire 
appears to be on a par with reason and also with the desire for the good. It could be 
said thus that consistency with Book 4, and also perhaps with Book 8 cannot be fully 
obtained. Rather one has to recognize that to some extent in Book 6 Socrates adopts a 
different point of view. I think that this point of view is the point of view of the whole 
soul or of the person as a whole. 
Furthermore, in this context Socrates has prepared his interlocutors for this 
point of view and more generally he has prepared them to accept that the form of the 
good is the ultimate end of action, and at the same time to recognize their ignorance 
of the good. The division of the soul in Book 4 has helped one to distinguish the good 
from the particular objects of appetite, and it indicated the irreducibility of the good of 
the whole to the good of the parts, even though it did not directly reveal its nature. 
However, in Book 4 the good did not emerge as something fully objective or non-
relative yet and correspondingly reason's ignorance of the good was not revealed. At 
the same time we did not reach an adequate conception of the whole, and the soul as a 
whole.41 However, the distinction between forms and particulars that has been drawn 
in the argument against the sight-lovers in Book 5 (476al-480a13) has prepared 
Socrates' interlocutors to conceive the form of the good as something independent 
from and non-relative to particular good things or actions. Also it further undermined 
people's assumption that they know the good. Thus I think the reader has been 
prepared to accept that the good is something which exists itself by itself and also that 
he is ignorant of it. 
40 Yet Plato indicates that the tyrannical character does not do what he wishes to do (577dlO"e2). 
41 I am not able to determine the precise relationship between the form of the good and the good of the 
whole soul. I think that the good of the whole if it is not to be identified with the form of the good has 
to be regarded as dependent on the form of the good. 
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In stressing his own and our ignorance of the good, and in associating failure 
to derive benefit from things with this ignorance Socrates can be said to be stressing 
the inadequacy of his arguments and at the same time to be inviting the reader to 
further philosophical investigation both in order to comprehend the nature and 
function of the soul and the nature of its objectives. More specifically he invites his 
interlocutors and the reader to a life of philosophy. Indeed from the moment one 
genuinely realizes one's ignorance of the good, philosophy is the sole option. Only 
philosophy and the 'longer road' constitutes a path that genuinely leads to the (form 
of the) good, since shortcuts have turned out to be inadequate. If one does not accept 
the need of philosophical investigation for oneself one at least has to accept that in the 
ideal polis philosophers should rule and also that one has to make room for others to 
pursue such philosophical investigation in one's city. Thus in some sense, by stressing 
people's ignorance of the good, Socrates indicates that the philosophical life is the one 
which best fulfils human nature and helps it reach its objectives. 
On the basis of Socrates' claims in Book 6 one has to accept that a desire for 
drink is not capable of generating action on its own. A belief that drink is good should 
not be regarded merely as something that coincides with action or with the desire that 
leads to action rather it has to be considered to be constitutive of the desire that leads 
to action. So the desire that leads to action is always a desire for good drink. 
Furthermore, resting on Socrates' claims that the good is the ultimate aim of human 
action one has to accept that the desire for the good is a desire that accounts for such a 
belief and is not exactly on a par with particular desires for particular things rather it 
is somehow prior to other desires. If the desire for the good were subordinate to other 
desires, their objects would constitute the ends of action and it should be said perhaps 
that we desire the good for the sake of other things and not vice versa. Thus particular 
desires that lead to action are dependent on the desire for the good and can be 
regarded as a species or parts of the desire for the good. 
The priority of the desire for the good (as a desire for the form of the good) 
and also the position of the good as the ultimate aim of action can be interpreted as 
expressing the fact that if we did not desire the good in the first place we would not 
have other particular desires. Thus somehow the desire for the good is the cause of 
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other desires. Perhaps its priority can be interpreted as a normative claim. A desire 
for the good can be seen as something prior to other desires in the sense that it is what 
makes, or should make or in principle can make desires for particular things and their 
objects to form an integrated whole that can be rationally apprehended as such. Thus 
the desire for the good can be viewed as representing a desire or tendency for order 
and unity, or a potential for unity, that exist in all souls and characterizes them as 
wholes. This potential or tendency is inadequately or partially realized and manifested 
in most human souls. The priority of the desire for the good can also be interpreted as 
representing the fact that particular pursuits or desires are conditional on the overall 
desires and pursuits of the whole. What can be characterized as being desired and 
pursued unqualifiedly from the point of view of a part (if the part is conceived in 
abstraction or separation from the whole) is only wished or desired qualifiedly 
conditionally from the point of view of the whole, and a condition of its being wished 
or desired is somehow both that one takes it to be good and also perhaps that it is as a 
matter of fact good for the whole. 
Hence, if my interpretation is correct, when one drinks 'bad drink', one as a 
whole does not do what one desires, since one never desires merely drink, rather one 
desires beneficial drink, drink that benefits or is going to benefit one. Assuming that 
one desires beneficial drink or good drink, it can be argued that one also (even if one 
does not know it) desires drink together with the form of the good, and not separately, 
and also one desires knowledge of the good. This is the case because Socrates seems 
to suggest that nothing can be beneficial without (knowledge of) the form of the good 
(505a6-b3, 505e5). Knowledge of the good is necessary not only in order to 'obtain' 
the form of the good but also to reap benefit from particular things or actions since 
participation in the good makes these things beneficial. Thus it can be said that in so 
far as one does not merely desire particular things, rather one more specifically 
desires to be benefited from the things that one desires, one somehow desires the form 
of the good and also knowledge of the form of the good together with these things. 42 
Eventually, even though this sounds paradoxical, it may be said, if one also rests on 
42 It may be argued that things become good or come to participate in the good due to their coexistence 
with knowledge (of the good) in the soul or if such knowledge is not obtainable, with philosophic 
virtue. 
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the Gorgias (468c),43 that one as a whole desires the particular things one does or 
gets, both in so far as one takes them to be good and also in so far as they are really 
good. Perhaps for particular things to be really good it is necessary either that one has 
already knowledge of the good, or alternatively that they are conducive to knowledge 
and virtue, or at least that one desires them with the understanding that one's priority 
in one's life is acquisition of knowledge and virtue. 
Now in arguing that a desire for good drink is the desire that leads to action, I 
do not mean to say that the lower parts of the soul have beliefs or appearances 
concerning the good as such. Rather, as I suggested earlier, for the belief or 
appearance that drinking is good and also for the desire for good drink reason's 
involvement is necessary. In other words, it is not the case that thirst itself can fully 
account for a belief that drinking is good, nor can it fully account for the desire for 
good drink. It would be perhaps the case that desire or even the body could account 
both for the desire for the good drink and also the belief that drink is good if somehow 
the desire for the good, or reason could be conceived as fully dependent on the desire 
to drink and thus it would be somehow 'caused' by thirst, and thirst more generally 
could be seen as somehow the exclusive source or cause of such beliefs and the desire 
for good drink. 
Nevertheless I think that a belief or appearance that drink is good (or 
alternatively pleasant) and by consequence the desire for good drink may be said to 
constitute a rather mechanical and immediate response that one has when one is 
thirsty, and more generally such a belief or appearance tends to always accompany the 
feeling of thirst. Reason in this case does not really operate as a fully autonomous 
factor in the soul, and is mixed with appetite, or the pain appetite involves. Moreover, 
43 Socrates in the Gorgias ( 468b-d) seems to move from indicating that a condition of our doing certain 
things is a belief that they are best (468b: oi6!-1EVOL ~EAnov dvat,) to the position that particular 
actions are wished when they are actually good and not merely believed to be good: OuK iiQa 
mj>a'L'LELV ~ouA6w8a ovb' EK~aAAnv EK 'LWV n6Aewv ovbf: XQTJ!-la'La a<j>aLQE'ia8at ant\wc; 
oihwc;, aM' Uxv 1-!EV w<j>EALI-!a ~ 'Lavm, ~ouA6!-1E8a 71QtX'L'LELV av'La, ~Aa~EQa bf: ovm ou 
~ouA6!-1E8a. Ta yaQ ayaea ~ouA6!-1E8a, we; <j>~c; aU, 'LtX 1-!TJ'LE ayaea 1-!TJ'LE KaKa ou 
~ouA0!-1E8a, oubf: 'LtX KaKa (Gorgias 468c). 
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it looks as though appearances belong somehow to appetite since indeed they are 
inseparable from appetite in so far as they are mixed with it. In such cases indeed the 
soul is 'ruled' by appetite. Furthermore I think that resting on this case one may say 
that people desire the good for the sake of drink, and also that one desires the apparent 
good and not the real good, since either it can be said that something appears good to 
one because one desires it in the first place or alternatively one desires it solely 
because it appears good. 
Reason in principle can separate itself from desire or appearances and be 
critical of them or oppose them and this perhaps happens to some extent in all souls. 
Socrates more generally indicates that one desires the real good and not the apparent 
good. He contrasts people's attitude towards justice with their attitude towards the 
good (505d5-9): 'And again, is it not apparent that while in the case of the just and the 
honourable many would prefer the semblance without the reality in action, possession 
and opinion, yet when it comes to the good nobody is content with the possession of 
the appearance but all men seek the reality, and the semblance (bo~av) satisfies 
nobody here?' (trans. by Shorey). In the case of justice he indicates that many people 
are happy with appearances or convention. This passage suggests that one is satisfied 
with what is commonly believed to be just and appears to be just, even if one believes 
that justice is not just a matter of convention and one knows or is able somehow to 
think that what appears to be just may not be just.44 People are interested solely in 
convention and they do not want to find out what justice (really) is because they are 
primarily interested not in being just but appearing just to others. In the case of the 
good, appearances and convention do not satisfy anybody rather one is looking for the 
reality of the good (505d7-9). One wants to have and to do and to believe what is 
really good and not just what appears to be good to one or to others. People are ready 
to reject appearances if they have reasons to think that they do not correspond to 
reality and also they try to reason concerning the good and try to find out what is 
44 Shorey notes ad. loc: 'men may deny the reality of the conventional virtues but not of the ultimate 
sanction, whatever it is'. However it seems to me that Kav <Ei>!-LiJ ELTJ suggests that people may come 
to think that there is reality in justice, and what is really just is different from what merely is agreed to 
be just, but they are not interested in this reality since they think that benefit is to be derived from 
appearing just and not being really just since they do not clearly recognize that justice has intrinsic 
value. 
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really good. However, Socrates suggests that people do not possess firm conviction 
(ni.a'TEL ~ovi.~cy) concerning the good (505e3-5) and he associates failure to derive 
benefit from things or the knowledge with this lack of stable conviction (505e4-5). 
This I think indicates that one is eventually at the mercy of appearances. One may 
want to judge appearances but being deprived of grounds concerning what is good or 
not, one has necessarily to follow fleeting appearances.45 
Right action presupposes that the belief that guides action be true. For 
instance, when one drinks the belief that drinking is good needs to be true. I think that 
there is a strong sense of 'true belief, according to which one can only have true 
belief only if one possesses knowledge of the good. If knowledge and virtue are what 
make other things good, it is the case that drink can be good only if one has 
knowledge.46 This knowledge also 'makes' one's belief that drinking is good true. 
Hence I think that 'good drink' is not just drink that just happens to be beneficial 
overall. Rather it is drink that one also knows to be beneficial, possessing 
understanding of one's wider interests and that one chooses in the light of this 
understanding. More generally it can be said that one's beliefs are true when they rest 
on proper grounds. Thus the belief that drink is good is not true just because one 
happens to be thirsty and one cannot think of any reason not to drink. Rather the 
belief somehow 'becomes' true 'Yhen it is informed by reflection and by correct 
considerations. In that case we should not longer talk about a mere appearance, rather 
about a rational belief. 
Being ruled by reason as opposed to being ruled by appetite involves acting 
reflectively. Both when one is ruled by reason and when one is not, a desire for good 
drink and a belief that drinking is good are involved. What is different is the input that 
reason provides to action, since, when reason rules, the desire and belief that drives to 
action is informed by an understanding of one's identity and of what is in general 
good for one. More generally, I believe that the unity of the soul, and the fact that the 
soul desires the real good can be expressed by the fact that reason can not only 
45 Cf. 519c2-3, where not properly educated people, unlike philosophers, are said not to have a single 
aim in their life to which all their actions must be directed. 
46 Knowledge is what makes things good in the Euthydemus (281 b-e) and also in the Meno (87d-89a). 
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distance itself or separate itself from what appears to be good and reject appearances 
but also inform and modify appearances and the desires that are connected with them. 
Thus eventually the particular belief that drives a particular action will not be a mere 
appearance rather it will be qualified and justified by rational considerations. 
As I previously suggested it may be argued that in reality one desires drink 
only conditionally, in so far as it is good, and what one desires unconditionally is the 
(real) good. However the immediate response to drink or the appearance that drink is 
good can be said to involve the assumption that drink is something unqualifiedly or 
unconditionally good or alternatively unqualifiedly pleasant. In this way it looks as 
though one desires drink unconditionally and drink exhausts the good or one's 
interests. It seems to me that this intellectual error corresponds to what Plato regards 
as the greatest or more fundamental ignorance, which can be characterized as a state 
of 'dreaming'47 and involves confusion or failure to distinguish between the forms 
and their likenesses, sensible particular things (476c7-d2). It can be associated with 
the mistake of the sight-lovers, who think that certain particular things or kinds of 
things 'are' beautiful, in other words that they are unqualifiedly or essentially 
beautiful (479a5-8).48 In an analogous fashion it can be said that the immediate or 
unreflective response to the object of desire or to the pleasure derived from this object 
involves the assumption that what one desires is unqualifiedly good49 and this 
ignorance to a great extent accounts for one's commitment to the objectof desire that 
one pursues as if it is one's end. 
This fundamental mistake causes two associated problems. One problem is 
that in so far as one confuses the good with the wrong kinds of things, and one more 
generally fully identifies oneself with certain objects or desires, one will never 
manage to direct oneself towards the real good, since one does not realize one's 
ignorance of the good and also one will never manage to acquire knowledge of what 
one truly or ultimately desires. Furthermore, one cannot derive benefit from particular 
things. One's beliefs concerning particular things can never be true in so far as they 
47 For Plato's use of the contrast between dreaming and waking see Gallop (1971) pp. 187-201. 
48 Here perhaps it could be said that the confusion Socrates seems to talk about involves a false 
identification of a form with its instances. 
49 Compare with Aristotle's De Anima, 433b 8-10. 
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involve the assumption that certain particular things or kinds of particular things are 
intrinsically good, or beautiful or just. Philosophers on the other hand avoid these 
fundamental mistakes. On the one hand they do not believe that particular actions are 
essentially or intrinsically good or just, on the other hand they avoid relativism by 
recognizing that there are objective non-sensible standards of beauty, justice and 
goodness. They try to reach objective and non-sensible standards of goodness beauty 
and justice and measure particular actions or things or appearances by reference to 
these standards. 
I think that here one can talk of an intellectual error and also ignorance 
because possession of knowledge or at least the kind of knowledge that characterizes 
philosophers is able to protect one from this mistake. 50 Yet, it can be said that this 
kind of 'ignorance' or confusion is encouraged by bodily pleasure and pain and 
desire. One's in other words immediate response to bodily pleasure and also pain in 
particular is to see these things in the wrong way. Philosophers or reflective 
individuals are not immune to this mistake. 51 This inclination or tendency towards 
falsehood cannot be fully avoided. However, I think that it can really be called 
'ignorance' because the body is not fully responsible for this problem, rather the soul 
as well, and more generally because knowledge and understanding can modify one's 
response and more generally affect one's desires. However, I believe that such an 
immediate response can in principle at least modified by one's knowledge. More 
generally since I believe that Plato is committed to the unity of the soul I think that 
the fact that one acquires knowledge does not mean that one part of the soul keeps 
thinking in a different way still 'believing' somehow that its objects are 
unconditionally good or pleasant, and still being unconditionally committed to these 
50 Rowe (2007) p. 209 suggests that the knowledge that characterizes philosophers, or lovers of beauty 
in the context of the argument in Book 5 (476al-480al3) basically lies in the distinction between forms 
and particulars. 
51 See also Phaedo 83c5-9 where it is argued that when one experiences strong pleasure or pain one 
will attribute truth to these feelings and their objects: "On t!JUXTJ 7t£XV'l"Oc; av9Q(~mou avayKet,E'raL 
Uf .. W 'rE ~a9fJvm mp6bQa f) AU7tf19fJvm E7tl 'r4J Kai. ~yfJa9m 7tEQL 0 av f..!MLam 'l"Ot)'(O 
miaxlJ, 'l"OV'l"O evaQyEa'ta'l"OV n: dvm Kai. Mf19Ea'ta'rov. However, philosophers are said to 
avoid intense pleasures, pains and desires exactly for this reason since they fear the greatest evil which 
is exactly the formation of false beliefs in the soul. 
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objects, as if one really has two minds. Rather somehow the belief and the desire are 
placed in a given context and become qualified or modified because one possesses 
knowledge. 
Moreover I wish to suggest that saying that particular actions are not 
(essentially) good or just or beautiful means that these actions are not just or good 
themselves. However, this does not mean that there is absolute relativism and flux in 
the sensible world or that particular actions or things, such as 'drinking' cannot be 
good or just in any way. This would mean that Plato would accept a rather radical 
dualism both in the world in general and also inside the soul, and certain things should 
not be desired at all. More generally human action and practical thinking would be of 
no value. I believe that ultimately what can make particular things 'truly' just or good 
is the relationship they may have with the forms and (normative or objective) reason. 
The goodness or justice or pleasantness of certain things depends on particular 
circumstances, and is not something absolute, and in a similar way the truth of our 
beliefs depends on correct perception of circumstances. However, the characters of 
things also depends on the forms, which allows things to have a share in being, and 
truth, and in a similar manner knowledge of the forms allows particular beliefs to 
have a share in truth. In so far as people's beliefs involve confusion between 
particulars things and forms they correspond to the state of 'dreaming' and they 
cannot be said to be true, even though they may not be exactly false. Belief 
concerning particular things can be true only if it is accompanied with knowledge of 
forms, or less ideally with recognition of the independent existence of forms. 
Particular things in general can acquire truth and intelligibility if they are examined in 
association with forms. 
The issue of weakness of will is one I shall not deal adequately with. I have 
attempted to defend an interpretation of Plato's psychology in the Republic according 
to which the soul is taken to be essentially unitary and a rational entity that desires the 
good as whole. I am not sure how far weakness of the will can be accommodated to 
such an account. My account does not preclude both the possibility and also the 
experience of conflict in the soul. However since the soul does not involve separate 
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or autonomous parts, I believe that the tendency and desire of the soul is to resolve 
conflict and contradiction even though it may fail to do so. 
The weak person is commonly conceived as one who acts against his 
judgement concerning what is best to do in the circumstances. The account of desire I 
have provided excludes the possibility of viewing the weak person as acting without a 
belief that what he does is good. I have furthermore tried to suggest that such a belief 
is necessary for action and also it presupposes reason's involvement. Perhaps the 
weak person can be understood as someone who holds contradictory or conflicting 
beliefs concerning what is good. Knowledge of the good in principle precludes 
conflict and is able to resolve contradictions. Thus more generally weakness reveals 
not solely a deficiency of character but also a cognitive deficiency and ignorance, 
ignorance of the good, which characterizes the soul as a whole and by implication 
reason and not solely a lower part of the soul. One may further ask whether a 
cognitive error should be considered to be something that occurs at the moment of 
action, so that still reason and knowledge can be regarded as overcome by passion or 
whether it generally indicates a person whose reason is inadequately developed. 
Plato's description of philosophers in Book 6 suggests that he is more willing to 
accept that at least in principle reason can develop in such a way that it cannot be 
overcome by passion. 52 It may be further argued that such development of reason both 
presupposes and also involves a development of character, which excludes weakness. 
I wish also to suggest that the kind of conflict Plato is primarily interested in is 
a confliCt between on the one hand certain 'good' beliefs one has concerning what is 
just, fine and good, which one has acquired through custom and education, and on the 
other hand inclination that is due to desire, pleasure and pain. Thus more generally 
one can view the conflict in the soul as a conflict between 'nature' and 'law' or 
custom. 53 Resting on observation, one can find two attitudes or tendencies in the 
majority of people, one being to endorse law and society and the other to follow 
inclination, for the sake of pleasure. One tendency may prevail in some circumstances 
52 See 485d-e. 
53 The contrast betweenphusis and nomos is suggested in Socrates' frrst speech in the Phaedrus (237d). 
Similarly it is suggested in Book 10 of the Republic where the superior element in the soul is said to be 
prepared to follow law (604b4-5). 
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and the other in others. Plato in Book 4 tends to present desire as irrational and 
brutish, and also naturally opposed to law, but I tried to suggest that this is not strictly 
speaking the case. Desire and inclination in general are not in essential opposition to 
reason and law. Ideally in the soul of the philosopher inclination or desire is not going 
against what is objectively good or just. On the other hand, the beliefs that one has, 
which reflect one's endorsement of law and society and objective reason may not be 
sufficiently ingrained or supported by reasoning. These beliefs thus can be easily 
subverted by desire whether it can be said that one acts still believing that one's action 
is bad or not. However, the more one's beliefs constitute firm convictions and also the 
more one is able to justify them and endorse them reflectively the less prone one is to 
act against them. Simultaneously one is less inclined to regard the object of desire as 
something good or pleasant. But I think that in so far as one is able to see the desire 
and its object as something 'bad' the desire itself cannot persist in the soul, unless one 
is talking of certain basic biological urges which indeed one cannot avoid. 
Plato wants to encourage a conception of virtue and justice according to 
which justice is not merely something good, or good in some respects of it and not 
good in other respects, but rather something intrinsically and necessarily good, and 
vital to the self. Simultaneously injustice has to appear to one as something 
unacceptable in every respect. Ideally justice and virtue is tied up with one's 
conception of the good and the self in such a way that one is not willing to sacrifice 
against any other thing ordinarily taken to be 'good'. 54 Furthermore I think that to 
conceive justice in this way involves also to be committed to justice and also to do 
what is just and to avoid by· all means what is unjust. Thus possessing such a 
conception of justice as something intrinsically good entails that one is good and 
virtuous. Perhaps understanding the value of virtue ideally excludes that other things 
or actions, in so far as they are not compatible with justice, appear to be good or 
54 I think that this conception of justice and virtue, as well as knowledge involves a conception of it as 
something that possesses incommensurable value. In other words, the value of virtue, justice and 
goodness cannot be placed under a common standard with other things and compared to the value of 
other things. Rather justice and virtue and knowledge constitute the measure or standard by reference 
to which other things can be compared to each other and accordingly chosen or rejected. More 
generally the value of other things are relative to justice, virtue, and knowledge while the value of 
virtue is not relative. 
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attractive in any way. Alternatively, if it is impossible for a human being to avoid 
false appearances or opposite inclinations completely, false appearances have no 
impact on the person. 
To believe that certain just or honourable actions are good does not necessarily 
entail that one believes that justice is necessarily good. In fact Plato seems to believe 
that the majority of people, even people who are normally considered to be good and 
virtuous, are committed to the appearance of justice, and not its reality because they 
do not see justice as something intrinsically good rather they regard it as something 
relatively good. 55 What most people pursue as good is not justice itself, but rather 
being approved by other people. Also they seek to avoid condemnation or reproach. 
Thus they have to do what is agreed to be just, even if it is not really just, and also 
more generally in so far as others are not watching they may fail to do what is good 
and just. It is not clear to me whether one needs to be necessarily a philosopher in 
order to be able to view justice as something intrinsically good. However, it is 
philosophers that Plato primarily expects to reach or approach such a conception of 
justice, being able to apprehend the relationship between the form of justice and the 
form of the good. I think that this relationship must be conceived as necessary. There 
is no aspect or point of view from which (the form) of justice can appear not to be 
good. If one comes to perceive this relationship, one will also conceive doing 
particular just actions as somehow necessarily good.56 
55 See 505d5-7. 
56 One may compare with Phaedrus 254b-c: 'and now they are close to the beloved, and they see the 
beloved's face, flashing like lightning. As the charioteer sees it, his memory is carried back to the 
nature of beauty and again sees it standing together with self-control on a holy pedestal; at the sight it 
becomes frightened, and in sudden reverence falls on its back, and is forced at the same time to pull 
back the reins so violently as to bring both horses down on their haunches, the one willingly, because 
of its of resistance to him, but the horse of excess much against its will' (trans. by Rowe (2005)). The 
charioteer seems to come to perceive the relationship between beauty and self-control in a way that 
makes it impossible for him to allow the bad horse to offend his beloved. 
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Appendix: The division of the soul in Book 10 
I wish to discuss in brief Plato's examination of the soul in the context of his 
discussion of poetry in Book 10. The division of the soul in Book 10 may appear to 
undermine my account of Plato's conception of the soul. Socrates speaks of an 
inferior element in us which poetry addresses and appeals to and which disregards or 
opposes 'measures', reason and 'law'. According to my understanding of Plato's 
conception of the soul there is no 'part' ofhuman nature that is in essential opposition 
to reason and thus there is no part that is not amenable, at least to some extent, to 
reason, and 'measures'. Furthermore, it might be argued that in Book 10 Socrates 
appears to deny that knowledge can protect the soul from the negative influence of 
poetry, since there is an element which operates independently from one's reason and 
knowledge and which poetry and appearances have their effect upon. I shall attempt 
to argue that in Book 1 0 Plato is not denying the supremacy and power of knowledge 
and 'measures' in the soul. Furthermore, I shall suggest that the division and conflict 
in the soul that Socrates detects in Book 1 0 to a great extent is a symptom of a 
character whose reason has not been properly developed. 
In Book 10 there are two divisions of the soul. The first argument examines 
the soul in relation to cognition (602c4-603b6), while the second argument examines 
the soul in relation to action (praxis) (603b7-605c3). As far as the first division is 
concerned, Socrates detects opposition and conflict in relation to sight. The opposition 
is expressed in terms of opposite beliefs (603d1-2). As far as action is concerned 
opposition may be said to concern pleasure and pain. Socrates clarifies that action 
apart from belief concerning whether one fares well or not also involves pleasure and 
pain (603b5-9 and 606d1-3). More specifically, the argument examines the soul in 
relation to grief (603e5 ff). Grief in its objective dimension can be perhaps identified 
with the pathos at 604a1 0. 57 In the first division Socrates discovered an element in us 
57 The pathos here is presented as something external having an objective dimension, and thus it may 
involve perhaps the death of one's son. Adam (1902) p. 410 notes that pathos here represents the 
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that puts its trust in measurement and another one that opposes it and forms beliefs 
that contradict measurement (603al-7). In the second division Socrates discovers a 
lower irrational, or unreasoned element that draws one toward recollection of one's 
suffering ( 604d7 -9) while the best element is said to be willing to follow the precepts 
of reason and law (604d4-5). Socrates regards the two lower elements that the two 
divisions yield as being analogous to each other (605a7-c3). Socrates in the context of 
the second division does not describe explicitly the opposition in terms of opposite 
beliefs or desires, but the terms he uses suggest that the opposition may be said to 
involve both (605b7-8, 604d7-9, 606dl-3). 58 
As the first division of the soul has not been exactly a division between sight 
and reason, even though reason can be said to be to some extent in opposition to sight, 
also the second division does not appear to be at least solely a division between 
sorrow or pain as such and reason, even though the decent character is said to oppose 
his grief (604al-2). 59 Rather the lower element represents an attitude towards one's 
grief or what happened to one, an attitude of immoderate grief or sorrow.60 The 
depiction of the lower part as being lazy, indignant and a coward allows Socrates to 
associate it with a type of immoderate character, which the poets imitate because they 
'affliction' objectively understood. Halliwell (1988) p.l38 notes that 'mi8oc; covers both the objective 
suffering and the corresponding emotion'. 
58 The two lower parts of the soul in the two divisions are not identified rather they are presented as 
analogous or similar (605a9-10). A further question that arises is whether the parts in Book 10 are to be 
identified with the three elements that the reader is familiar with from the earlier Books of the 
Republic. The superior element in both cases is the same and identified with the logistikon (605b3). 
However, it should be noted that the superior element here is associated with shame (604a5-6). Hence 
it may appear to involve the spirited part. I think that the lower element in the context of the discussion 
of poetry represents pleasure and pain and in general whatever tendency one may have that goes 
against law and virtue, while the superior element represents one's endorsement oflaw. 
59 Initially we are presented with reason together with law on the one hand and grief or the pathos on 
the other hand as two external 'objective' factors that drag the person in opposite directions (604a9-
l 0). In this passage the opposition does not appear to be something due to the. soul, having its origin in 
the soul itself. However, later Socrates presents the opposition as internal, stating that there is a part in 
us which draws us towards the pathos while another one which follows reasoning (604d3-9). 
60 See also Murphy (1951) p. 241. Murphy argues that 'it would seem then that in this case, ... that to 
which poetry appeals is not our emotions in general but only what Plato considers detrimental 
emotions, such as superfluous pity or fear, and our tendency to indulge emotions excessively'. 
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can be easily imitated and easily understood by their audience (604e-605a). 
Alternatively the lower element can be seen as a tendency or inclination towards an 
immoderate emotional response, while the superior one represents a tendency or 
propensity towards moderation and restraint and one's willingness or readiness to 
follow the precepts of society. The lower part is not exactly a blind attitude towards 
one's suffering. Rather it involves an exaggerated and unreflective evaluation of what 
happened to one. 
It seems to me that the lower part represents one's unreflective response to 
the loss of one's son, or alternatively a desire one has to indulge in an uncritical 
unreflective response. Such response to what happened to one indeed represents to a 
great extent one's immediate unreflective attitude towards one's affliction. As 
Murphy notes: 'Plato seems to be writing of this cpaui\6v n as of something that we 
ought to try to get rid of; it does not then consist in sense and emotion, but in 
undesirable attitudes to them, or in the states which rro i\oyLanK6v assumes through 
lack of intelligent control by constant attention to ideals and standards' _61 I agree with 
Murphy and I believe that the lower element here, in the context of the discussion of 
poetry, and in so far as it is not to be identified with pain and pleasure or emotion as 
such, is not an irreducible and unavoidable factor in human nature, rather it represents 
a tendency for excess or an excessive emotional reaction that is present in the average 
non well-educated person. More specifically to a great extent the presence of 
conflicting attitudes in the soul indicates a person whose character is not adequately 
developed and is unstable. 62 
Socrates makes it quite clear that the 'decent' person (603e4: avi]Q E7CLELKT]c;) 
he is talking about is not exactly perfect. His imperfection does not lie in the fact that 
61 See Murphy (1951) p. 241. 
62 I should also note that Socrates does not say that both attitudes are strictly speaking simultaneous. 
Rather the person is characterized as having the two attitudes at different times (604a1-7). More 
generally excessive emotion is not compatible with reasoning, as if it would be the case if one had two 
minds. Rather when emotion becomes excessive the AoyLanK6v or in other words our reasoning 
capacity is 'destroyed' (605b3). What may be simultaneous with reason and resist reason to some 
extent is the tendency to indulge emotion. 
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the loss of his son saddens him. It is impossible for one to fully avoid this sorrow 
(603e8-9).63 Rather I think that this imperfection involves inadequate internalisation 
and understanding of virtue and the standards or norms of society that can be 
associated with virtue. The defect does not solely concern a separate 'irrational' part 
of the soul rather it concerns one's superior element as well. The fact that the 
'gentleman' tends to fight his grief when he is watched by his peers and not when he 
is alone indicates the decent person's insufficient internalisation of the law and reason 
(604a1-8) and more generally his passivity. I think that Plato describes law and reason 
as external forces exhorting the person to restraint ( 604a9-1 0) exactly because the 
person has not fully internalised the values of society. Also perhaps in order to 
suggest the passivity of the person in relation to the struggle in his soul, a struggle that 
he is unable to fully resolve due to lack of adequate intellectual training and 
understanding of the true nature and value of virtue. 
The decent character does not oppose his excessive sorrow or his desire to cry 
itself, as something bad itself. He tends to think that it is bad only when he is among 
his peers (604a1-4), a fact that indicates that he is primarily interested not in virtue as 
such and the condition of his soul, but rather in the way he is viewed by others.64 
Simultaneously it indicates that the person is not in possession of adequate reasons or 
grounds to address his grief and the assessment of his circumstances that underlies his 
grief. I believe that the fact that the superior element in the soul is associated with 
shame ( e.g.604a6) points to the same direction, since it may be said that what 
primarily restrains this person is another emotion, in particular an emotion that is 
operative and effective primarily when one is watched by others. Socrates provides a 
reason.ing that justifies custom or law and which encourages one to restrain one's. 
grief and indignation not solely when one is in front of others but also when one is by 
oneself ( 604b5-d 1 ). This reasoning involves the assumption that that it is best to keep 
quiet in misfortunes, both because ultimately one cannot not know what is good or 
63 Nevertheless as Plato has argued in Book 2 (38la4-5) a virtuous soul will be least disturbed and 
altered by any external affection (tjJUXfJV bf OU UJV tXVbQELO'HlTilV Kal cj:>QOVLflW'HlTf]V rlKLU'r1 av 
'rL El;W8EV m:i8o~ TaQal;ELEV TE Kal tiMOLWUELEV;). 
64 Compare also with 606c5-7: one restrains the comic or clown in oneself because one is afraid of the 
reputation of buffoonery. 
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bad in such things, in other words whether they are really misfortunes, and also 
because grief and exaggeration contributes to nothing, rather it impedes one from 
deliberating about what happened to one, and from getting used to healing oneself. 
However, this reasoning is not clearly introduced as something that the person is able 
to make for himself. The superior element of the person is presented as being 
responsive to it and willing to endorse it (604d4-5). 
I think that Socrates allows that the best element in the decent man is not in 
possession of adequate reasons so that it may oppose false assumptions and restrain 
grief. It may be argued that the fact that a lower part of the soul is presented as 
irresponsive to reason and reasoning does not show that people's emotions in general 
are irresponsive to reasoning~ and persuasion cannot affect and moderate them. The 
emotions encapsulate an evaluation of the situation and can be altered to a great extent 
if such evaluation is modified. Perhaps it may be argued that the fact that the person is 
only partly amenable to reasoning indicates an inadequately developed character and 
inability to consider one's misfortune from a wider point of view. 
Socrates goes on to suggest that poetry has the power to harm even 'decent 
people' apart from the very few (606c5-8). That the best among us are not so virtuous 
after all is suggested by Socrates' remarks concerning the best characters' attitude 
towards poetry. At 606a7-b8 Socrates argues that 'the best element in our nature, 
since it has not been properly educated by reason, or even by habit, then relaxes its 
guard over the plaintive part, inasmuch as this is contemplating the woes of others and 
it is no shame to it to praise and pity another who, claiming to be a good man, 
abandons himself to excess in his grief; but it thinks this vicarious pleasure is so much 
clear gain, and would not consent to forfeit it by disdaining the poem altogether' 
(trans. by Shorey). Socrates continues that 'few are capable of reflecting that what we 
enjoy in others will inevitably react upon ourselves'. What we see here is that the 
'best' part in us, due to inadequate training engages in a wrong reasoning concerning 
both the benefit and also the harm of poetry and because of this reasoning it abandons 
control of the 'lower' element. In other words, the person abandons rational control 
on the one hand because he thinks that poetry poses no harm to him and his 
reputation, and on the other hand because he thinks that he is going to gain innocent 
pleasure from doing so. Both assumptions are false. 
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This passage makes it clear that tragic performance is dangerous because its 
pleasure presupposes abandonment of rational control or reflection and it habituates 
us to abandon ourselves to emotive unreflective reactions. Pleasure in poetic 
performance is considered to be spurious because it is taken to require abandonment 
of critical thinking and is not compatible with the presence of critical thinking, since 
critical thinking would find most of what is said or acted as false and inappropriate. I 
think Plato is not arguing that one can enjoy poetry thinking that what the poets say 
are falsehoods. One cannot enjoy appearances knowing or believing that appearances 
are somehow false. Rather one enjoys appearances only insofar as one believes them 
and regards them as constituting realities or alternatively, as long as one thinks that 
they are true, adequate depictions of reality. If people thus enjoy poetry ' knowing' 
somehow that what the poets say might be false, this 'knowledge' is suppressed. This 
suppression of disbelief and more generally of one's critical thinking may be said to 
involve a form of self-deception. However, it does not amount to the presence of a 
straightforward contradiction in the soul, or more specifically to the presence of 
contradictory beliefs that one knows that they are contradictory. The presence of 
one's belief that what is said is false would destroy one's pleasure. Plato assumes that 
what we are primarily committed to is the good, and in cognitive terms it is truth or 
reality. 
I think that Socrates here is not contradicting his earlier claims that ignorance 
and falsehood are involuntary. 65 One cannot accept falsehoods in the soul knowing 
that what one accepts is false and also knowing that one is forming false beliefs. The 
good character may have a notion that what the poets say is false, but he does not 
believe that in abandoning reflection he allows false beliefs to intrude in his soul or 
more generally that he does any harm to his soul whatever. His suppression of 
disbelief and also his abandonment to emotion is due to the fact that he thinks that 
there is no harm to the soul and also that he is going to derive some sort of benefit in 
the form of pleasure. But it may be argued that at a deeper level the person does not 
really believe that the poets say falsehoods. His readiness to sympathize with the 
65 Falsehood and ignorance are presented as involuntary at 382al-b5, 412e8-413a8, and 589c6-7. 
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tragic hero indicates that he is inclined to think that the hero's reaction is appropriate. 
Nevertheless he is not able to detect that he possesses in his soul contradictory beliefs. 
Socrates tries to unmask the contradiction by arguing that the praise that the decent 
character reserves for the poet is problematic (605d7-e5). 
Poets according to Plato are the mouthpieces of society. Poets are said to 
imitate things as they appear (598b1-4). But they do not imitate things as they appear 
to them or to wise people. Rather Socrates argues they imitate things as they appear to 
the multitude or the masses (602b1-3). The poem's appeal and the fact that its 
audience is persuaded is due to a great extent to the fact that the audience already 
believes that what the poets say is true for the most part. Socrates distinguishes the 
decent man who restrains his sorrow in front of others from the multitude ( 604e-
605a), or from women (605d7-e1), but it turns out that the 'decent' man's values are 
not so different from the values of the masses after all. More generally Plato seems to 
believe this person's attitude towards his emotions reflects conflicting values in 
society in general, which characterize even its superior members. Society forbids 
mourning in public but it praises poets who depict people mourning in public and it 
also allows its members to indulge in excessive emotional reactions in the context of 
poetic performance. I think that Plato in the Republic would interpret this as 
indicating the presence of incoherent values and not as a policy that ultimately aims at 
making restraint of emotions easier in the long term by allowing emotional energy to 
be released in a safe context. 
Janaway (1995) has argued that poetry poses a danger for the soul since 
'however reflective we are, however governed by reason, however desirous of the 
good, we still cannot resist feeling a pleasure in tragic drama, which arises out of an 
identification with the character's emotional situation' (p. 150). He further suggests 
that 'aesthetic distance, then feels like a safe distance, but it is not. Indeed it is not 
even a true distance, because, while on the rational level we know the fiction for what 
it is and deliberately reckon on benefiting from harmless pleasure taken in it, on a less 
discriminating level we feel in an involved way emotions concerning the fictional 
situation'. Because the psyche is split we can be 'in' the drama, even while we claim 
to be appreciating it from 'outside"(p. 152). I am not in complete agreement with 
Janaway's interpretation because it does not pay full justice to the text. Socrates is not 
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arguing that critical distance and reflection in general cannot protect someone from 
poetry. He reproaches people's attitude to a great extent exactly because they do not 
keep critical, reflective distance, for the sake of pleasure. The ultimate reason for this 
behaviour is that people do not understand the corruptive influence of poetry. Socrates 
suggests at the beginning of Book 10 that poetry does not corrupt those who possess 
knowledge of its real nature as an antidote (595b5-7).66 Ultimately people are 
vulnerable to the corruptive effects of poetry because they do not possess adequate 
knowledge of 'measures' or standards, by reference to which they can evaluate and 
reject what the poets say. A person who is in possession of understanding is able to 
reject appearances as false. More generally he is able to protect his soul from 
appearances or excessive and false emotions. I think that such a person would also 
find no pleasure in poetry in so far as it involves falsehoods. 
In the first division of the soul in Book 1 0 ( 602c3-603b4) it may appear that 
Socrates is arguing that knowledge of 'measures' or standards is unable to protect the 
soul from appearances, since there is a cpauAov element in us which forms beliefs 
independently from measures, and rational standards. I think that Socrates wants to 
warn against appearances, and to show that they are not so innocent as one may think, 
in particular one who thinks that one possesses knowledge, even though one does not 
really possess such knowledge. But he does not want to deny the 'power' of measures 
and reason to assist the soul in relation to appearances so that appearances do not 
'rule' in it.67 
One may argue that appearances pose no threat to the soul because they do not 
involve belief. Socrates assumes that appearance entails belief. On these grounds he 
divides the soul into two parts (602e4-603a2). Socrates' argument is compressed. He 
argues that since the opposite appearance can coexist in the soul when reason has 
measured and indicated what is the case (602e4-6), and since we cannot believe 
66 Compare with 605c6-7. 
67 See 602d6-e2: AQ' ouv ou 1:0 f.l.E1:QELV Kai. CtQL8f.l.ELV Kai. lmtivat ~oi]SnaL xaQLEG1:a1:aL 1lQO<; 
mha EcplivTJaav, wme f-lil tXQXELV EV TJf.l.LV 1:0 <j>mv6f.l.EVov f.l.Eil;;ov ~ f:Aanov ~ rrAEov ~ 
~aQlhEQOV, aAA.a 1:0 AoyLGCtf.l.EVOV Kai. f.l.E1:Qijaav ~ Kai. mijaav; Ow<; yaQ ov; AMa flilV 
1:0U1:0 ye 1:0U AoyLGHKOU av ELTJ 1:0U EV l.jJuxtj EQyov. 
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opposite things about the same things with the same element (6028-9), the part that 
forms beliefs in accordance with measures is different from the one that disregards 
measures (603al-2). What we can see here is that even though an appearance entails 
belief, it does not entail belief for the 'whole' soul. Rather solely a part in us believes 
'appearances' and illusions, when reasoning is present. A much-debated question 
regarding this passage is whether the lower element is introduced as a subdivision of 
the logistikon or not. 68 It can be argued that the subdivision is inside the logistikon 
since at 602e4-6 Socrates seems to present the logistikon as the subject of appearance. 
However, I believe that if one rests on what Socrates says in the division of the soul in 
relation to poetry where again appearances are associated with an inferior element 
(605cl-3) one will be inclined to regard the lower element here as different from the 
logistikon. What is clear however is that we have a subdivision in our cognitive 
faculties. 69 
I am inclined to believe that Plato in this context does not want to present the 
logistikon as subject of beliefs that rest on appearances since this would undermine 
his claim that it is something that can assist the soul in relation to appearances (602a6-
e2). The fact that the logistikon is presented as the subject of appearances does not 
show that the logistikon believes what it sees. I think that what appears to be the case 
appears to the soul as a whole, (or at least to all its cognitive faculties, that exhaust the 
soul in this case) in so far as the soul sees, but only a 'part' of it believes that this is 
actually the case. In my opinion, even if one accepts that the division concerns the 
logistikon, one part of the logistikon would believe what appears to be the case, while 
another part would not believe it, but still in so far as one for example views the sticks 
under water, the sticks would appear bent to the other part as well. In other words as I 
understand the passage, it indicates that, when reasoning is operative, appearances do 
not necessarily entail a full blown belief rather a partial belief, or a half belief or 
perhaps a tendency for belief. 
68 For the view that the logistikon is subdivided see Nehamas (1982) p 64-66, Murphy (1951). For the 
opposite view see Halliwell (1988) p.l34, Adam (1902) ad loc. 
69 In the Timaeus appearances, dreams and images are associated with a cpauAov element that inhabits 
the area around the liver (71d2-e2). Unlike the Republic in the Timaeus the emphasis is on reason's 
control of the imagination. 
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However, when reasoning is not operative to protect the soul, it could be said 
that that this belief poses a real threat in the soul and may not be just a half-belief. 
Furthermore in that case it would be difficult to say that one part of the mind believes 
what it sees while another part of the mind somehow remains unaffected and does not 
believe anything. Rather, the whole soul would believe what it sees. More generally 
by showing that beliefs or a propensity to believe may be present even when one 
employs critical thinking, Plato primarily wants to warn against abandoning such 
critical thinking. Such appearances cannot affect the soul as a whole, or 'rule' in it 
when reasoning is present and opposes them. Furthermore, as long as reason 'knows' 
that appearances may be responsible for false beliefs, it will not allow, in so far as it is 
possible the formation of false and contradictory beliefs in the soul and also it will be 
watchful and avoid relying on the senses. 
The tendency to form false beliefs on the basis of appearances as also the 
tendency to experience emotions of sorrow or pity is not something that can be fully 
avoided. What appears to be the case indeed appears to be the case. However, exactly 
because the philosopher knows that appearances may involve falsehood and the 
potential for belief or belief, he is critical and reflective and continuously questions 
what appears to be the case. However, it has also to be said that if one assumes that 
the world is to a great extent a creation of reason, what appears to be the case will, in 
most cases, be in conformity with reason. 
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Chapter 7 
Pleasure in the Republic 
Preliminary remarks 
In this section I shall discuss in some greater detail the argument on pleasure 
in Republic Book 9. I believe that the significance of the argument lies in the fact that 
it establishes the possibility of harmony in the soul as a harmony between reason and 
desire, reason and pleasure, which has already been hinted at 485d-e. It also emerges 
in the context of this argument that people's attachment to pleasure involves a 
cognitive error and indicates ignorance. Therefore, I think that the argument on 
pleasure indicates the unity of the soul, as a unity of its parts, and simultaneously as a 
unity between reason and experience, and more generally the subjective aspects of 
human life. 
The discussion of pleasure in Book 9 is intended to provide support to the 
thesis that the just life is the happiest life, by showing that the pleasure of this life is 
superior to the pleasures of other lives. The two arguments on pleasure that Socrates 
provides, constitute the second (580c10-583b2) and the third 'proof (583b1-588a5) 
(apodeixeis) that the just life is the happiest life. More specifically, the third proof is 
regarded as the decisive overthrow (583b8) of the person who believes that the unjust 
life is the happiest life. The conclusion of the first 'proof has been provided 
immediately before, at 580b9c-8. It is difficult to establish what precisely the first 
proof involved. It seems that it involved the comparison of the deviant characters with 
the virtuous character (580b). Perhaps the first 'proof on happiness primarily rested 
on showing that the tyrant des not do what he wishes (577d10-578a2) and what he 
desires (579e1-3). 70 The description of the state of the tyrannical soul emphasized the 
70 In order to argue that the tyrant does not do what he desires Socrates did not state explicitly that one 
wishes the real good and also that one may not do as one wishes because what one may do or what one 
may think one desires may be bad. Thus his strategy in the Republic Book 9 is different from the 
Gorgias (467c-469c), where Socrates stated that one wishes the real good, and maintained that the 
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pain and frustration that characterizes the unjust life. The two arguments on pleasure 
can be viewed as complementing the portrait of the tyrannical life, showing that the 
just life involves pleasure and real satisfaction of desires, by distinguishing real 
pleasure from the fake one71 and thus it complements the first proof indicating what 
one really desires is true pleasure. 
Socrates is resting in this context on a common conception of happiness as 
something that lies in or involves satisfaction of desire. 72 One may consider pleasure 
as either the object of desire, as it is commonly conceived, or what arises out of 
satisfaction of desire. As I suggested in the earlier sections the argument in Book 4 for 
justice could be said to be incomplete and not satisfying the common conception of 
happiness in the sense that it was left open whether justice as an order in the soul is 
something that involves satisfaction of desire and pleasure. In Book 9 Socrates begins 
his arguments on pleasure by assigning desire and pleasure to the superior part of the 
soul, that part that according to Book 4 has to rule (580d), and continues to argue that 
the pleasures associated with this part are superior. However, it will emerge in the 
course of the argument that all the parts of the soul are best satisfied in a just soul. 
One problem that may arise in relation to Socrates' two arguments is that it 
seems as though the goodness and value of the just life depends on satisfaction of 
tyrant does not do what he wishes because injustice is bad. The underlying position is nevertheless the 
same. In the Republic Book 9 Socrates makes use of the common conception of desire and tries to 
show the badness of injustice without fully or directly rejecting such a conception, rather to a great 
extent relying on such a conception. Partition of the soul is a crucial part in his argumentative strategy, 
since it allows him to suggest that the desire the tyrant follows (assuming that the tyrant really satisfies 
such a desire) is only one part among the others (and the smallest part in him according to Book 9) and 
it does not represent the other parts and the whole (577d), without specifying the object of the whole's 
desire. Eventually, both the description of the tyrannical soul and the argument on pleasure indicate 
that one does not merely do what one 'wishes' (bou/etai) (577d) as a whole but one also does not 
satisfy (at least the majority of) one's desires (epithumiai) (579e), something that was not argued in the 
Gorgias. 
71 Perhaps a 'Calliclean' opponent could still try to argue that the life of the tyrant is happy, conceding 
that the life of the tyrant involves pain but insisting that it is happy since it involves great pleasure and 
the greatest pleasures are compatible with great pains. 
72 For further discussion see Gosling and Taylor (1982) pp. 103-5, p. 188, p. 322. 
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desire (according to a common conception of desire) and pleasure. Pleasure, however, 
is not presented as the criterion of the goodness of a good life (581 e 5-7). 
Furthermore, it is implied that the good is ultimately the criterion of (the truth of) 
pleasure (586el-2), even though it is not clearly stated. However, it may seem that 
pleasure is introduced at least as one criterion of happiness. I believe that Socrates 
here is relying on a common conception of happiness. While the goodness of the just 
life does not depend on its pleasantness, the pleasantness of such a life is necessary so 
that people may apprehend its happiness and also its goodness. But if people are to 
see such goodness, their conception of the nature of desire and pleasure needs to be 
first attacked and modified, so that it can be brought closer to Socrates' conception of 
pleasure, desire and happiness. Even though pleasure does not constitute a criterion of 
a happy and good life it can, I believe, serve as an indication of such a life. Pleasure is 
an inseparable feature and necessary concomitant of a good life, since it is something 
that follows from the fulfilment of one's nature. 
I am not going here to discuss in detail Socrates first argument or 'proof on 
pleasure. In the first 'proof (580c10-583b2), after distinguishing three kinds of 
pleasure on the basis of the tripartite division of the soul Socrates argues that the 
pleasure associated with the superior 'part' of the soul and the philosophic life is the 
pleasantest, on the grounds that philosophers who are governed by this part and whose 
life by consequence is dominated by the pleasures of this part, consider their life to be 
the pleasantest. Even though each character considers their life as being the 
pleasantest (581c9-e2), philosophers' assessment of the pleasantness of their life is 
true (582al) since only philosophers are in (full) possession of the three 'criteria' 
necessary for judging anything, namely experience (E~7t:ELQLa), wisdom (cpQOVllaLc;) 
and arguments/reason-ing (Aoyoc;: 582a3-5, Aoym: 582d7-11), which are said to be 
the instruments (6Qyavov) with which we judge things (582a3-5). 
The third proof, which I will discuss in greater detail, can be viewed as the use 
of logoi in the judgement of pleasure. The two proofs cannot be fully separated. While 
in the first proof it is argued that philosophic pleasure is the pleasantest because 
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philosophers say so 73 by using logoi, and more generally the superiority of reason in 
relation to every matter is established, the second part justifies the first by showing 
the reasons why philosophers think so and applies logos to pleasure. Socrates sets out 
to demonstrate that pleasures of other lives, except for the pleasures of the phronimos, 
are not altogether true (rrava/\118i]~), nor pure (Ka8aqa), but shadow painted 
(eaK~.ayqacpll~Evll) (583bl-7). 
The argument 
Commentators agree that Plato takes questions of pleasure in the Republic to 
be objective and able to be settled by reason. This implies that one can be mistaken 
about pleasure; what appears to be pleasant to one is not necessarily truly or really 
pleasant to one. One question that arises is what Plato conceives statements or beliefs 
concerning pleasure, in order to argue that one can have a mistaken conception of 
pleasure and mistaken beliefs concerning pleasure. Belief more generally according to 
Plato aims at truth and reality, since he takes falsehood to be involuntary. Therefore, it 
seems that statements or beliefs about pleasure are not, solely, concerned with how 
one feels or how things appear to one. Rather they concern 'reality', in other words a 
condition of the soul or the organism, or alternatively perhaps a power that an object 
or an activity has to produce a condition in the body or the soul. To maintain that 
beliefs concerning pleasure can be true or false presupposes that there is reality, 
objectivity and truth in pleasure. In fact, according to the argument, pleasure has a 
nature and reality because it rests upon certain 'objective' processes or states in the 
body and the soul. Ultimately the question of whether one is pleased relates to the 
question whether one is replenished, in other words, the satisfaction of certain psychic 
and bodily needs. Thus falsehood concerning pleasure ultimately is falsehood about 
the body's and the soul's objective needs and how far one has progressed in satisfying 
them. 
73 One reason perhaps why Socrates attributes the arguments he is going to provide to some sophoi 
(583b5-6) is because he does not want to identify himself fully with a sophos or perhaps a philosopher. 
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As I understand the argument on pleasure, its overall purposes are partly 
destructive and partly constructive. Socrates wants to show that the virtuous life is the 
pleasantest life, and in order to show this he needs first to undermine people's 
conception of pleasure and their attachment to certain bodily pleasures that are 
commonly conceived to be paradigmatically pleasant. In trying to show that certain 
pleasures are not true Socrates tries to show that certain 'pleasures' do not constitute 
proper grounds or basis for pleasure and, I will argue, enjoyment. He intends to 
undermine people's reasons for taking something to be pleasant. However, the 
argument does not have solely destructive purposes. Socrates wants to provide 
grounds or criteria of pleasure and more generally to indicate where genuine pleasure 
is to be found. 
In talking about grounds or basis for taking something to be pleasant or 
enjoyable perhaps I should distinguish between 'objective' and 'subjective' grounds. 
An objective ground for enjoyment is something that is taking place in the body or the 
soul. This perhaps would justify one's enjoyment from an external point of view. By 
speaking of 'subjective' ground I am thinking of a reason one has to regard something 
as pleasant. Plato wants to show both that there is no real basis in people's assumption 
that they are pleased, and also simultaneously to show that the reasons or grounds 
people have to think that they are pleased are not adequate. It seems that his denial 
that certain pleasures are true covers both aspects. He wants to undermine the 'reality' 
of such pleasures, and thus show that people's thinking ofthem as pleasant has no real 
foundation. He wants to show that these pleasures, as sensations, cannot serve as a 
basis upon which one can rely to assess something as pleasant. Ultimately in 
providing 'objective grounds' of pleasure, Socrates also wants to indicate what can 
serve as a reason for one to take oneself to be pleased. 
Even though Socrates thinks that people's beliefs that certain things are 
pleasant are quite unfounded, he does not want to argue that people take things to be 
pleasant for no reason at all. Rather he is arguing that there are cases of saying that 
people taking things to be pleasant for inadequate or wrong reasons. He assumes that 
people base pleasure on bodily sensations. Socrates wants to show that bodily 
sensations and feelings cannot serve as a sufficient and adequate basis for one to think 
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that one is pleased and that one fares well. It is· not solely because they do not 
constitute adequate reasons. Rather, they can also be misleading and deceptive. 
Simultaneously, I think it can be said that these pleasures do not have enough 'reality' 
or backing in reality to support one's considering them to be pleasant and also one's 
enjoying them from an objective point of view. Socrates is going to provide certain 
criteria of pleasure, which also I think can form a basis or reason for someone to think 
that something is pleasant. I will discuss Socrates' argument in brief in order to make 
more specific the nature of the mistake that Socrates detects in the case of pleasure. 
Socrates first of all secures Glaucon's agreement that pleasure and pain are 
opposites (583c3), and that there is an intermediate state of quiescence where one is 
neither in pleasure, nor in pain (583c5-9). The intermediate state of quiescence 
constitutes a convenient starting point so Socrates can show that people can be 
mistaken about pleasure. lh showing that people who are in pain take the middle state 
to be pleasant (583c10-d9), and also possibly painful (583el-2), Socrates indicates 
that something is taken to be pleasant which involves no pleasure at all. Thus he can 
distinguish between appearance and reality. There is no real basis here in enjoyment 
rather the pleasure assumed to be involved (and experienced in relation to such a 
state) is an illusion (phantasma) having nothing healthy in it (584a7-10). 
Simultaneously Socrates shows how perspective influences our beliefs concerning 
pleasure since it becomes clear that the middle state appears to be pleasant because 
one looks at it from the point of view of pain. Pain in this case seems to function as 
the primary criterion or ground that one relies upon to take something as pleasant. 
In logical terms the mistake of the sick people can be described as a confusion 
of an opposite with the absence or negation of its opposite. In arguing that the middle 
state is not pleasant and pleasure is an illusion Socrates assumes that one opposite is 
not the negation of the other opposite and that pleasure, being the opposite of pain as 
Glaucon has accepted, does not consist in the negation or absence of pain. However, 
to reinforce his claim that the middle state does not involve any real pleasure, 
Socrates also indicates that (bodily) pleasure constitutes a becoming or motion 
(583a9-1 0), while the state of quiescence (in which no bodily motion reaches the soul) 
is by definition a state where motion is absent (584al-2). In confusing thus the middle 
state with pleasure one takes rest to be some kind of change or motion. 
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Socrates wants to generalize his attack on bodily pleasure and so he argues 
that the majority and the greatest pleasures of bodily origin constitute releases or 
liberations from pain and do not properly deserve the name 'pleasure' (584c3-5). His 
attack at this stage, as I understand it, rests precisely in assuming that (real) pleasure 
is the genuine opposite of pain, and that releases from pain are not as opposed to pain 
as one may consider them to be. In characterizing them as releases from pain, 
Socrates is not confusing the absence of pain, which has been defined as an 
intermediate state, with bodily pleasure. Bodily pleasures constitute motions in which 
one is being released from pain. It seems also to be assumed that pain still exists to 
some extent while one is being released from it. Thus the confusion is analogous to 
the one that characterizes sick people but not exactly the same since one here does not 
confuse rest with motion, rather one motion or becoming with another, as it is 
becomes clear in the simile that Socrates provides (584d6-9). One confuses a motion 
away from pain with a motion away from the intermediate state that is taken to be 
absence of pain. The presence of pain again can be said to play a fundamental role in 
people's mistaken conception of bodily pleasures. 
Socrates is keen to argue in this stage that pure pleasure (Ka9aQav) is not the 
release from pain (584c12-b2). Thus he indicates that there are bodily pure pleasures, 
such as the pleasures of smell, which involve no pain whatsoever (584b3-7). He has 
not yet introduced pure psychic pleasure, and he wants to prepare for the introduction 
of such pleasures. The pleasantness of such bodily pleasures cannot be said to 
constitute an illusion since there is no pain involved which would affect our 
conception and assessment of them. Socrates wants to indicate that pleasure is not a 
relieving or relief from pain because then it would emerge that there is no reality or 
objectivity whatever in pleasure. If one assumed that there is no reality or objectivity 
in pleasure at all, then either people's beliefs concerning pleasure in general would all 
be false, in that they assumed that there is reality in something that has no reality or 
objectivity, or alternatively what appeared pleasant to one would be really pleasant to 
one. 
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I think that conceiving one opposite as being the privation of the other, or a 
motion away from the other involves the following assumptions. First of all, they are 
not genuine opposites, since genuine opposites are not taken to be the negation or 
absence of each other, rather it seems to be assumed that one opposite presupposes the 
absence of the other. Second, I think to conceive opposites in this way is to conceive 
them as interdependent and therefore as not having (independent) existence or reality 
of their own. Finally, in epistemological terms, it is to see them as relative to each 
other. One can be known or assessed by reference to the other (as the absence or 
distance from the other), by comparing it to the other. Ultimately there is no stable 
and independent point of view by reference to which pleasure and pain can be 
assessed. Something is pleasant if it is less painful in comparison with something that 
is more painful, and something is painful if it is less pleasant in comparison to 
something that is pleasanter. The same thing can be said to be pleasant or painful 
depending on where we stand and what we compare it with. 
'Mixed opposites', or opposites in so far as they are conceived to be mixed, 
are not genuine opposites, rather one qualifies the other since they form a kind of 
unity, whether good or problematic. I think that in so far as they can be said to be 
mixed they can appear to be interdependent. However, Plato seems to assume that 
exactly because (bodily) pleasure is mixed with pain, or more generally taken together 
with pain it looks more opposed to pain than it is. Its juxtaposition with pain (whether 
in the body or in the mind) creates an illusion of contrast, or a contrast that is much 
more extreme than it really is, and thus it looks more 'opposed' to pain than it really is 
(586b7-c5). 74 Therefore, according to the first part of the argument, mixed pleasures 
are problematic both because they are not real pleasures and also, and primarily I 
think, because they look like real pleasures. 
Thus the mistake concerning pleasure can be presented as involving taking 
what is not (essentially or unqualifiedly) pleasant as (essentially or unqualifiedly) 
74 Socrates later draws a comparison with colours: if one looks at something grey, having looked at 
black, grey would appear white to someone who has no experience or knowledge of white (585a3-5). 
The comparison is extended to painting (586b7-c2). Certain pleasures 'are painted' in such a way that 
the illusion of contrast and extremity is created, as perhaps in the case of shadow- painting the illusion 
of depth is created. 
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pleasant, which can be expressed as taking something which is not a genuine opposite 
as being a genuine opposite. Simultaneously, and since there is (real) pleasure, the 
mistake involves a confusion between one 'pleasure' and 'another'. In assuming that 
certain 'so called pleasures' are pleasant one ultimately confuses genuine psychic 
pleasure with bodily pleasure. 
I wish to note that the distinction Plato draws between certain bodily states, 
and the way they appear, corresponds to a distinction between pleasure as a sensation 
and pleasure as an appearance. I think this distinction, which is not drawn explicitly, 
is necessary in order to make sense of what Socrates says in his argument on pleasure. 
Furthermore, I believe that this distinction can perhaps explain why there are levels of 
untruth and unreality in pleasure. For instance, in the case of the state of quiescence 
there is no sensation of bodily origin involved but it looks as though it is involved. 
The pleasure one experiences in relation to this state is characterized an illusion 
(584a9:<Pav'taa~HX'tWV). Here absence of sensation can be distinguished from the 
appearance, which can I think be considered as a pleasure since one finds pleasure in 
the middle state. 75 Later we have again a distinction between the mixed pleasures 
themselves and the way they appear (586cl-2). They are not intense rather they 
appear to be intense and one can assume that one also experiences them as intense, 
however this 'intensity' as part of our experience is an illusion. 76 Here I think the 
distinction between sensation and appearance is clearer, since in this case a pleasant 
sensation is involved. The sensation itself, unlike the appearance, corresponds to 
something that is (as a matter of fact) happening in the body. Perhaps the sensation 
can be seen as something that can be 'abstracted' from the experience, which has 
some dose of reality. The remainder is mere illusion. The pleasures themselves (I 
think as sensations) are said to be deceitful images of real pleasure, which look like 
the original (586b8-cl) dbwAmc;; 'ti)c;; M.118ouc;; r1bovflc;; Kat taKI.lXyQa<Pll~tvaLc;;, 
uno 'tf]c;; naQ' M.AijAac;; etaEwc;; anoxQaLVO~EVaLc;;). I think that the appearance 
75 Such appearances can be associated with the pleasures of anticipation that Socrates mentions at 
584c7-9. 
76 I think that in this passage (586d7-c5) Plato is referring primarily to sexual pleasure, which is taken 
to be paradigmatically intense and are associated with madness, thoughtlessness and disease in both the 
Timaeus (86c-d) and the Philebus (46d-47b). 
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itself can be conceived as an image, more precisely as an image of an image.77 
However, in so far as this image can be seen as appearance or part of an appearance, it 
presupposes belief and 'interpretation' of the sensation (or its absence, and by 
extension what is happening in the body). We can thus distinguish between different 
degrees of reality (or unreality).78 Mixed pleasures (in so far as they are sensations) 
are particularly problematic, and also bad images because they convey the impression 
of reality and thus encourage false belief. Falsehood here concerns both what is 
happening in the body and also what is happening in the soul. Not all bodily pleasures 
as sensations are necessarily deceptive in this way, and may not appear different from 
what they are and thus may not involve false belief. 79 
77 See also 587c8-9 (TQLntJ EibwA<f.> nQoc; £lA:r'j8nav) and 605c2 (dbwAa dbwAonowvv-ra). 
78 One may compare with Book 10 where Socrates distinguishes three degrees of reality, the form of a 
couch, a particular cough and the image of a particular couch, which corresponds to the appearance of a 
couch that the painter imitates and reproduces (596a-598b). In terms of Book 9 an image or painting 
that is painted with a certain illusionist technique can be distinguished from the illusion or appearance 
it produces (cf. Book 10, 602c-d). 
79 I have a difficulty as to whether one should regard pleasure as a phantasma as involving a belief or 
not. What is clear to me is that belief is presupposed so that such' images' can be generated in the soul. 
Phantasia as it is defmed in the Sophist as a mixture of belief and sensation (Sophist 244a-b). However, 
in both the Philebus and also in the Timaeus it may look as though Plato talks of images or appearances 
in the soul as something that occurs in parallel with belief. Hence it may look as if belief is not a part of 
them in the Sophist's sense. In the Timaeus such 'images' are said to be due to thought and reason, are 
'reflections' of thoughts and are located in the liver which functions as their receptacle (71 a-b). In the 
Philebus Socrates mentions a 'painter' in the soul who works in parallel with a 'scribe', and illustrates 
what the 'scribe' says (39b-c). These 'images' should be identified with the compound or mixture of 
belief and sensation (actual or supplied by memory) or alternatively they should be identified with 
something further that arises because of this combination. I think that they can be 'isolated' and 
distinguished from sensation (or perception) as such, when perceptual circumstances are problematic 
and the sensible object is spatially or temporally 'distant'. According to Delcomminette (2003) in such 
cases the function of the painter in the soul is to compensate for the absence of actual perception (p. 
226). Furthermore, they can be 'isolated' in cases of illusion. When there is no falsehood or illusion in 
actual perception I think that there is no need to postulate such an image in the soul. In the Philebus it 
is clearer I think that in cases of illusion the images constitute a 'component' or part of our experience 
that ideally should be 'cut off or separated (apotemomenos) from what one perceives (Philebus 42b-c). 
Also in the Philebus (42a-b) it is I think clear that even if such false images or illusions, always 
presuppose false belief, they can be primarily due either to the pleasures themselves (or their memory), 
which also thus cause false belief, or to false belief. 
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Socrates proceeds to provide a simile in order to illustrate and explain the 
confusion that people undergo in relation to pleasure and pain (585d1-585a7). 
Socrates first maintains that in nature there is 'Up', 'Down' and the 'Middle'. 
Someone who has not seen the real Up, when moved to the middle would think that 
he is going up. When standing in the middle, looking to where he came from he 
would think he were up. The mistake is due to inexperience of the true up. 80 However, 
when moving down he would rightly think that he is moving down. Similarly people 
who have not experienced truth, and who have mistaken and unhealthy beliefs in 
general, also have unhealthy opinions concerning pleasure: when they are moving 
down, they are right and they are really in pain, but when they move to the middle, 
they intensell1 believe that they are moving towards pleasure and fulfilment (585a2-
3: acpobQa f-lEV o'lov'raL nQoc; nA:rwwan 'r£ Kai. t1bov~J y(yvea8aL),82 which is 
not the case. The middle state here corresponds to the satisfaction of the body and 
what is necessary whereas the upward path corresponds to the satisfaction of the soul. 
The 'up' as a point where motion ends, which is confused with the intermediate state, 
80 It seems to me that the fact that Socrates presents 'up' and the 'middle' as points which are termini of 
motions suggests that there are objective standards, or stable points of reference in the assessment of 
pleasure, both bodily and psychic. Pleasure can be evaluated positively by reference to the terminus as 
an approximation to the terminus, and not solely negatively by reference to pain or distance from pain. 
81 The 'intensity' of people's believing at 585a2 corresponds to the intensity of the pleasure that they 
think they are experiencing. Compare with 586cl-2. 
82 Gosling and Taylor (1982) argue that Plato's argument on pleasure suffers from a 'fatal ambiguity', 
which Plato shows no signs of detecting (p. 122-3). The ambiguity concerns the question whether 
pleasure is considered to lie in acquiring what one needs, or in possessing what one needs. The 
ambiguity also concerns the term plerosis, which may signify both. I believe that the term at 585a2-3 
signifies possession of what one needs. More generally, even though the question whether pleasure lies 
in a process or a state would require long discussion, I think that in the Republic the ambiguity is not 
'fatal' if one distinguishes between the body and the soul. In the body pleasure ceases when one is 
filled, while in the soul pleasure 'lasts', and this is a reason for the superiority of psychic pleasure. It 
perhaps may not be possible for the human soul ever to reach the real 'up', and thus in some sense the 
soul is in perpetual motion upwards. But in relative terms it may be said that Plato does not want to 
exclude the possibility that possession of something good, as long as one possesses it, cannot provide 
pleasure. And certainly, as Gosling and Taylor note (1882), what would be really fatal to Plato's 
argument would be to say that the more advanced a philosopher, or a virtuous person, the less pleasure 
she experiences (p. 123). 
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can be identified with the good. As it seems to be suggested at 585a2-3 the up 
identified with plerosis is itself being presented as pleasant. 83 
The first part of the argument, in having primarily a destructive effect, 
undermining the grounds for finding pleasure in the body, and in showing more 
generally how people can be victims of illusions, paves the way for the second part 
(585a8-585e5) where Plato tries to provide an account of the nature of pleasure.84 
Thus also showing how reason can provide criteria or reasons for taking something to 
be pleasant. 
Plato assumes that pleasure can be examined and assessed by reference to its 
sources or the conditions of its generation. Socrates argues that the nature of pleasure 
is to be filled by what befits nature (585dll: TO nAT]QODa8cu TWV cpuan 
71QOUT]KOVTWV i]bu £an). Thus it emerges that pleasure lies in the satisfaction of 
one's real needs. Socrates distinguishes between bodily needs or lacks, such as thirst 
and hunger, from psychic needs or lacks, which lie in ignorance and folly (585a8-b4), 
and also the things that fill these lacks. Bodily needs are satisfied by nourishment and 
drink whereas psychic needs are satisfied by acquisition of intelligence (585b6-7), 
true belief, knowledge and virtue in general (585cl-2). Satisfaction ofbodily needs is 
less true and 'real' than the satisfaction of psychic needs, because the body is a less 
real and stable container, and the objects with which it is filled are themselves less 
real and true; while the soul is a more real and stable container, able in other words to 
keep what is filled with, and the objects which satisfy it, are themselves more real 
(585b9-c9). Thus psychic pleasure is truer and more real than bodily pleasure, since it 
lies in a truer and more real filling ( 585d 11-eS). 
The contrast that Socrates draws between the body and the soul indicates that 
while the body is constantly changing the soul enjoys stability, thus we can achieve 
83 The fact that Socrates presents 'up' and the 'middle' as points which are termini of motions suggests 
that there are objective standards, or stable points of reference in the assessment of pleasure both bodily 
and psychic. 
84 Compare with Gorgias 501a. Socrates indicates in this context that pleasure has to be examined 
scientifically: one has to examine the 'nature' of pleasure (phusis) and its cause (aitia) and be able to 
give an account in relation to it and not merely rely on experience and memory. 
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lasting satisfaction and pleasure only in the case of the soul. The body cannot be 
properly filled because the objects of bodily needs lack truth, and are changing and 
unsubstantial, and it is itself in constant change. Change in the case of the soul should 
not be excluded, since acquisition of knowledge is a form of change. What Socrates 
seems to want to emphasize is that unlike the body, the soul is a stable (or fairly 
stable) container and thus it can find lasting satisfaction since it can retain what it 
acquires (which is itself true real and stable, and thus can be kept). 
What Socrates I think wants to undermine is not only bodily sensations as 
such, or more generally the value of satisfying bodily needs, but also bodily 
processes, or sensations as proper objects of the soul's attention and enjoyment. It is 
not only that the body cannot find lasting satisfaction rather one cannot find lasting 
satisfaction in satisfying the body, since one is primarily a soul. Bodily 
replenishments in other words are not real because they are not really replenishments 
of the soul. In satisfying the body one mistakenly thinks that one satisfies oneself, and 
that is to a great extent why one enjoys these processes. Socrates wants to show that 
what is happening in the body does not particularly deserve enjoyment, and does not 
fully comply with what is needed to give rise to proper enjoyment, such as stability, 
reality, and truth. 
In the course of this passage it emerges that ultimately the criterion or ground 
of pleasure is not so much its 'purity', but rather human nature and its needs. 
Ultimately the criterion or basis of pleasure, and of what is truly or really pleasant is 
the good. 85 Reason should discover human needs, and what satisfies them, relying on 
its own understanding of human nature and the good, and what satisfies them; this is 
how it discovers what is truly or genuinely pleasant, both in the case of the soul but 
also, and in so far as it is possible, in the case of the body. 86 As experience of 
pleasure may confirm, reason discovers that what one primarily needs is reason itself, 
and more generally virtue, true belief and knowledge, which are desirable m 
themselves and also can help us determine and satisfy other needs we have. 
85 Cf. Gorgias 499c-500a. 
86 Reason has to rely on the senses to some extent to determine bodily needs. 
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On the grounds that Socrates has argued that the majority of bodily pleasures 
are in reality releases from pain, one may argue that Socrates believes that there is no 
truth, objectivity or reality in bodily pleasure whatsoever. Thus it could be argued that 
people's beliefs concerning bodily pleasure are necessarily mistaken and can never be 
true. However, in arguing that pleasure lies in replenishment Socrates indicates that 
there is an amount of truth and reality in the satisfaction of the body, and thus by 
extension in pleasure due to this satisfaction. Furthermore, it turns out that bodily 
pleasure is not something solely dependent on or relative to pain, rather it is 
something which depends on a certain bodily process (even certain so called 'mixed' 
pleasures, I believe). The first part of Socrates' argument is primarily destructive 
since he wants to undermine people's attachment to bodily pleasures. However, later 
he goes on to say that reason will provide the 'truest' pleasures to the appetitive part 
in so far as it is possible (586d7-e2). This suggests that bodily pleasures can 
participate in truth and reality, and also that our beliefs concerning bodily pleasure 
can be true to some extent, in particular when they do not rest solely on sensation. 
However, both bodily pleasures and beliefs concerning bodily pleasure can never be 
true if one does not possess understanding of the nature of pleasure, and also 
experience of genuine pleasure in virtue, and understanding of the value of virtue 
itself. Ultimately, I believe that bodily pleasures are not 'true' in themselves rather 
they can become true and also good, in so far as they part of a good life a life which is 
characterized by genuine psychic pleasure, knowledge and understanding. Thus their 
reality and truth depends on reason. 
Some general comments 
As I suggested earlier, people when they form beliefs aim at truth and reality. 
Socrates' argumentative strategy presupposes that people are taking something to be 
pleasant for a reason and they think that there is real basis in their assumption that 
they are pleased. In thinking that one is pleased, one thinks that one is really pleased 
and that there is a real or objective basis in one's beliefs concerning both the nature of 
pleasure in general and also particular pleasures. Plato is assuming that people are not 
indifferent to considerations of reality and objectivity, even in the case of pleasure. 
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However, it may be argued that the majority of people in taking something to be 
pleasant rely upon certain bodily sensations. More generally it seems that, according 
to Plato, the majority of people do not question the truth and reality of their feelings 
and it is also fairly difficult to prompt them to question them. Socrates tries to 
encourage his interlocutors to question their feelings by showing that one's 
assessment of pleasure can be affected by perspective. In prompting his interlocutors 
to question the 'reality' of bodily pleasure, Socrates is assuming that people's 
conception and beliefs concerning pleasure can be affected and modified by 
arguments, and that these arguments can also modify their more general attitude 
towards pleasure and their enjoyment ofit.87 
I wish suggest that what applies to people's beliefs concerning pleasure, can 
also apply to people's enjoyment of pleasure. As beliefs concerning pleasure and 
people's conception of pleasure are in general not indifferent to considerations of 
reality, in a similar manner pleasure as function of the soul, and as something distinct 
from pleasure as a sensation, can be affected by considerations of reality and 
objectivity. Arguing that certain bodily pleasures are not, or may not, be true or real 
can be said ultimately to mean that these pleasures do not constitute proper or 
adequate objects of enjoyment, and they do not quite deserve the soul's attention and 
desire. Such attention and enjoyment Socrates associates with cognitive error. 
I am in agreement with Russ~ll (2005) who argues that Plato's mention of 
pleasures of anticipation (584c7-9) indicates that Plato in the Republic is interested in 
pleasure as an intentional state and not merely as a purely qualitative state (p. 129).88 
87 Furthermore, Plato' argumentative strategy indicates that it is not sufficient to encourage people to 
doubt the reality of their sensations or feelings. A merely destructive argument would encourage one to 
adopt a relativist position concerning pleasure and such relativist position would not particularly help 
to diminish people's attachment to certain pleasures. Relativism is taken to be as unwelcome as 
people's uncritical trust in the reality of sensations. One has to be provided with certain standards or 
'measures' of pleasure, that one can lay one's trust upon. 
88 However, it should be noted that Plato does not make the distinction explicit. Psychic pleasure and 
satisfaction is solely associated with true belief, knowledge, and virtue (585cl-2). However, true belief 
(as well as false belief) can be about the body and its sensations, and thus pleasure from true belief can 
be associated with bodily sensations. 
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According to Russell, pleasure as an intentional state is 'to enjoy something under a 
description'. Russell argues that 'Plato's view is that the pleased agent construes the 
object of her pleasure in terms of a need or lack that she takes the object to satisfy' (p. 
130). Thus, as I understand Russell's account, enjoyment as an intentional state 
involves the exercise of reason, minimally in the form of a belief that what one 
experiences is (really) pleasant and the object of such experience is pleasant, and can 
be said to rest upon this belief. Ultimately in being pleased, and in taking oneself to be 
pleased, one forms evaluative judgements concerning what are one's needs and what 
is good for one. One's pleasure about something can be said to be derived from a 
belief that one is in a good condition, but the pleasant feeling itself can be said to 
encourage such a belief. 
I think that this description of pleasure is applicable to bodily pleasure as well. 
One's response and attitude to these pleasures can be distinguished from the pleasures 
themselves in their 'objective' dimension as sensations, and such response can be 
always said to be mediated by a belief which involves an 'interpretation' of one's 
sensation. It may be said that the sensation of 'pleasure' is always accompanied with 
such a response and cannot be easily distinguished from it. However, arguing that 
reason and belief is involved in pleasure is saying that to a great extent one's attitude 
towards bodily pleasure can be in principle affected by rational considerations. The 
sensation itself cannot change in so far as it originates in the body. What can change 
is one's interpretation of the sensation and one's attitude in relation to this sensation. 
It can be argued that as believing aims at truth and reality, similarly pleasure, 
as an intentional state and desire for pleasure, aims at truth and reality, and more 
precisely at real or true pleasure. People's enjoyment and passionate desire of certain 
pleasures can be said to be ultimately due to deception and ignorance, as Socrates 
suggests at 586b7-c5. In other words, one confuses bodily pleasure with genuine 
psychic pleasure and satisfaction, but also one desires them because of this confusion. 
One is attached to and desires bodily pleasure to a great extent because one takes it for 
something that it is not. Ultimately the proper object of desire is psychic pleasure. 
I wish to note that there are two aspects or two factors that play a role in the 
error. Socrates argues that people are attracted by Helen's phantom because of their 
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ignorance of the real Helen (586c4-5). To a great extent the confusion between true 
pleasures, and non-true pleasures, is due to the fact that one has not knowledge and 
experience of true pleasure. However, the mistake is due to a great extent to certain 
mixed pleasures themselves, which are taken to be particularly deceptive. Due to their 
deceptive nature these pleasures encourage people to confuse them with true or real 
pleasure. Somehow these pleasures look like genuine pleasure. As I suggested earlier, 
this is due to the appearance or illusion of extremity or intensity they produce (586cl-
2). Such illusion can be ultimately due to the fact that they are 'mixed' or juxtaposed 
with pain and perhaps other pleasures. They appear to be opposed to pain while they 
are not. Eventually it may be said that people's ignorance and inexperience of genuine 
pleasure encourages them to attach to these deceptive pleasures, and try to reproduce 
them, while these pleasures themselves direct the soul away from knowledge, reality 
and the good and thus encourage ignorance of genuine pleasure and the good. 89 90 
89 The confusion is attributed not solely to ignorance of the nature of pleasure but also to inexperience 
of genuine pleasure (584e2, 586al). It looks as though Socrates is implying that the taste of genuine 
pleasure would make one realize that it is genuine pleasure and see its difference from other pleasures. 
The more one tastes such pleasure the more one will be able to realize that it is superior from other 
pleasures and one will desire other pleasures less. 
9° Cf. the Lysis where Socrates rejects the claim that the good is the absence of the bad and also what 
removes the bad. Cf. Shorey (1980), p. 206. In the Lysis Socrates' initial suggestion is that what is 
(essentially) neither good nor bad desires the good because of the presence of the bad (217b-218c) as 
would happen if the good were taken to be what removes the bad having merely remedial value and 
also as if badness would be what made us desire the good. Socrates eventually rejects this suggestion 
(220b-22lc). Even ifbadness were not involved in human life, we would still need and desire the good. 
Rather, it may be said that we desire to remove the bad and what removes the bad exactly because we 
desire the good in the ftrst place (219a-220b). However, the presence of 'badness' makes us focus on 
what removes the bad and confuse it with the good (see Lysis 219d). By taking it for the 'good' we 
miss the 'real' good. Thus the mistake one commits lies roughly speaking in attributing intrinsic value 
to something that has merely relative value and seeking it in this way. (Nevertheless, Socrates in the 
Lysis does not seem to assume that all the things that are not good as such are needed solely because of 
badness. For example at 220e-22lb he argues that we would desire food and drink even if badness did 
not exist, and these things are not good in themselves.) To desire what merely removes the bad, as the 
good, involves also, in some sense, trying to reproduce the bad, because what is at least merely 
necessary (necessary in order to remove the bad) is needed only in so far as badness exists, and its 
appeal depend on badness. Thus people enter a vicious circle, without making any progress towards the 
real good. They end up moving from the 'down' to the 'middle' and downwards again, since they have 
not really experienced the genuine up (Republic 586al-b70). Pain and 'badness' more generally cannot 
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Now it is perhaps impossible in human nature not to desire and enjoy bodily 
pleasure at all. Socrates' claim here is not that it should not be desired or should not 
be desired at all, as he is not really suggesting that these pleasures cannot be pleasant 
at all. They are not intrinsically pleasant, and their pleasantness ultimately depends on 
reason. Their desiring should be conditioned and qualified by reason and be in 
accordance with reason's standards or measures (586d3-587a2). In some sense bodily 
pleasure can become both desirable and also pleasant when its enjoyment is informed 
by reason, true belief and knowledge. In this way it can also be said that it becomes 
impregnated with, and thus it comes to 'participate' in, 'genuine' psychic pleasure. 91 
I wish also to suggest that desire in its subjective dimension as epithumia can 
be defined as being for pleasure, which should be distinguished from the desire for the 
good since the good and pleasure are not the same thing. I think that as particular 
desires can be defined as being for particular objects and not for the good as such, 
epithumia in its generic character can be defined as being for pleasure, since particular 
things are primarily desired as pleasant.92 Desire in this sense is associated with all the 
parts of the soul in Book 9 since all the parts of the soul are attributed epithumiai and 
pleasure ( 580d6-7) and thus its source cannot be seen as being the body. 93 Saying that 
desire is for psychic pleasure, as Socrates I think indicates in the argument on 
function as an adequate criterion or basis of what we really need, what is pleasant or what is good. 
Thus in the Republic at 586bl we can also find an explanation of pleonexia. Its origin is not so much in 
the body rather in the soul, (and in the very desire for good and genuine, pleasure) which desires 
'more' and 'more' of certain things because these things cannot really 'fill' it and it does not know 
where it can fmd true satisfaction. In reality bodily needs and desires are limited and can be satisfied. 
What cannot be satisfied (by certain objects) is the soul and its desire for the good. 
91 Thus absolute priority more generally is to be given to psychic pleasure. Bodily pleasure and psychic 
pleasure are not comparable or commensurable, in the sense that the latter constitutes the standard or 
measure for the former. Equally I think is not intelligible to say that one can choose or prefer bodily 
pleasure to genuine psychic pleasure. (If one experiences psychic pleasure one will always prefer it.) 
Rather bodily pleasures are chosen in so far as they are in accordance with psychic pleasure. 
92 Cf. Charmides 167el-8, where epithumia is defmed as being for pleasure and is distinguished from 
boulesis which is for the good and from eros which is for beauty. It seems to me that if epithumiai can 
be said to be for pleasure and the desire for the good is for the good, eros as being for beauty covers 
both the subjective and the objective dimension of desire, and represents their unison. 
93 The same notion of desire as being for pleasure is employed at 485d6-el and again it is not 
associated with any part of the soul in particular. 
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pleasure, is showing that more generally desire in its subjective dimension, as a 
feeling or inclination, can be aligned with the desire for the good, one's objective 
wish, and reason, and when and if it finds its proper object it will be so aligned. 
Furthermore, I believe that saying that desire is for true pleasure, as Socrates seems to 
suggest in relation to the appetitive part, is to suggest that desire in its subjective 
dimension is commingled with and inseparable from reason and the desire for the 
good is dependent on reason, as also (true or real) pleasure is dependent on the good. 
To desire true or real pleasure is to desire good pleasure, in other words pleasure 
together with the good, and pleasure together with understanding. True or real 
pleasure can be said to be pleasure which is both in conformity with and accompanied 
by true belief and knowledge, whether the body is involved or not. If desire in the 
form of epithumia, as I previously defined it, has a notion of truth and reality, this is 
due to reason's involvement in it. Reason's involvement is perhaps greater in the case 
of the desires which are associated with the rational part, and lesser in the case of the 
desires which are associated with other parts, which can also come to be in 
conformity with (objective) reason with a greater difficulty, but reason, in the form at 
least of false belief or appearance is always involved. 
One reason why one cannot be said to merely desire pleasure, rather one 
desires true or real pleasure, is that more generally one does not simply desire a given 
object or a pleasant sensation in relation to a given object. Rather one desires to 
understand that there is a real basis in one's enjoyment, and more generally to 
understand that a particular thing or action or sensation one enjoys is in conformity 
with, and can be incorporated into, a life that constitutes a well ordered whole. Such a 
conception of oneself as being ordered and being part of order is itself inherently 
pleasant. In so far as one's action or the particular object of one's desire is not in 
conformity with such a conception, and more generally in so far as one is incapable of 
such a conception, one cannot find stable satisfaction and pleasure in what one is 
doing. 
I also wish to suggest that Plato would counter a hedonistic argument, 
according to which knowledge of reality is irrelevant to pleasure, by maintaining that 
since rationality is an essential part and need of human nature, the exercise of reason 
(as obtaining or possessing true belief and knowledge) is by itself a source of 
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pleasure. The 'better or greater' the exercise of reason the pleasanter one's life is. 
Here it may look as if Plato would advocate reason for the sake of the pleasure that 
one derives as a matter of fact from reason reasoning and learning. The pleasure 
derived from reasoning and understanding in reality, and more generally in one's 
conception of oneself as being in touch with reality, can function as an indication that 
reason is an essential human need. However, this is not exactly a hedonistic 
argument, in the sense that reason and its exercise is pleasant because we really need 
it and we do not primarily need it because it is pleasant, even though it may be argued 
that pleasure may encourage our attachment to it. One is not attributing to rationality 
in the form of either true belief or knowledge any instrumental value in maintaining 
that they contribute to pleasure. And it could also be said that even practical use of 
reason, where for instance one forms correct beliefs concerning the body, its needs 
and 'pleasures', is a form of 'learning' and it is as such a source or cause of pleasure. 
More generally, the more or better one exercises one's reason, the more pleased one 
is, as one understands oneself as connected with truth and reality. This is another way 
of saying that people essentially aim at, or have, an inherent desire for truth and 
reality itself which is manifested in every sphere of human existence. This tendency 
or desire (which is involved to a greater or lesser extent in everything we do or enjoy) 
perhaps cannot be fully or directly proved by reference to any experience (even 
though the pleasure one derives from learning can work as an indication) but I think it 
is to this tendency or desire that Plato primarily appeals when he attempts to 
undermine people's grounds for pleasure. 
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